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 1 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
I.1 Setting: Indonesia before the Crisis 
The rapid transition of the Indonesian economy and its implications 
for the employment structure provide an interesting case for studying the 
difficult prospects for an (un) balanced development pathway in a society 
under growth stress. The limited sectoral and sub-regional absorption 
capacities of surplus labour tend to illustrate the limitations of an 
exclusively growth-based development strategy and could inform us 
about the adverse distributional implications. 
There are usually three periods distinguished in Indonesian political 
history after the independence: (a) Orde Lama (Old Order: 1945-1965) 
(b) Orde Baru (New Order: 1965-1998) and (c) Orde Reformasi (Reform 
Order: 1998-now). Indonesia under the New Order administration was 
able to cope with economic and political problems faced by the Old 
Order. In this period, national economic performance was highly 
significant and the country surprisingly recovered very fast from a 
deteriorating phase in 1945-1965. We can refer to Hill‘s (1999b: 5) 
observation that ―economic growth was strong and all available evidence 
suggested that the benefits continued to be broad-based‖. However, the 
situation changed dramatically at the end of the New Order period when 
the country‘s economy plunged into turbulence and uncertainty, starting 
in the middle of 1998. 
In the New Order, Indonesia achieved remarkable success in 
economic development as shown by several indicators (Dick, 2000). The 
annual economic growth rate was 6.1 percent in 1980-1990 and went up 
to 7.6 percent annually in the period of 1990-1995. In 1996, the growth 
was even higher at 7.8 percent. The economy had also transformed from 
a predominantly agricultural society into one in which the non-
agricultural sector played a more important driving role in the national 
economy. The share of agriculture in GDP in the mid-1960s was about 
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50 percent and decreased to 20 percent in the 1990s. At the same time, 
the share of the manufacturing sector more than doubled from less than 
10 percent to about 20 percent and was expected to pass the share of the 
agricultural sector (Dick, 2000). Analysis by Basri (2003) reveals that the 
performance of manufacturing sector was outstanding after 1983. As 
explain by Hill (Basri, 2003: 58) several factors can be attributed to the 
performance, such as devaluation of rupiah in 1983 and 1986, high 
savings, high investment rates, and economic liberalization since 1984. 
Along with the decrease of its share in GDP, the capacity of the 
agricultural sector to absorb labour had also decreased. However, we 
must bear in mind that the percentage of those working in this sector was 
still very high. In 1980, for instance, the agricultural sector absorbed 56 
percent of the labour force and it decreased to 50 percent ten years later. 
In 1995, the absorption experienced a fall of about 6 percent compared to 
that in 1990, becoming 44 percent (Sukamdi, 1996). When the crisis 
started to hit the country in 1998, this sector was still able to absorb 
almost 37 percent of the labour force (Biro Pusat Statistik, 1999). In 
addition, it must be noted that the absolute number of people working in 
the agricultural sector was still increasing. In the period of 1980-1990 the 
growth was 2.2 percent annually. This is clear evidence of the enduring 
importance of agriculture in the Indonesian economy, especially in 
absorbing labour. 
An interesting phenomenon of the Indonesian economy is a tendency 
of employment shift from agriculture to services, not to manufacturing. 
For example, employment in services increased sharply from 22.8 
percent in 1971 (Biro Pusat Statistik, 1974) to 37.6 percent in 1998 (Biro 
Pusat Statistik, 1999). Meanwhile, the increase in the manufacturing 
sector in the same period was slower: 8.4 percent in 1971 and 18.4 
percent in 1998. Basri‘s study (2003) concluded that the lower absorption 
of labour in the agriculture sector was not compensated by manufacturing 
but by the service sector. Ananta and Fontana (1995) argue that this is a 
typical pattern of the transformation process in developing countries. 
These figures provide a clear picture of the imbalance between the 
sectoral labour absorption and the sectoral share of GDP. The share of 
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the agricultural sector in production decreased much more than in its 
employment absorption. In contrast, the share of the manufacturing 
sector increased much more in output than in employment. With regard 
to the fact that the incidence of unemployment and under-employment 
has remained relatively high, the Indonesian economy failed to transfer 
from a labour surplus to a condition of full employment. 
Indonesia under the New Order was considered as one of the nations 
that had successfully reduced poverty incidence. In this period, the level 
of poverty decreased from 60 percent in 1970 (World Bank, 1990) to 
13.7 percent in 1993 and further decreased to 11.3 percent in 1996 
(Booth, 1999). In addition to this, the level of education was increasing 
and as a result of a successful family planning program population 
growth started to decline (Cameron, 2000).1 From a demographic point of 
view, there had been a tremendous decrease in the total fertility rate 
(average number of children per woman over lifetime) from 5.6 in 1967-
1970 to 2.8 in 1991-1994. Infant mortality also decreased from 145 per 
1000 live births in 1967 to 47 per 1000 live births in 1996. Population 
growth decreased from 3.3 percent annually in the early 70s to less than 2 
percent in the 90s (see: BPS, 2001). 
Other indicators of national economic performance are equally 
relevant: annual economic growth rate consistently achieved high levels 
(Kompas, 1995); per capita income in 1995 surpassed for the first time 
US$ 1,000 (Jawa Pos, 1996); and real wages were growing in every 
sector (Manning, in Hill, 1999b). Hill (1999b) also argued that several 
indicators, such as educational enrolment, nutritional intake and health 
status were improving. All these indicators made policy makers very 
optimistic about the future of the Indonesian economy.2Indonesia was 
even included in the list of the newly industrialising countries together 
with Malaysia and Thailand (see Page, 1996: 205). 
However, along with the very positive signs of economic 
development, several problems remained in existence. First, labour 
                                                 
1
 See also Said and Widyanti (2001); Hal Hill (1999a) 
2
 The optimistic view can be found in Hill (1996) even though later he tried to revise his 
analysis.  
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productivity in the agricultural sector remained inferior compared to that 
in the manufacturing sector. The tendency of a widening gap between the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors as an impact of urban bias policies 
had led to rural-urban migration flows and in turn could create problems 
in modern urban sector development (see Sukamdi, 1990). Secondly, it 
seemed that the growth of income per capita did not lead to reduced 
income inequality, not only among sectors, but also in terms of rural-
urban and individual income inequality. Third, as mentioned previously, 
the capacity of the manufacturing sector to absorb the labour surplus 
from the agricultural sector was severely limited. Even though there was 
evidence of an increase of the employment share in the manufacturing 
sector, still, a huge number of the labour force had been absorbed in the 
agricultural sector. In addition, a large number of people who were 
relatively better off, decided to wait until better jobs were available. 
The failure of the economy to provide sufficient employment also 
pushed a very high percentage of people into the informal sector. The 
role of the informal sector in the Indonesian economy is very significant, 
because this sector plays a very important function particularly in 
absorbing the labour force. For example, during the period of 1980-1995, 
although there was a decline in the absorption of labour in the informal 
sector in urban areas from 42.7 percent to 40.4 percent, the number of 
workers in the informal sector experienced an annual increase of 6.4 
percent (Sukamdi, 1996). The high level of absorption in the informal 
sector is again a sign of the failure of the urban (modern) economy to 
absorb the labour surplus in the rural (traditional) sector. Fourth, official 
figures show that the unemployment rate tended to increase every year. 
There was also evidence that the higher the education level, the higher 
risk to be unemployed (Sukamdi, 1996). 
On the other hand, from a political economy point of view, a 
pessimistic belief regarding the future of the Indonesian economic 
condition was expressed by Hamilton (1996: 377) arguing that - 
compared to the Philippines - Indonesia has ―poor overall growth 
prospects, principally because of the economic and political dominance 
of classes which derive wealth from unproductive activities and the 
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structural unwillingness of the government to attack these classes‖. In 
addition, a number of underlying weaknesses made the country 
vulnerable to adverse external shocks. Starting in the mid 1997s, when 
the wind of the monetary crisis began to blow over the Asian economies, 
Indonesia fell dramatically into a deep economic hole. In this sense, the 
economic crisis in mid-1998 was not a surprise. When the economic 
crisis was followed by a political and social crisis, the situation became 
worse. The success story of Indonesian development had become history. 
I.2 The Late 1990s Crisis: the Turning Point of Indonesian 
History 
Compared to other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia was worst hit 
by the crisis. In 1998, the country‘s economy contracted by 13.6 percent, 
which was double that of Malaysia and Thailand. Indonesia also 
experienced serious inflation (Hill, 1999b). Estimations have been made 
to calculate how serious the impact of the economic crisis was on 
development performance in Indonesia. As the manufacturing sector 
began to collapse, many workers lost their jobs. In 1998, for instance, 
open unemployment was as high as 13.7 million people. That was an 
increase from 5.8 million unemployed people in the previous year, 2.7 
million additional new labour force and 5.2 million of those who lost 
their job because of the crisis (ILO, 1998: 26). The labour force in 1998 
was estimated at 92.6 million people, thus the unemployment rate was 
14.8 percent, or three times compared to the 4.7 percent rate in 1997 (See 
also Sussangkarn, et.al. 1999). 
Several poverty estimates have been developed that are generally 
expenditure-based. Poor people are those living under the poverty line as 
based on comparable real expenditures. In any given time, the poverty 
line can be adjusted using the price deflator.  ILO (1998) reported that 
the number of poor has increased substantially. In 1998, the number of 
the poor was 98.8 million people, almost half of the Indonesian 
population. The figure for 1999 was even worse with about 137.8 million 
people, or 66.3 percent Indonesian population being poor.3 The 
                                                 
3
 A more detailed description on the impact of the economic crisis can be found in Hill (1999b), 
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assumption is that the average wage rate and household incomes would 
not change in nominal terms in this period. In addition, according to the 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) estimates for 1999, the distribution of 
expenditures was not to change compared with those in 1996, cumulative 
inflation would achieve 80 percent increase and the prices of basic need 
was estimated to increase by 25 %. 
Estimates made by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) show that 
the number of poor was less than that of the ILO estimate, but it 
constituted a very drastic increase compared to the figures before the 
crisis (see Table 1.1). It is interesting that estimates made by Poppele, 
et.al (1999), were very much lower than those made by both the ILO and 
the CBS. Hill (1999b) argues that the ILO and the CBS estimates 
overstated the incidence of poverty. 
Other estimations of the poverty trends during the crisis show that the 
situation was not as bad as the ILO estimated (see Said and Widyanti, 
2001, Frankenberg, et. al., 1999). Said and Widyanti (2001: 12), for 
instance, found that the poverty rate in December 1998 was 26.4 percent 
and decreased to 18.8 percent in December 1999. The World Bank 
suggested that the poverty incidence was about 25 percent in 1998, which 
might have decreased to only 14 percent the following year 
(Sussangkarn, et.al., 1999). Even though these figures are lower than 
ILO‘s estimates, it is clear that in a macro perspective the economic crisis 
caused a tremendous increase of poverty incidence. 
Table 1.1 shows interesting estimates made by Strauss et.al. (2002) 
based on the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). This survey 
concluded that in the period of 1997-2000, the incidence of poverty 
decreased both in rural and urban areas. In fact, in the period of 1997-
1999, poverty incidence increased substantially, however, we can 
conclude that since then there has been a marked recovery from poverty. 
The comparison of rural and urban poverty through time is, however, 
difficult because the data of different periods appear to be inconsistent. In 
the 1970s, for instance, the poverty incidence was higher in rural areas 
                                                                                                                       
Booth (1999) and Manning (2000). 
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than in urban areas. In the 1980s and early 1990s, when the economy of 
the country started to improve, poverty was more an urban, rather than a 
rural, phenomenon. In contrast, in the late 1990s, when the economy 
deteriorated, poverty incidence in rural areas was more pronounced than 
that in urban areas. It might be true to say that better economic 
performance produces more benefits for urban areas rather than for rural 
areas. 
 
Table 1.1 Headcount Measure of Poverty According to the CBS Poverty Line, 
1976-1996 and Estimates for 1998, 1999, and 2000 (% of Population) 
Source 
Time 
reference 
Urban Rural Total 
CBS 1976 38.8 40.4 40.1 
 1978 30.8 33.4 33.3 
 1980 29.0 28.4 28.6 
 1981 28.1 26.5 26.9 
 1984 23.1 21.2 21.6 
 1987 20.1 16.1 17.4 
 1990 16.8 14.3 15.1 
 1993 13.4 13.8 13.7 
 1996 9.7 12.3 11.3 
 1998 (June) 28.8 45.6 39.1 
ILO 1998 (Dec) 39.1 53.2 48.2 
 1999 (Dec) 56.6 71.7 66.3 
Poppele, et.al 1998 (A) 12.0 15.2 13.8 
 1998 (B) 15.8 23.0 19.9 
SMERU (Pradhan, et.al) 1996 (Feb) 20.54 7.22 15.74 
 1999 (Feb) 16.34 34.10 27.13 
IFLS (Strauss, et.al) Late 1997 13.3 20.1 17.4 
 Late 2000 11.6 18.7 15.5 
Source: Hill, 1999b, pp. 41; Pradhan, et.al. 2000. Booth, 1999, pp. 130, Table 1; 
Poppele, et.el. 1999; Strauss, et.al. 2002. 
 
Introduction 
8 
A further impact of the crisis can be registered by decreasing 
purchasing power. Along with skyrocketing prices of basic needs, per 
capita income dropped from US$ 1,100 in 1996 to US$ 400 in 1999. This 
means that the country moved from a middle-income country to low-
income country. This indicator has been commonly used to justify what 
many scholars called the ―doomsday‖ scenario of the crisis (see: 
Mubyarto, 2001). In fact, the impact of the crisis did not have a single 
direction, but varied across regions and is sometimes surprising and 
contradictory (see for example: Abdullah, 1999, Dwiyanto, 1999; 
Boomgaard, 1999; Breman, 1999; Hüsken, 1999; de Jonge, 1999; 
Wolters, 1999; Frankenberg, et.al., 1999). 
One other important impact to note is that the role of the agricultural 
sector in labour absorption increased even during the crisis period. In 
1995-1998, the contribution of the agricultural sector increased from 16.1 
percent  to 17.2 percent. The increase was notable at the end of the period 
of 1997-1998, because in the beginning period of 1995-1997, the 
contribution of the agricultural sector had decreased from 16.1 percent to 
14.8 percent (BPS, 1999: 98). The growth of the agricultural sector was 
0.22 percent in the same period. Meanwhile, the growth of the mining 
sector was minus 14.6 percent and the manufacturing sector was minus 
12.9 percent. One of the reasons for this decrease is that many workers 
who were displaced from their jobs in these sectors entered the 
agricultural sector (Manning, 2000). The important role of the 
agricultural sector in the Indonesian economy has its own history (see: 
Lindblad, 2000; Hűsken, 1998; Boomgaard, 1991). However, research 
has shown that this sector has been marginalised in the process of 
development (see: Cypher and Dietz, 1998: 331). 
There are several questions that can be raised regarding these 
developments. First, in the beginning, the Indonesian economic 
transformation was very dynamic and in the macro context it seemed to 
follow the process that was taking place in other countries. In this regard, 
there was the optimistic view that the Indonesian economy would be 
included in the group of newly industrialised countries (Jameson and 
Wilber, 1996: 22). However, no one can argue that the benefits of the 
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transformation process belonged to the manufacturing sector, or the 
urban area, or ‗elite‘ at the most. Second, the multidimensional crisis 
changed all macro and micro performances of economic development in 
Indonesia. The transformation process was unfinished, unbalanced and 
delayed. Many questions were left unanswered concerning how the 
process occurred both from the macro and from the micro perspective. 
In subsequent phases of Indonesian social and economic 
development, the island of Java has always been considered as the core 
area and the outer islands as periphery. The linkage between the two 
regions operated as in dependency analysis, which stresses the core as 
cause and periphery as effect (Cypher and Dietz, 1998: 189). Several 
reasons have been forwarded to justify this interpretation. First, Java is 
inhabited by about 65 percent of the Indonesian population and functions 
as the centre of social, political, and economic activities. Second, the 
dynamics of social and economic activities in Java, directly or indirectly, 
influence national economic conditions. However, the economic crisis 
and the changing political situation may have changed the role of Java in 
the national economy as a decentralisation policy was launched in 1999. 
Therefore, it is very important to focus the study on Java. In addition, 
socio-economic conditions vary among districts in Java and therefore 
their responses to the crisis tend to be different from one district to 
another in regard to the economic transformation process. 
I.3 Research Questions 
There is very little research focusing at the district and household 
level in examining the impact of macro-economic transformation 
processes. In addition, it is also interesting to examine the socio-
economic implications not only in macro terms, but also in micro 
(household) terms and how these processes are linked to each other. It is 
considered a useful contribution to research to address these linkages. 
Structural transformations are likely to have an impact on household 
welfare; thus, it is worthwhile to investigate what this impact is and how 
it can be compared with regional stratification at ―the core‖ and ―the 
peripheries‖. There is anecdotal evidence that the economic crisis, which 
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represents the collapse of macroeconomic performance, affected the daily 
lives of the Indonesian people. However, the question remains: Are 
people able to cope with the crisis? Actually, considerable research has 
paid attention to this issue, however this has, for the most part, been 
carried out in specific areas or as case studies. 
We may expect that macroeconomic performance at a national level 
and at the level of people‘s daily lives have been influenced by the crisis. 
However, there is limited research examining in detail the effects of the 
crisis at the provincial and district levels, as well as establishing the links 
between macro and micro effects. The central question to be addressed is 
therefore defined as: To what extent did the economic crisis in 1997-1998 
affect national, provincial, district, and individual household socio-
economic performance in Indonesia? 
Based on this general question, the following specific sub-questions 
will be addressed: 
1. Were there any different causes and consequences of the 1930s, 
1960s and 1990s crises in Indonesia? 
2. Was there any different economic performance at provincial and 
district levels before and during the 1990s economic crisis? 
3. To what extent do economic performance at provincial and district 
levels explain the changing household economic performance 
around 1990? 
4. Are there any changes in economic performance of the districts 
during the recovery period and how might decentralisation explains 
the performance? 
The objectives of this study are fourfold. The first objective is to 
examine the historical perspective of economic crisis in Indonesia. The 
second objective is to examine the economic performance of the 
provinces and districts in Java before and during the crisis. The third 
objective is to elaborate upon the influence of the changing economic 
performance at the district level on household economic performance. 
The fourth objective is to explain the changing economic performance 
during the recovery period and its association with decentralisation, 
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which was started in the year of 2000. These four objectives together 
provide a thorough insight in the structure and dynamics of the 
Indonesian transition process and the implications thereof at different 
levels of scale. 
I.5 Research Methods 
The main approach followed in this thesis is based on the analysis of 
micro-meso-macro interactions during the process of economic 
development in Indonesia. This approach permits us to generate insights 
into the dynamic interlinkages between regions, sectors and households 
and to explain possible patterns of unbalanced growth that are related to 
structural differences and behavioural patterns that inhibit simple ―trickle 
down‖. 
This study employs a quantitative approach using mainly secondary 
data sources. The main quantitative data sources used in this study are 
panel data of the 1997 and 2000 Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS). 
Using this panel data makes it possible to trace the changing conditions 
of individuals and households over time. The survey is a large-scale 
integrated socio-economic and health survey covering a wide range of 
information on households, their  families and the communities in which 
they live. The sample is representative of about 83% of the Indonesian 
Population and contains over 30,000 individuals living in 13 of the 27 
provinces in the country (Frankenberg, et.al., 1999). It includes 7,637 
households in 1997 and 10,441 households in 2000. Within panel 
households, interviews were done with all members and within split 
households. In addition, interviews were conducted for the previous IFLS 
respondents and his/her spouse and children in residence. The survey has 
also provided a full set of data on communities and facilities. The sample 
facilities include health and educational facilities. For the purpose of this 
study, only household data will be used. 
Data on employment structure on the district and provincial level will 
be drawn from the National Social and Economic Survey (SUSENAS). 
SUSENAS has been done every year covering a larger area and more 
samples compared to IFLS. Information on important aspects such as 
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expenditures, education and health has also been collected in this survey. 
By using IFLS and SUSENAS at the same time, it is expected that the 
result will be comprehensive enough to figure out the impact of the crisis. 
In addition to this, some other data sources will be also employed, 
especially to develop macro indicators at the district and province levels. 
This consists primarily of economic and employment data, such as the 
Gross Domestic Regional Product (GDRP), economic and employment 
structure. 
This study only uses data from the provinces on Java, excluding 
Jakarta, which is the capital of the nation and has economic conditions 
incomparable with other areas. Thus, the study will focus on 4 provinces 
on the island of Java, namely West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, and 
East Java, comprising 70 districts and 143 sub-districts. 
The statistical analysis will rely mainly on a multilevel (contextual) 
model to specify the effect of the social and economic context on 
individual and household level outcomes. According to Blallock (1984: 
354) contextual analysis is ―the essential feature of all contextual effects 
models is to allowance for macro processes that are presumed to have an 
impact on individual actor over and above the effects of any individual 
level variables that may be operating‖. The idea is that variation in a 
dependent variable is explained by processes that operate at several 
levels. In this case variations in income are said to be explained by both 
individual characteristics, like education, and contextual (higher level) 
characteristics, like the economic situation in the district where people 
live. 
Multilevel models explain micro level outcomes in two ways (DiPrete 
and Forristal, 1994: 33): (a) by showing parameters of models specified 
at the micro level, where the micro level covariates are used to explain 
micro level outcomes, and (b) by showing parameters specified at the 
macro-level, where contextual variables are used. 
There are two models of analysis that will be used. First, analysis will 
be simple and focused more on descriptive analysis in order to examine 
the economic performance at provincial and district levels in the periods 
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of 1993-1997 (pre crisis), 1997-1998 (crisis), 1998-2000 (recovery 
period)  and 2000-2007 (decentralisation). The analysis will be based on 
secondary data gathered from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
Two main variables will be employed about sectoral shares on both 
employment and economic structure over time. 
These two variables are: (a) percentage of people working in 
agriculture, manufacture and services, and (b) percentage of the share of 
agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors to gross regional 
domestic product (GRDP). The other variable is economic growth 
measured by the annual increase of Gross Regional Domestic Product 
(GRDP). The analysis will be done on an annual basis. Since the data is 
available, analysis will also be done for all districts in the Java provinces, 
excluding Jakarta. 
The second part is an analysis on (a) the dynamics and differentials, 
and (b) the determinants of household economic performance (Chapter 
VI). The performance will be measured using per capita expenditure 
(pce). In the first step, the dynamics of both household and individual 
welfare will be crossed with the pattern of the transformation process on 
the district level. It will be examined whether the pattern of the 
transformation process explains the dynamics of the welfare. 
The second step will be focused on examining the determinants of 
individual welfare (Chapter VI). First, the analysis will be applied on the 
same level. The assumption is that the household welfare is a function of 
household characteristics. In the second step, multi level analysis will be 
applied. The household welfare is assumed to be a function of not only 
household characteristics, but also as a function of both the household 
and area (district) economic performance. 
I.6 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is embedded in the discussion about the national condition 
of Indonesian development. We focus on the topic of economic crisis at 
the national level and its impact at the provincial, district, and 
households. 
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Chapter I: Introduction. 
This part explains the reason why it is important to analyse economic 
crisis in Indonesia especially in lower government level, provincial, 
district, and household levels in the context of Indonesian economic 
development in general. 
Chapter II: Theoretical Background 
This chapter discusses theoretical background of the research as basis for 
analysis. The discussion includes development theory, character of the 
industrialisation process, role of the informal sector, industrial agriculture 
and agrarian dualism, and vulnerability of the economy. 
Chapter III: Changing Indonesian Economic Performance in the 20
th
 
Century 
This section will discuss the economic crises that have occurred in 
Indonesia in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1990s. This discussion is important in 
order to understand the causes and consequences of each crisis. This 
study is needed before discussing the economic crisis in the 1990s in 
greater depth. 
Chapter IV: 1993-1997 - Limits of Economic Growth and Regional 
Disparities 
This section will explain the condition of the national economy in the 
period before the economic crisis, i.e. 1993-1997. Discussion was also 
made to understand the development that took place at provincial and 
district levels. The focus of analysis is an understanding of the structural 
transformation, consisting of transformation of economic and 
employment structure at the national, provincial, and district level. This 
discussion is important as a basis for analysis in the next chapter. 
Chapter V: The Crisis at the National and Provincial Level 
Analysis in this section will focus on the 1990s economic crisis at the 
national and provincial level. It is to examine the cause and effect of 
economic crisis at the national level and the impact of the crisis at the 
provincial level. It is based on the assumption that the economic crisis 
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will bring about different effects at the provincial level, which in turn 
will also cause some difference at the district level. 
Chapter VI: 1998-2000: Coping with the Crisis at the District and 
Household Level. 
The focus of analysis in this chapter is to understand the effect of 
economic performance at the district level on household economic 
performance. It will be divided into two parts. First is the analysis of 
economic performance at the district level to understand if there is any 
variation of the performance. Secondly, multi level analysis is applied to 
examine the influence of district economic performance on individual 
household economic performance. 
Chapter VII: 2000-2007: Recovery Continued 
The chapter discusses the economic performance during the recovery 
period. The discussion is to answer the question if there is any changing 
pattern of economic and employment structure after the crisis at the 
national, provincial, and district level. This is to clarify how the nation, 
provinces, and districts have coped with the difficult situation and what 
are the future prospects.  
Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
The chapter elaborates the main findings of the research and presents the 
most important policy implications. In addition, this part also explains 
theoretical contributions of the findings to provide a basis for further 
research on related issues. 
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Chapter II 
Theoretical Background 
II.1 Development Theory 
There are several major and often competing development theories 
that can be used to explain economic development. The first one is a 
linear stages growth model in which developing countries could learn 
from the historical growth experience of the now developed countries in 
order to transform their economies from poor agrarian societies to 
modern industrial giants. This consists of two schools of thought, 
Rostow‘s stage of growth and Harrod-Domar‘s growth model. 
According to Rostow (1960), the transition from underdevelopment 
to development will follow a series of steps or stages through which all 
countries must proceed. He proposed a hierarchy of developmental 
stages: (1) The traditional society, (2) Transitional stage: the pre-
conditions to take-off, (3) The take-off, (4) The drive to maturity, and (5) 
The age of high mass-consumption. Rostow argued that the advanced 
countries had all passed the stage of take-off into self-sustaining growth, 
and that the under-developed countries were still in either the traditional 
society or the pre-conditions stage. One of the principal strategies of 
development necessary for any take-off was the mobilisation of domestic 
and foreign saving in order to generate sufficient investment to accelerate 
economic growth. Rostow believes that countries want to modernise as 
he describes modernisation, and that the society will ascent to the 
materialistic norms of economic growth. Critics on this theory lay on the 
assumption that the growth is linear and the strong bias to western 
models of modernisation. 
The Harrod-Domar Model (Harrod, 1939 and Domar, 1946) describes 
the mechanism by which more investment leads to more growth. This 
model suggests that savings provide the funds that are then borrowed for 
investment purposes. Two important factors are becoming the engine of 
economic growth, namely level of saving and productivity of investment 
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or capital. It suggests there is no natural reason for an economy to have 
balanced growth. 
The main criticism against the model refers to the level of 
assumptions; one being that there is no reason for growth to be enough to 
maintain full employment. This is based on the belief that the relative 
price of labour and capital is fixed, and that they are used in equal 
proportions. The model explains economic booms and busts by the 
assumption that investors are only influenced by output (known as the 
accelerator principle). This is now widely believed to be false (Todaro 
and Smith, 2009). 
The second stream of development theories is that of structural 
change (Lewis‘s Two -Sector Model and Chenery‘s Pattern of 
Development). These models emphasize the transformation of domestic 
economic structures from traditional subsistence agriculture economies to 
more modern, urbanised and industrially diverse manufacturing and 
service economies 
Lewis (1954) argued that industrialisation is the means for less-
developed countries to escape from poverty and improve their economic 
and social conditions (Cypher and Dietz, 1998). This idea is further 
strengthened by Snow (1963) who clearly argued that, ―… 
industrialisation is the only hope for the poor‖ (cited in: Firebaugh and 
Beck, 1994: 631). Those who believe that industrialisation is of foremost 
importance assume that the development process is always associated 
with a structural transformation of economies.4 This transformation refers 
to the shift in output and employment composition from a condition in 
which the agricultural sector predominantly influences the economy to 
one in which the manufacturing sector plays a more important role than 
the agricultural sector.  Moreover, the transformation is expected to bring 
an increase in people‘s welfare. However, this is not always the case 
since the correlation between economic transformation and people‘s 
welfare is not a simple one. There is sound evidence, especially in 
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 Tomich, Kilby and Johnston (in Meier, 1995: 333) argued that ―structural transformation at the 
sectoral level results from movement toward specialization and market participation at the 
producer level‖.  
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developing countries, that structural transformation has lead to economic 
growth, however, there has yet to be made the case that economic growth 
affects the welfare of the population equally, even when welfare is 
exclusively defined in strictly economic terms. 
Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and other followers proposing the 
patterns of development analysis of structural change focuses on the 
sequential process through which the economic, industrial and 
institutional structure of an underdeveloped economy is transformed over 
time to permit new industries to replace traditional agriculture as the 
engine of economic growth. In addition to the accumulation of capital 
both physical and human, a set of interrelated changes in the economic 
structure of a country are required for the transition from a traditional 
economic system to a modern one. These structural changes involve 
virtually all economic functions, including the transformation of 
production and changes in the composition of consumer demand, 
international trade and resource use as well as changes in socio-economic 
factors such as urbanisation, and the growth and distribution of a 
country‘s population. 
Concerning the relationship between economic growth and inequality, 
Simon Kuznets  (1955) suggests that when economic growth occurs, per 
capita income and inequality will initially increase and then decrease 
only in the long run, resulting in an inverted U shape relationship 
between per capita income and income inequality. Based on this 
hypothesis, rising per capita income will lead to an increase in inequality 
of income distribution at the initial stage. The trend reverses when the 
level of aggregate income has reached a certain level. Thus, economic 
growth can never be equally distributed. 
A study by Wimberley and Bello concluded that economic growth 
provides little benefits for the masses in the Third World (Firebaugh and 
Beck, 1994). Based on data from 50 developing countries, Adam (2003) 
found out that on average, an increase of 10 percentage points in 
economic growth, which is measured by mean income, will produce a 
25.9 percent decrease in the proportion of people living in poverty ($1 
per capita per day). However, poverty is only one aspect of economic 
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life, and is always followed by a more important problem, that is, 
inequality. Adam (2003) concluded that economic growth has little 
impact on income inequality. There is growing evidence that in 
developing countries there is a positive correlation between economic 
growth and inequality. Similar results have been confirmed by Chan and 
Kulkarni‘s study (2006) in China during the period of1978-2005, 
showing more serious income inequality when economic growth 
occurred, thus following the first stage of Kuznets U-shaped hypothesis. 
Paul Krugman (1979), in his article in Journal of International 
Economics, pointed out that trade is not a result of differences in 
technology or factor endowments, but is a way of extending the market 
and allowing exploitation of scale economies. Trade is, then, similar to 
labour force growth and regional agglomeration. This idea becomes a 
backbone of what was the so called as New Trade Theory (NTT). Based 
on this idea, he moves forward to introduce a ―new economic 
geography‖. Krugman (1991) argues that economic regions with more 
production will be more profitable, therefore attracting even more 
production. Production will concentrate in a few regions, which will 
become densely populated but also have higher levels of income. These 
will lead to regional specialisation. 
Barro et.al. (1991)  propose two types of convergences. The first, 
what he calls as β convergence, relates to poor economies growing faster 
than rich ones, and the second is σ convergence, involving a decline over 
time in the cross sectional dispersion of per capita income. Barro and 
Sala–i-Martin (1995) then explain that the faster growth of poor 
economies is driven by the technology discovery in developed countries. 
The faster growth is because copying is cheaper than innovation. When 
the cost of imitation increases, the growth rate tends to decline. 
In the following, we will review the most important aspects of the 
transition literature, focusing on issues of (a) industrialisation, (b) 
urbanisation, (c) agrarian dualism and (d) economic vulnerability. These 
issues are considered of vital importance for the appreciation of the 
effects of macro-economic change at district and household level. 
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II.2 The Character of the Industrialisation Process 
The most general model of economic development divides economic 
activity and employment into two broad sectors: the modern sector and 
traditional sector, which can be translated into dichotomous non-
agricultural and agricultural sectors. The agricultural sector is considered 
to be a pre-capitalist, transitional form of production providing inputs to 
the modern sector (Cypher and Dietz, 1998), or Lewis‘s version of 
traditional, low-productivity sector (see Cypher and Dietz, 1998 and 
Hunt, 1989) where the villagers of a peasant society live literally in 
different worlds and have only a few interests in common (Hagen, 1957). 
On the other hand, the modern non-agricultural sector is a capitalist 
sector, where production is technology-driven, having higher 
productivity  (Lewis in Cypher and Dietz, 1998: 150) and a place for the 
elite  (Hagen, 1957). This dualism theory is also known as structuralism 
economic theory. Ruhs (1996) argues that dualism theory is able to 
capture the reality in the Third World more adequately. 
The structuralists discuss the mechanism by which "underdeveloped" 
economies transform their domestic economies from a traditional 
agricultural base into a modern economy. The object of development is 
the structural transformation of underdeveloped economies so as to 
permit a process of self-sustained economic growth. To do so, economic 
growth must be fuelled through an expansion of the internal industrial 
sector (Contreras, 2001). This approach assumes that the mechanism of 
growth and structural change together comprise the economic 
development concept.  Development theorists are of the opinion that this 
mechanism applies to Indonesia. 
The mechanism and structural change occurs within stages explaining 
a transition from an ―agrarian‖ to a ―dualistic society‖ and finally to 
―economic maturity‖ (Ruhs, 1996). The agrarian stage is an economy in 
which all productive units engage in the agricultural sector. A dualist 
economy is a condition in which agriculture dominates all productive 
activity along with a growing share in the industrial sector. Economic 
maturity refers to what is now well-known as modern or western 
economy in which the economy has been industrialised and taken off into 
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self-sustained growth. Economic development, then, is a process of 
change from an agrarian society to a dualistic society to maturity. In 
regards to this division, dualism is the best explanation of how the 
economic development process in developing countries been guided. 
Structural transformation under the dualism stage of the economy, as 
previously mentioned, consists of three stages. In the early stage, the 
labour surplus of the agricultural sector is absorbed into the 
manufacturing sector producing a decline in the share of agriculture and a 
rise in the share of manufacturing in output and employment. The second 
stage is a shift of labour from low-productivity to high-productivity 
occupations in the manufacturing sector. At the same time, the average-
productivity of labour in the agricultural sector increases and real wages 
rise in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In addition, the 
output and employment share of manufacturing increases, while the share 
of the agricultural sector decreases. In the third stage of structural 
transformation, the share of the manufacturing sector in both output and 
employment declines, while the share of the services sector rises. Many 
believe that developing countries should go through this path in order to 
develop their economy. 
Adelman and Morris (1997) provide examples on how different 
countries have gone through different patterns of development. The first 
pattern is made up of the countries that have successfully transformed 
from the autonomous export-led industrialisation path followed by the 
first arrivals of the Industrial Revolution. This includes Great Britain, 
Belgium, and France, in which industrialisation started from high-
productivity agricultural systems, highly developed market institutions, 
and political institutions that limited the power of agricultural elites. The 
second pattern is made up of the government-led, inward-oriented 
industrialisation path followed by the large latecomers to the Industrial 
Revolution. Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia are examples of the 
countries included in the second pattern. The third pattern is made up of 
the balanced-growth, open-economy, and limited-government-
intervention path pursued by a few small European countries, including 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden. In these countries, 
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agricultural productivity growth kept pace with industrialisation and 
there was rapid growth of skill-intensive, internationally competitive 
exports. The fourth pattern is made up of the agricultural, primary-export 
oriented, sharply dualistic path, pursued by both land-abundant 
(Australia, Argentina, Canada, and New Zealand) and densely populated 
(Burma, China, Egypt, and India) countries. Viewing industrialisation in 
China at present, it is difficult to include this country into this pattern 
group. China could be included in the fifth pattern characterised by a 
very extensive manufacturing export economy that retains the importance 
of the agricultural sector. Indonesia can be seen as following yet a 
different path. Industrialisation in this country is limited and combined 
with very extensive urban service sector development. 
Structural change in Indonesia, which can also be observed in some 
developing countries, is not following these stages, but seems to be an 
example of a country that failed in its industrialisation process. Indonesia 
shows a different pattern of socio-economic change, that is, urbanisation 
without industrialisation. Accordingly, the effect is a more complicated 
one, since wages and productivity differences exist not only between 
sectors, but also within sectors. In addition, the service sector has not 
developed as it has in industrialised countries, but rather represents the 
incapability of the manufacturing sector to absorb labour surplus from 
the agricultural sector. This is the reason that the service sector in the 
Indonesian economy is always characterised and dominated by the 
informal sector. Thus, the impact of the transformation process will not 
be the same as experienced in developed countries. 
Lewis argued that typically less-developed countries are dualistic 
with very limited interrelationship between the two sectors. Three 
dualistic models can be distinguished (see: Meier, 1995; Copestake, 
1999). The simplest one is the closed economy in which there is no trade 
between the sectors. The process is that the capitalist nucleus expands by 
attracting migrants from a traditional low-productivity hinterland. It is 
assumed that the supply of unskilled labour for the capitalist sector is 
unlimited, comprised of disguised unemployment in the agricultural 
sector, over-manned occupations, women entering into commercial 
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employment, and absorbing an additional labour force that is a result of 
population increase (Meier, 1995). Demand for labour in the capitalist 
sector will increase because of reinvestment of the profits. However, 
wages do not rise because the extra demand is met through immigration. 
Thus, profits remain high and can continue to be reinvested in new 
capital stock. Within this model, the hinterland acts only as a labour 
reserve. 
The second version is also a closed economy, but inter-sectoral terms 
of trade acquire particular significance. In some cases in which the trade 
is in favour of industry, profits and reinvestment in the industrial sector 
will rise, but rural demand for industrial goods will decrease. In contrast, 
high agricultural prices will reduce industrial investment, but increase 
demand. The consequence is that the modern industrial sector might not 
develop well due to its incapability to increase productivity of the 
population working in agriculture. Agricultural transformation, then, may 
become the key constraint to economic development rather than 
industrial modernisation (Copestake, 1999). 
The third version is an open economy in which the capitalist sector 
trades either with the non-capitalist one and/or with the outside world. 
This model is even more complicated since the dynamics of those two 
sectors is not only influenced by internal factors, but also by external 
ones. In addition, developing countries, such as Indonesia, face a 
different situation since linkage between the traditional and the modern 
sectors is merely a representation of how the modern, urban sector has 
exploited the traditional, rural sector. This has in some cases widened the 
gap between the sectors. 
Objections to Lewis' models have been raised in two forms (Cypher 
and Dietz, 1998). First, the models ignore institutional factors that 
influence wage determination in the industrial sector. For the Indonesian 
case, labour legislation has been introduced, including both minimum 
wages and regulations of labour unions.5 However, it is a fact that 
industrial wages are still much higher than agricultural wages and the 
                                                 
5
 We must bear in mind that in the Megawati era, the government lifted restrictions on labour 
unions that would later influence their bargaining power. 
Theoretical Background 
25 
unions do not have the power to negotiate. Second, objections are 
directed against Lewis' assumption that there will be a continued 
reinvestment of earnings in new production. In fact, the native capitalist 
strata tend to cut the growth process through capital flight, which often 
contributes to an external debt crisis. Obviously, exactly this has 
occurred in Indonesia. 
In most developing countries, the development of a modern sector has 
not benefited the traditional sector. However, Lewis (Meier, 1995) 
argued that there is no reason to expect the traditional sector always to 
benefit from expansion of the modern sector.  Lewis mentioned four 
ways the modern sector might benefit the traditional sector. First is 
through provision of labour. Those moving from the traditional sector are 
absorbed by the modern sector. The modern sector provides higher 
incomes, better opportunities for children and higher social status. The 
second way is through sharing physical facilities that the traditional 
sector uses with payment of marginal costs or less. The third one is 
modernisation of ideas and institutions in the traditional sector, such as 
introduction of technology, opportunity for girls to attend school, 
revision of land tenure system, and introduction of co-operative 
agricultural  institutions. The last one is through trade between the two 
sectors. This paradigm tends to simplify the situation so that the analysis 
is focused only on positive effects while ignoring the negative effects. 
Partly, it refers to the fact that employment problems are very much 
influenced by the dynamics of inter-sectoral linkage between the 
traditional and modern sectors. 
In spite of all of the possible situations explained above, the 
conditions in developing countries, especially in Indonesia, are not that 
straightforward. First of all, in most developing countries, including 
Indonesia, the modern sector has not expanded sufficiently so that it 
cannot provide enough jobs for people moving out the agriculture sector. 
If the modern sector is ―pushed‖ to accommodate the rural labour 
surplus, then it is possible that the wages in the modern sector may not be 
significantly higher compared to those in traditional one. If it is the case, 
the first positive effect, i.e., through  provision of labour, might not 
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occur. Second, in most cases the modern sector is not able to absorb the 
rural labour surplus so labourers move to the so-called informal sector. 
Third, if expansion of the modern sector occurs, the intermediate effect is 
an increase in the gap between rural and urban wages. The rural economy 
is marginalised because of the absence of money transfer from urban and 
rural sector. Finally, the division between the modern and traditional 
sectors is not merely defined in economic terms, but also in social and 
cultural terms. 
II.3 The Urban Economy: The Role of the Informal Sector 
Along with theoretical debates on development, there has been a 
growing concern in academic institutions and international organisations 
to redefine the meaning of development. Seers (Hunt, 1989) argued that 
development should be reinterpreted to take into account the trends not 
only in growth, but also in poverty, income distribution and employment. 
In this sense, discussion of the informal sector becomes important as the 
ILO report based on work in Kenya found out that the informal sector 
plays an important role as a source of output growth, employment, and 
increasing productivity of the poor. 
Discussions on the informal sector are always controversial, partly 
due to the contradictory nature of the sector and also the difficulty of 
determining a precise definition of it. According to Sethurahman (1997), 
the meaning of the term "informal sector" has been somewhat elusive and 
the subject of controversy, despite the fact that the issue has been widely 
discussed in development policy debates. The informal sector has also 
been viewed as part of an "assembly of traditional, backward and 
unproductive activities operating at the margins of society" 
(http://www.kimito.free-online.co.uk/twnweb/reports/oata.htm). For 
practical use, the definition may vary for many reasons (see Breman, 
2001). 
Growth in the informal sector has become a general phenomenon in 
developing countries. Growth in this sector can be viewed from various 
perspectives or using various approaches (Berger and Buvinic, 1989). 
First is the viewpoint based on the theory of excess labour supply. This 
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holds that the informal sector grows because of market imperfection, 
which limits employment opportunities in the formal sector. Secondly, 
this aspect can also be explained with the use of a neo-Marxist approach 
pointing out that growth in the informal sector is a consequence of the 
development of capitalism in developed countries (core regions). The 
growth, then, extracts economic benefit from the less developed countries 
(peripheral regions) through  sustained  support for the exploitation of the 
informal sector by the formal sector. Thirdly, the growth of this sector 
can also be explained by the underground approach. This blames 
international competition as the main cause of growth in informal 
activities because this kind of competition has forced several industries 
(formal activities) to involve themselves in various informal or illegal 
activities, in other words, to go ―underground‖. The fourth explanation is 
the neo-liberal approach, which views the informal sectors as growing 
because of several conditions and regulations that must be fulfilled by the 
formal sector (See also De Soto, 1989). De Soto (1989) also argues that 
the growth and productivity of the informal economy is restricted in the 
sense that it will create intervention by the regulator, which in turn 
affects the profitability of the ventures. Some of these conditions and 
regulations often complicate the formal sector; hence this sector is 
subsequently forced to resort to informal procedures in order to maintain 
its profit margin and its very existence. The tendency of an economic 
system to shift towards "an integrated economy", which increases the 
possibility of external influence, is becoming increasingly evident in the 
Indonesian economy. This is a very important aspect, which must be 
considered while discussing the informal market. The mechanism, which 
permits the free flow of goods, capital, and services from abroad into 
Indonesia, will, to a small or large extent, influence the existence of the 
informal sector both directly and indirectly (see Sukamdi and Dwiyanto, 
1998). 
Based on several studies, motives for participation in this sector vary 
(Sethuraman, 1997), such as: (a) labour market flexibility, (b) existence 
of profitable opportunities, and (c) non-compliance with regulations. 
Findings from a survey of urban street vendors in the city of Yogyakarta 
observed that those who lost their jobs because of the economic crisis 
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entered the informal sector. It was not a surprise to find out that some of 
the vendors were highly educated (Sukamdi, 2000). Thus, the function of 
the informal sector here was two-fold. First, during the non-crisis period, 
the informal sector provided job opportunities for those who failed to 
enter the formal sector. Second, it acted as a ―bumper‖ that absorbed the 
―labour surplus‖ in the formal sector when economic crisis hit the 
country. 
In addition, there are two important aspects of the informal sector that 
must be noted. First, the informal sector might economically not be that 
bad, since it can provide a better profit for some of the workers than the 
formal sector can, so it can sustain their household economy. Second, as 
it has been observed in several studies, the relationship between the 
formal and the informal sectors is exploitative in character. The formal 
sector exploits the informal sector. If this is indeed the case then we can 
expect to see that the informal sector is inferior to the formal sector. 
However, the informal sector plays an important role as it has the ability 
to absorb an unlimited workforce, especially for people who lost their 
jobs in the formal sector, because this sector is easy to enter. If this is the 
case, we can expect that in a time of crisis, the number of people 
involved in the informal sector will increase considerably. It is also 
expected that due to its flexibility to adapt, this sector may also escape 
from the effects of the crisis. 
II.4 The Rural Economy: Industrial Agriculture and Agrarian 
Dualism 
From a population dynamic point of view, labour migration from 
rural to urban areas has occurred in Indonesia since the 1970s. Along 
with the ―transportation revolution‖ in Indonesia, the volume of 
migration has increased substantially. There is no doubt that rural-urban 
migration is also a reflection of the sectoral shift. When the agricultural 
sector in rural areas can no longer absorb the bulk of the labour force, 
rural people are forced to move to urban areas, which represent the 
manufacturing and service sectors. Push factors in rural areas as a result 
of agricultural inferiority combined with pull factors in urban areas as a 
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result of urban bias policy is the explanation behind the rural-urban 
migration process. According to Harris and Todaro (1970), a massive 
labour migration from rural agriculture to urban or industrial centres is a 
consequence of a too-high wage differential between urban and rural 
areas. Rural out-migration tends to economically weaken a region and is 
referred to as the ―backwash effect‖.  Cypher and Dietz (1998) blame 
past institutional arrangements for the existing backwash effect in 
developing countries as a result of colonialism and neo-colonialism, 
rather than the working of the laws of comparative advantage. 
One important cause of rural-urban migration is that agriculture is in 
a relatively sub-ordinate position in the development process. 
Government policy for agriculture was enough but not sufficient. It is 
very difficult to expect the agricultural sector to compete with the 
industrial sector in terms of wage levels, labour productivity or in other 
aspects. This can improve if linkages between the agricultural and 
industrial sectors can be developed. The linkages will improve added 
value the agricultural sector and in turn reduce the gap with the industrial 
sector. 
In the face of globalisation, the conditions in the agricultural sector 
tend to worsen due to the incapability to compete with the international 
market (see Killick, 2001). It also must be noted that the incapability to 
compete with the external market also occurs in other sectors. In order to 
respond to both internal and international markets, the rural economy 
tries to adapt in several ways. First is the development of off-farm and 
non-farm activities (Bateman and Ray in Ilbery, 1998) to absorb the 
labour surplus in the agricultural sector. Secondly, there is a tendency to 
change the character of the ―agro food‖ system from local to national or 
even regional markets (Marsden in Ilbery, 1998). Accordingly, the rural 
market is expected to be part of the important global market. However, 
the rural economy experiences difficulty in competing with the external 
market and it is regrettable to say, the government, especially in 
developing countries, does not pay enough attention to this issue. In 
Indonesia, the first mechanism is more likely to happen. Off-farm and 
non-farm activities have grown very fast in the last three decades, but it 
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is not because of increasing demand but, again, merely because of the 
incapability of the agricultural sector to accommodate the growing labour 
force. 
The rise of industrial agriculture is more likely the appropriate 
explanation of what has happened in the rural economy in Indonesia, 
primarily in Java. The process can be divided into three stages (Bowler, 
1992). First is the replacement of the use of animal power by machinery 
in the production process. Second, modification or change in biological 
processes through introduction of agricultural inputs such as high yield 
varieties. Third, the development of industry substitution takes place in 
further effort to fulfil increasing demand of manufacturing products. 
Starting in the 1970s, the agricultural economy (specifically rice 
production) entered an intensification program known as Bimas and 
Inmas (Mass Guidance and Mass Intensification),  Indonesia‘s version of 
the ―green revolution‖. There is considerable evidence that this program 
successfully increased aggregate land productivity, with Indonesia 
moving from being the world‘s biggest rice importer to achieving rice 
self-sufficiency in the early 1980s (see Hűsken, 1998). However, heavy 
criticism has been addressed to this program based on the negative 
effects rising from the reality that the program‘s subsidised inputs 
benefitted primarily middle-sized farmers and larger landholders (Cypher 
and Dietz, 1998; Hűsken, 1998). Disparity between small landholders 
and relatively large landholding farmers is becoming eminent as an 
expression of agrarian dualism.6 This is also an example of existing 
social inequality in rural areas. Thus, it is becoming clear that small 
landholding farmers have benefitted less in Indonesia‘s rural 
transformation.  
When the crisis hit Indonesia, the imbalance between the rural and 
urban sectors may be reduced due to the weakening of the modern sector 
in urban areas and at the same time some rural economy, mainly cash-
crops, gain advantage from rising prices. The situation is, then, the other 
way around compared to pre-crisis conditions. People who lost their jobs 
                                                 
6
 Examples of agrarian dualism in developing countries is described in Cypher and Dietz (1998: 
336-338) 
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migrate to rural areas to find jobs in the agricultural sector. The 
agricultural sector then becomes an alternative for those who lost their 
jobs. It is unquestionable that the employment rate in the agricultural 
sector increases. It is expected that when economic recovery begins and 
the manufacturing sector starts to develop, people again start to leave the 
agricultural sector. 
II.5 Vulnerability of Economy 
The impact of the crisis on population welfare might operate in two 
ways. First, the economic crisis affects macro-economic performance, 
such as declining economic growth, per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), increasing inflation, the balance of payment due to the collapse of 
imports (see Hill, 1999a and Hill 1999b). In ASEAN countries, the 
effects might vary from one country to another, but there is general 
pattern that can be seen in all of the countries. However, the effect for the 
regional economy may vary based on the economic base developed in 
each region. In those parts of the country, which were based on ―cash-
crop cultivation and artisanal manufacture for export‖, people benefited 
from the crisis through rising employment and profits (Breman, 2000: 3). 
In the development process, some areas have experienced a faster 
economic growth fostered by the shift from the economic role of 
agriculture to manufacturing. The crisis has affected the collapse of the 
manufacturing sector and mainly the large-scale industries in it (see Hill, 
1999a and 1999b). This may cause a decrease of the role of 
manufacturing sector so that economic growth will drop significantly and 
the drop might be sharper in more industrialised areas than in less 
industrialised areas. 
Concerning the urban economy, since the modern sector was hit by 
the crisis, many people lost their jobs. There is evidence that some of 
them were absorbed into the informal sector (see Sukamdi and Dwiyanto, 
1998; Sussangkarn, et.al 1999)7 and the agricultural sector (Manning, 
2000). In the period of 1997-1998, for instance, the percentage working 
                                                 
7
 See also ILO report (http: //www.twnside.org/title/fairly-cn.htm) 
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in the urban informal sector increased from 43 to 46 percent, while in the 
urban formal sector it decreased from 57 percent to 55 percent. At the 
same time, the percentage of the work force involved in the agricultural 
sector increased by 5 percent. The informal and agricultural sector, then, 
acted as safety belts for the modern or formal economy. Breman (2000: 
6) articulates this phenomenon in different words: 
The informal economy would merely swallow up the labour 
surplus pushed out of higher-paid, regular and protected 
employment, enabling the displaced workforce, through 
income-sharing arrangements, to stick it out in all kinds of odd 
jobs, until the economic tide would turn again in their favour, 
when they would be reinstalled in their former occupation. 
Absorbing people in lower paid occupations is a must since they 
could not remain unemployed in regard to the absences of government 
financial support for unemployed persons. In addition, this also implies 
that working in the informal sector is only temporary while waiting for 
better economic conditions of the formal sector‘s recovery. 
Secondly, the crisis also affected individual welfare directly as the 
crisis caused a dramatic increase in prices, mainly food, resulting from 
the exchange rate volatility. Strauss, et.al. (2002) argued that from 
January through March 1998, nominal food prices increased threefold. 
Relative food prices also experienced a sharp increase in early 1999, and 
resulted in a fall of real incomes for net food purchasers. Sussangkarn, 
et.al. (1999) estimated that because of a very high rate of inflation, real 
wages were reduced by 30-50 percent in 1998. In 1994, female farm 
labourers earned 800-1000 rupiahs per day, which was equivalent to 1.25 
kilograms of rice. During the crisis (1998), their wages increased to 
2,500-3,500 rupiahs per day, which was equivalent then to 1.16 
kilograms of rice. In 1994, male farm labourers earned about 2,500 
rupiahs or 3.13 kilograms of rice, while in 1998; they earned 5,000-7,000 
rupiahs or 2.33 kilograms of rice. This is also evidence that real wages 
were declining. More evidence can be found in Table 2.1, which clearly 
shows that at the national level there was a strong decrease of real wages 
in the first year of the crisis, both in rural and urban areas. 
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With decreasing real wages, in general we can conclude that the crisis 
has caused an increase in the number of poor people.8 In many cases, the 
discussion on the impact of the crisis has been focused on this issue. 
However, there is also evidence that some people have benefited from 
the crisis, especially those who rely on export commodities (Hill, 199b). 
 
Table 2.1 Average Nominal and Real Wages of Employees, 1997-1998 (in 
Thousands) 
Area and Sex 
Nominal Wages Real Wage 
1998* 
Change 
(%) 1997 1998 
Urban     
Male 594 745 461 -22.4 
Female 410 470 291 -29.0 
Rural     
Male 404 456 282 -30.2 
Female 284 365 226 -20.4 
Source: calculated based on 1997 and 1998 National Labour Force Survey 
* deflated by 61.54 % (inflation rate between August 1997-1998) 
 
Boomgaard and Brown (2000, 15) also stated how the crisis affected 
the individual economy, ―…large numbers of people lost their 
livelihoods, permanent and circular migrants into the town and cities 
were sent home, and home- villages were deprived of the remittances of 
family members‖. However, as Hill (1999a) argued that while rural 
incomes were holding well, the urban poor were hit hard by the crisis. 
Koning (2001: 5) added that ―….those who had become dependent on 
this urban labour market would be the victims, being sent home because 
there was no more work to be done‖. Again, this explains that for those 
living in urban areas the crisis was more severe than for those in rural 
areas. 
The ILO has reported that the impact of the financial crisis has been 
more severe on women than on men. The rate of unemployment in 
                                                 
8
 See also arguments developed by Islam (1998) 
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Indonesia increased less for women (14 percent) than for men (27 
percent), but women‘s incomes fell further than men‘s. As can be seen in 
Table 2.1, the decrease of real wages for women was sharper than that for 
men. 
Analysis of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) shows 
interesting results (Strauss, et.al. 2002). As is mentioned above, 
Indonesian welfare in the period 1997-2000 was not as low as previously 
estimated. This can be observed from several indicators. First, the 
number of poor decreased slightly during this period. Considering that 
there was a dramatic increase of poverty incidence in the period of 1997-
1998, this result implies that recovery was in progress. The median real 
incomes (measured by per capita expenditures) increased both in rural 
and urban areas, with a higher increase in the rural rather than the urban 
areas. Interesting to note is that those with higher per capita expenditures 
were more likely to suffer a fall in 2000, compared to those with low 
income in 1997, experiencing an increase of per capita expenditure in 
2000. This means that the lower the income in 1997, the relatively better 
they were able to cope in 2000. 
Other findings have also shown that education significantly correlates 
with per capita expenditure and being out of poverty. It seems that 
education is the best way to explain coping with the crisis. Why 
education? According to human capital theory, education provides people 
with a better chance to diversify their jobs and gather capital. 
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Chapter III 
Changing Indonesian 
Economic Performance in the 20
th 
Century 
Abstract 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the economic performance of 
Indonesia from the early 1900's till the period before the 1990‘s crisis. 
This is in order to understand the dynamics of the country‘s economy, 
especially in reference to the several crises that have hit the country since 
1930. The data was collected from various secondary sources and 
previous writings on relevant issues. The findings show that Indonesia 
experienced very dynamic economic development. Three major stages 
can be identified. The first was the Great Depression in the 1930s 
because of a sharp contraction in economic activity in North America and 
Western Europe. The second crisis was in the 1960s, which different 
from the previous crisis, was affected by internal factors. The third stage 
was in the New Order Era when Indonesia was enjoying good macro-
economic performances. In spite of having several problems, especially 
in the transformation process, in this period Indonesia was labelled an 
―Asian Tiger‖. 
III.1 Introduction 
The history of the Indonesian economy provides an example on how 
the country has gone through a very dynamic situation and the way the 
country has escaped from a series of crises, which in turn have had their 
own influence on the country‘s recent economic performance. It is also a 
fact that the crisis as understood at a macro level has a different impact 
on lower levels of administration units and even on the individual level. 
Thus, it is important to understand the nature and impact of the crisis at 
all levels. 
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Indonesia after 1997 seemed to be a focus of interest to a great 
number of people due the ―unexpected‖ crisis.9 Many arguments have 
been proposed to explain the factors behind the crisis that are, to some 
extent, inconsistent, contradictory and controversial. Some of these 
studies have analysed the 1990s crisis not only as a single crisis in the 
country, but they attempt to understand the crisis in a historical 
perspective. Some comparisons, for instance, have been made between 
the 1930s and the 1990s crises. There are some similarities and 
differences between the 1930s and the 1990s crises that might serve as 
lessons learned for the future of the country. 
The analysis will be based on the stages of economic development in 
Indonesia as introduced by several authors. One of them is Touwen 
(2003), who proposed several stages for studying Indonesian economic 
history: (1) the pre-colonial economy, (2) sixteenth and seventeenth 
century, (3) the nineteenth century, (4) the heyday of the colonial export 
economy (1900-1942), (5) the post-1945 period, and (6) from 1998 until 
present. In this chapter we will not strictly follow these stages, but 
instead elaborate upon and compare the crises in Indonesia. The 
discussion will begin with the situation in the 1930s, focusing on the 
causes and consequences of the 1930s crisis. As it has been well 
understood, in the 1930s the world experienced a depression, which in 
turn affected the economies of Southeast Asian countries, including 
Indonesia. Understanding the nature of this crisis will be worthwhile for 
examining the 1990s crisis. The following stage to be examined is the 
period of 1945-1965, when the Old Order in power experienced 
economic stress because of existing serious economic and political 
turbulence. The next period is the New Order period, which was 
characterised primarily by better economic performance. The country 
achieved its golden period when Indonesia was included in the group of 
Newly Industrialised Countries. The last period is the post New Order, or 
reformation period, which began with the fall of the Suharto regime and 
the wide spread economic crisis followed by the multidimensional crisis 
in 1998. 
                                                 
9
 This will be elaborated further in the discussion on the 1990s crisis. 
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III.2 The 1930s: The Great Depression 
Van der Eng (2002a and 2002b) has reconstructed the economic 
performance in Indonesia during the period of 1880-2002, which is 
fruitful in understanding Indonesian economic history (for the later 
periods, see also: Booth, 2002a). There are several conclusions we can 
draw from this reconstruction. First, in the period of 1900-1930, the 
economy was consistently growing at a rate higher than population 
growth. In this period, the growth of the GDP was 2.7 percent annually 
compared to population growth of 1.2 percent growth per annum (Booth, 
2002a). As a result, the per capita GDP was consistently growing. Van 
der Eng (2002a) argued that the average GDP per capita was growing 
even higher at 1.7 percent per  annum  in  this period. Second, agriculture 
was the most important sector in the economy, even though it decreased 
slightly in this period. The role of industry only increased in the late 
1930s. There were some fluctuations in the standard of living. However, 
in the late 1930s, it was apparent that a food shortage existed, especially 
on Java. The level of education increased slightly from less than 0.1 year 
of education per person to 0.5 years in 1930, but it was also very clear 
that the level of education was still very low. 
There is also evidence that the Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) was very 
high, almost one in four children died before reaching one year of age. 
As a result, the expectancy of life was very low at 30 years. The situation 
was similar to the first stage of the demographic transition. High infant 
mortality rate is associated with the high incidence of infectious diseases, 
uncertain food supplies and poor diet, poor hygiene, limited clean water, 
and other problems of public utilities. 
In the 1930s, when the world was hit by serious economic problems, 
Southeast Asian countries experienced an economic crisis in which 
Indonesia was badly affected (see Booth 2002a). This is the first 
economic crisis that can be identified in the history of Indonesia. 
As most scholars (see Boomgaard and Brown, 2000) explained, the 
1930s crisis was generated outside Southeast Asian countries due to 
sharp contraction in economic activity in North America and Western 
Europe. The depression was transmitted in two ways. First, the sharp 
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contraction in demand of major primary commodity exports had 
influenced rubber produced on plantations and in the smallholding sector 
in the Malay States, Sumatra, and Cochin China. Internationally, both 
agriculture and industry had increased production so much during the 
1920s that over-production was the result. Secondly, the collapse of 
banks across the United States and Western Europe caused the tightening 
of credit, not only in these regions, but also in Southeast Asian countries. 
However, the crisis also had internal causes in Southeast Asian countries. 
First, there was a serious oversupply of major primary commodity 
exports, such as rubber and sugar. Second, in the agricultural area, land 
was becoming a scarce factor of production as the open land frontier was 
closing, and tenant profits and labour wages fell. 
 
Figure 3.1 Per Capita GDP in Indonesia, 1880-1960 (x100 1983 Rp) 
Figure 1. Per Capita GDP in Indonesia, 1880-1960 
(x100 1983 Rp)
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Source: Based on data provided by Van der Eng (2002b). 
 
Indonesian data on exports and imports reveal that in the 1930s, 
Indonesia experienced a surplus in the balance of trade. However, the 
balance of trade fluctuated as can be seen from Figure 3.2. The surplus 
decreased in the period of 1925-1933 from 954 million guilders to 148 
million guilders and then increased to 456 million guilders in 1937 and 
decreased to 169 million guilders in 1938. Van der Eng (2002a) estimates 
that the surplus was relatively high and reached 36 percent in the period 
of 1900-1930. Surprisingly, it was higher than the surplus in the period of 
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1967-1997, which was only 15 percent. How was the surplus utilised? 
Van der Eng (2002a) pointed out that the net export earnings were used 
to finance overseas remittances. However, there is no evidence that such 
payments had decreased available funds for productive activities. 
The crisis in Indonesia actually had been felt in 1925, when the value 
of exports started to decline. A sharp decline occurred in 1930 and the 
following years to reach the lowest point in 1933. At the same time, the 
volume of imports also decreased for the first time (Figure 3.2). It was in 
1929 when both exports and imports had fallen sharply and dropped to 
the lowest level in 1933. The figure will support the argument that the 
crisis began in 1930. However, Boomgaard (2000) argues that when we 
use the real value of exports based on constant prices, it is clear that the 
crisis started in 1931 when the slump of exports was significant (Figure 
3.2). In addition, the lowest export did not appear in 1933, but in 1934. 
 
Figure 3.2 Export, Real Export, Import and Trade Balance, 1925-1938 
Figure 2. Export, Real Export, Import and Trade 
Balance, 1925-1938
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Note: this figure was drawn based on data provided by Korthals, as cited in 
Boomgaard (2000), Table 3.1 and 2.2 p: 23-24. The value of export, import and 
trade balance are in million guilders at current prices, while real export is based 
on constant prices as correction of export value using an index of export prices. 
 
Based on calculations done by Van der Eng (2002a and 2002b) using 
1980 prices as reference, we can compare per capita GDP during the 
1930s. There is evidence that during the crisis per capita GDP was 
decreasing (See Figure 3.1). Indonesia achieved the highest per capita 
Changing Indonesian Economic Performance 
40 
GDP in 1929, which was 200.9 thousand rupiahs and declined to 200.5 
thousand in 1934 (Van der Eng, 2002b). Using the year of 1929 as base 
line, Boomgaard (2000) has also shown that the per capita GDP in 
Indonesia decreased to the lowest level in 1934 that was 93 compared to 
100 in 1929. Booth (2002a), using 1928 as a base line, also found a 
similar pattern that the lowest real income per capita was in 1934. It is 
clear that even before the crisis the people had experienced a decrease in 
per capita income and it was worsened by the crisis that occurred in 
1931. However, Boomgaard (2000) argued that in fact the people of the 
outer islands were hit harder than their counterparts in Java. It was 
estimated that the population of Java lost on average 1 guilder per capita 
in 1930 compared to 5 guilders for people of the outer islands. 
 
Figure 3.3 Index of Real Income in Java and Income Per Capitain Java and 
Indonesia 1927-1939 
Figure 3. Index of Real  Income in Java and 
Income Per Capita  in Java and Indonesia 
1927-1939
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Note: 
RI Java: real income Java; RIP Java: real income per capita Java; RIP Indo: real 
income per capita Indonesia is based on Boomgaard (2000), Table 3.4 using 
1929 as a base line. 
RIGDP: real income per capita Indonesia, based on Booth (2002a) Table 1 using 1928 
as a base line 
PCGDP: real income per capita Indonesia, based on Van der Eng (2002b) using 1929 
as a base line 
 
The trend of real income per capita in the 1930s derived from three 
different sources (Booth, 2002a; Boomgaard, 2000; and Van der Eng, 
2002b) show similar patterns. After it plunged to the lowest level in 
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1934, the real income per capita increased consistently till 1939 (Figure 
3.3). Data provided by Van der Eng (2002b) shows that in 1941, it 
reached the 1929 level (see also Booth, 2002a). It appears that the 
economy was recovering five years after the crisis. During the period of 
1941-1945, Indonesia experienced difficulties due to social, economic 
and political turbulence, especially related to Japanese occupation and 
the war for independence. It is estimated that in 1944-1945 alone, 2.4 
million Javanese died due to widespread poverty and hunger (Van der 
Eng, 2002a). 
White (2011) argues that the 1930s was a deflationary crisis with 
massive deflation reaching around 50 percent. Citing Bijleveld, White 
(2011) explains that in the time of crisis, food was plentiful but money 
had almost completely disappeared. Referring to his study in Yogyakarta, 
White (2011: 69) found people who recalled the 1930 crisis as one in 
which money became scarce and products became very cheap. As a 
consequence this early crisis affected people differently. Those having 
jobs with regular (constant), wages, like in government service, benefited 
from the crisis while those who relied on producing goods and services to 
obtain a loan, suffered severely. 
III.3 Stagnation and Decline of the Economy under the Old 
Order 
During the 1945-1970 periods, the problems in Indonesia were not 
only economic in nature; they were also political. The national leadership 
(President Soekarno) had to cope with centrifugal tendencies in the 
unitary state. Military commanders in the export areas in the outer islands 
attempted to grab and control local taxes and income sources, depriving 
the central government in Jakarta of these funds. 
In 1957-1958, military and civilian forces in West Sumatra rebelled 
against the central government in Jakarta. Throughout these years 
President Soekarno was preoccupied with the problems of how to keep 
the country together. With all these political problems, it is 
understandable that the Indonesian government placed more attention on 
politics, rather than on the economy. Some believe the root of the 
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deteriorating economy in this period laid in the way the government 
over-emphasized politics and neglected economic considerations in 
major development policies (Mangkusuwondo, 1973). 
Any of the articles discussing the performance of Indonesia's 
economy under the Soekarno administration (1945-1965) come to a 
similar conclusion that there were very unfavourable conditions. Not 
only in terms of a macro economy perspective, but also in terms of food 
shortages, very poor infrastructure and communication facilities, as well 
as a bulk number of poor. Indonesia faced a difficult time after 
independence due to the hardships of the Japanese occupation and the 
war for independence. Problems encountered (Touwen, 2003) included 
very little economic growth especially from 1950-1957, and the absence 
of foreign capital and problems with the exchange rate, which were 
detrimental to economic development. In the mid 1960s, experts, such as 
Higgins (1968); Myrdal (1969); Keyfits (1965); and Panglaykim and 
Arndt (1966), expressed pessimistic views concerning Indonesian 
economic prospects (see: Hill, 2000). 
As can be seen from Table 3.1, the inflation rate was 20 percent in 
1960 and then increased to 594 percent in 1965. This high inflation rate 
is easily understood since the money supply (M1) increased very rapidly 
from 37 percent in 1960 to 302 percent in 1965. This increase was 
directly influenced by the increase of the budget deficit, which was 
solved only by an increase of the money supply. During the period of 
1960-1963, the budget deficit increased significantly from 19 percent to 
115 percent. Two years later, it improved slightly to reach 90 percent in 
1965, but the situation was still worse than that in 1960. 
The condition was worsened by the fact that prices were skyrocketing 
(Dumairy, 1997) and economic growth was only 1.9 percent annually 
from 1960 through1965. Per capita income during the period of 1960-
1965 fluctuated to reach minus four percent in the year of 1963. Better 
conditions occurred in 1963-1965 when per capita income increased. 
However, in the 1960s, Indonesian per capita income was one of the 
lowest in the world. In 1967, for instance, per capita GNP was only $US 
50, which was half of that in India, Bangladesh, and Nigeria (Cheetam 
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and Peters, 1997). The formal financial system, especially in the period 
of 1957-1965, was under pressure and nearly destroyed (Cole and Slade, 
1996). Dick (2001) considers this period as a period of ‖stagnation and 
decline under guided democracy‖.10 These deteriorating economic 
conditions led to political confrontation, which resulted in the deaths of 
hundreds of thousands of people (see Hűsken, Rutten and Dirkse, 1997). 
Considering how bad the economic performance was, we could say 
that Indonesia experienced a second economic crisis in the 1960s. 
Compared to the 1930s crisis, the 1960s crisis was worse concerning its 
impact on the whole economy. First, the very high inflation rate affected 
the economy at all levels, reaching the lowest point in the history of the 
country. Second, this situation was worsened by social and political 
unrest, which in turn generated difficulties for recovery. Many were 
sceptical about Indonesian economic development unless a significant 
shift of government policies was made. 
 
Table 3.1 Economic Development Indicators, 1960-1965 
Indicators 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
NDP (billion Rp) based on 1960 
constant price  
391 407 403 396 407 430 
Per capita income change (%) -1.6 1.7 -3.0 -4.0 0.3 3.2 
Money Supply (M1) growth (%) 37 41 101 94 156 302 
Budget Deficit (%) 19 134 97 115 104 90 
Inflation (CPI) in %) 20 95 156 129 135 594 
Source: quoted from Hill (2000, 4). 
 
There is an interesting question to be asked with regard to cause and 
effect. As it is well understood, the Old Order collapsed after the 1965 
                                                 
10
 Dick (2001) constructed a periodisation of the Indonesian economy for the period of 1884-
1999 as follows: (a) 1884-1902: stagnation; (b) 1902-1929: upswing; (c) 1930-1934: 
downswing; (d) 1934-1941: upswing; (e) 1942-1945: catastrophic decline; (f) 1945-1957: 
upswing; (g) 1957-1967: downswing; (h) 1967-1997: upswing; and (i) 1997-1999: 
downswing.  
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coup. However, the September 30 Movement (G 30 S PKI) was the result 
of a culmination of long present political tension. So, did the economic 
crisis cause the political crisis or vice versa? Or did the political crisis 
cause the economic crisis? In my opinion, the nature of the relationship 
between the two crises was reciprocal. It is also wise to remember that 
the poor economic and political conditions were rooted in the political 
and economic developments after independence. It is understandable that 
the government prioritised the political sector. Whoever held power at 
that time faced a difficult situation. 
III.4 The National Economy Under the New Order 
In 1966, when the New Order regime took over power, they inherited 
a condition that Dumairy (1997: 3) characterised as ―keadaan 
perekonomian yang porak poranda (a badly damaged economy)‖ (see 
also: Firdhanustyawan, Aswicahyono and Anas, 2004). The situation was 
bad in many ways: (a) inability to pay of more than US$ 2 billion debt; 
(b) a very low volume of exports, which totalled only half of the imports; 
(c) inability of the government to control the budget and increase taxes; 
(d) high inflation rate; and  (e) poor economic infrastructure and decrease 
of production capacity of the manufacturing sector. However, the New 
Order developed policies that were able to shift the sceptical views of the 
experts. The year 1966 was the turning point in the history of the 
Indonesian economy in that government introduced a very clear 
economic policy goal and direction. Expectations that the government 
would shift the policy toward a stronger economic focus were realised. 
This could be justified from the following focus of development stages. 
The first five-year period of the New Order, 1966-1970, was the 
stabilisation and rehabilitation period (Perdana, 2001; Firdhanustyawan, 
Aswicahyono and Anas, 2004; Touwen, 2003; Hill, 2000)11 in which the 
                                                 
11
 Scholars discerning development phases in the Indonesian Economy have produced similar 
schemes of periodisation. Touwen (2003) follows Thee Kian Wie‘s periodisation of 
Indonesian Development in the New Order period in three phases: (1) 1966-1973: 
stabilisation, rehabilitation, partial liberalisation, and economic recovery. (2) 1974-1982: oil 
boom, rapid economic growth, and increasing government intervention. (3) 1983-1996 post-
oil boom, deregulation, renewed liberalisation, and rapid export led growth. Almost similar to 
this, Firdhanustyawan, Aswicahyono and Anas (2004) divided Indonesian development 
during the New Order into four phases: (1) 1966-1970: stabilisation period; (2) 1971-1981: oil 
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government directed the policy into a more market - oriented economy. 
In 1967, the Inter-Government Group on Indonesia (IGGI) was 
established as the main foreign donor for Indonesia and foreign 
exchange, as well as trade policies, were liberalised, and the state bank 
was rehabilitated. The effect was that inflation dropped to less than 20 
percent in 1969 compared to almost 600 percent in 1966, and economic 
growth, for the first time, reached two digits in 1968. In addition, 
population welfare and income distribution improved, which can be 
observed from the increase in purchasing power. Scarcity of goods and 
services became manageable, and the Gini coefficient was decreasing 
(Perdana, 2001). Hill (2000) stated that the Indonesian economy 
recovered  surprisingly  fast, beyond the most optimistic expectations 
(see also Aswicahyono and Firdhanusetyawan, 2004). Indonesia was also 
considered the most effective government and served as an example in 
Asia on how to control inflation. The government continued to introduce 
major monetary and fiscal policies, such as devaluation, unification of a 
multiple exchange rate system, simplification of exports and import 
procedures, and the elimination of international capital control 
(Firdhanustyawan, Aswicahyono and Anas, 2004: 1-2). 
In the early 1970s, many serious problems remained unsolved and in 
a need of being addressed. One of them was the incidence of poverty, 
which, in 1970, was almost 60 percent or 70 million of the total 
population at that time below the absolute poverty line. Purchasing 
power, even though it was better in comparison to that in the 1960s, was 
still low and the political situation was still vulnerable. 
Under Suharto, the government designed a long-term planning system 
that constituted a series of five-year plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima 
Tahun, Repelita). The first plan (1969-1973) focused on increasing 
production of staple foods and infrastructure development; the second 
                                                                                                                       
boom and increasing government intervention; 1982-1986: adjustment of oil prices; 1986-
1997: deregulation phase. Later, Aswicahyono and Ferdhanustyawan (2004) divided this 
period into two, i.e., swift and effective liberalisation period (1986-1991) and deregulation 
fatigue (1992-1997). Hill (2000) introduced another periodisation: (1) 1966-1970: 
rehabilitation and recovery; (2) 1971-1981: fast growth; (3) 1982-1986: adjustment of oil 
prices; 1987-before the crisis: liberalisation and recovery. Perdana (2001) also has similar 
stages: (1) 1967-1972: stabilisation and rehabilitation; (2) 1973-1981: oil boom; (3) 1982-
1985: post oil boom; 1986-1997: liberalisation. 
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plan (1974-1978) stressed agriculture, employment, and regionally 
equitable development; the third plan (1979-1983) emphasised 
development of agriculture-related and other industries; the fourth plan 
(1984-1988) put priority on basic industries; and the fifth plan (1989-
1993) concentrated on transportation and communication. 
Benefiting from the oil boom, macro-economic performance four 
years after the New Order assumed power showed a significant change 
compared to performance in the 1960s. In the First Five Year Plan 
(Repelita I), 1969-1973, and the Second Five Years Plan (Repelita II), 
1974-1979, economic growth was 7 percent annually, investment 
increased significantly, and the budget contribution of government 
savings compared to loans increased significantly. In the following Third 
Repelita, 1979-1984, the economy suffered with economic growth only 
2.24 percent in 1982 compared to 7-8 percent in the previous decade. 
Indonesia experienced budget deficits and per capita income was 
stagnant. In this period, the rupiah was devaluated 28 percent. In 
response to this situation, the Indonesian government proposed a very 
strict macroeconomic policy, such as tight money policy, increasing 
loans, increasing non-oil exports, limiting imports, and strict regulation 
on travelling abroad (see Dumairy, 1997). 
A very important issue in understanding the Indonesian economy is 
the issue of government intervention. This is one of the factors that can 
be used to explain the economic conditions both before and during the 
crisis. Government intervention started in the late 1970s. At least two 
factors can be identified as an explanation for this (Firdhanustyawan, 
Aswicahyono and Anas, 2004). First, resentment arose in nationalist 
circles in response to increasing foreign investment. It came to a peak on 
15 January 1974, popularly called the Malari12 Affair, when the Japanese 
Prime Minister, Tanaka, visited Indonesia. Restrictions were placed on 
foreign investment with the proposition of a new regulation that all new 
foreign investments should be in the form of joint ventures and Indonesia 
should be the majority shareholder. Second, government became engaged 
directly in production because of windfall oil revenues. In this period, 
                                                 
12
 Malari is an Indonesian acronym for Malapetaka Januari (Great January Disaster). 
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government also introduced a complex regulation to promote various 
industry policy objectives. These can be translated into four channels by 
which government intervened in the economy (Aswicahyono and 
Firdhanusetyawan, 2004): (a) domination of the state bank; (b) direct 
involvement in production; (c) rising barriers to imports; and (d) 
establishing a set of complex regulations. 
The results of these policies were real. In the years after 1975, for 
instance, industry output increased strongly (see McCawley, 1984). 
McCawley also observes that growth faltered in the middle of 1978 and 
continued to decrease in 1979, but later growth recovered through 1981 
(pp. 160). In the period of 1975-1982, the growth rate of employment 
was significant, reaching 5 percent annually, while productivity increased 
at 9 percent per annum and output grew at 14 percent per annum (Table 
3.2). McCawley argued that this achievement helped the country to raise 
productivity through improvement of availability of manufactured goods, 
introduction of new technology and improvement of the technical skill of 
Indonesian workers. 
The phenomenon of government intervention can be interpreted in 
two ways. First, there is enough evidence to show that government 
intervention was able to stabilise the macro economy and improve the 
country‘s conditions. Secondly, many were anxious that the government 
was getting stronger and did not want to reduce its involvement, which to 
some extent would reduce the working of the free market. It is not 
impossible that the macro economy would worsen. 
 
Table 3.2 Growth Rates in Manufacturing, 1975-1982 (Average Increase per 
Annum) 
Sector Employment Productivity Output 
Traditional  1.8 7.6 9.5 
Intermediate/Capital goods 10.9 7.7 19.3 
Total 5.1 8.8 14.3 
Source: McCawley 1984, 166. 
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In the Fourth Five Year Plan (Repelita IV), 1984-1989, deregulation 
and de-bureaucratisation continued to be introduced with a focus on 
increasing the role of the private sector in attracting foreign investment. 
After having enjoyed the increase of oil prices in the 1970s, Indonesia 
suffered when oil prices began to decline sharply in 1985-1986. As can 
be observed from Table 3.3, in this period, Indonesia was in a recession. 
Compared to the growth in the period 1973-1981 (7.5 percent per annum 
at 1973 prices), economic growth in 1981-1986 was much lower at 2.9 
percent per annum at 1983 prices (Sundrum, 1988).13 However, one 
should bear in mind that during this period, growth fluctuated and even in 
1984, economic growth was remarkably high at 6.45 percent. 
 
Table 3.3 Sectoral Shares in GDP Growth, 1967-1992 (%) 
Sector 
Period 
Recovery 
1967-1973 
Oil Boom 
1971-1981 
Recession 
1982-1986 
Export 
Growth 
1987-1992 
Agriculture 28.2 16.4 23.2 10.4 
Mining 12.8 4.9 -5.0 7.4 
Manufacture 10.0 22.9 28.9 29.2 
Public Facilities 0.6 1.1 2.5 1.2 
Construction 7.3 8.8 2.0 9.3 
Industry 30.7 37.7 28.4 47.1 
Trade 25.4 17.2 12.5 18.3 
Transportation 4.2 8.0 10.5 7.3 
Finance 4.3 2.6 4.7 7.1 
Housing 1.6 4.3 3.2 1.6 
Public Adm. 3.8 12.6 15.5 5.4 
Other services 1.6 1.1 2.2 2.8 
Services 40.9 45.8 48.6 42.5 
Average Growth of GDP 7.9 7.51 4.01 6.73 
Source: Hill 2000, 31 
                                                 
13
 This may be incomparable due to different price standards, but using similar constant price, 
Sundrum (1988) still found a 47-57 percent decline of growth. 
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In response to the slow-down of growth, the government then 
devaluated the rupiah twice in 1983 and 1986. The aim was to increase 
non-oil export performance. The efforts to increase non-oil export 
continued in the following years. 
A very drastic and popular deregulation policy was also introduced in 
1988, called ―Paket Deregulasi Kebijakan 27 Oktober 1988‖ (October 
Package 27-88), to reform the banking system. The effect was an 
increase in the number of banks all over the country and increased 
mobilisation of public monetary assets.14 A series of trade reforms were 
also introduced in October 1986, January 1987, November 1988, and 
May 1990 (Aswicahyono and Firdhanustyawan, 2004). We can see then, 
the increase of non-oil exports in the next period (1987-1992) was 
tremendous,  reaching 25.6 percent  per annum. Indonesia in the 1980s 
was also characterised by industrial transformation: large scale industrial 
operations, vastly increased range of products, changing industrial 
structure, development of a stronger ―indigenous‖ industrial base, a more 
broadly-based industrial structure, rapid productivity and real wage 
growth, and ―evening up‖ of inter-industry productivity differentials 
(Hill, 1990a). 
In addition, economic growth in this period was higher than in the 
previous five-year plan (Repelita), which was 5.32 percent annually. In 
this period, Indonesia successfully attained self-sufficiency in rice 
production  and  at the end of this Repelita there was a very promising 
sign of development in the banking sector and the stock exchange. 
However, in general, in this period the country still faced some problems 
that were, to some extent, not stimulating the macro economy. What 
Jayasuria and Manning (1988: 3) described for the situation might be the 
best illustration: 
The current jewel in Indonesia‘s economic crown, non-oil 
export, has continued to shine brightly. But there is now 
increasing concern with sluggish growth of the non-traceable 
                                                 
14
 This policy was blamed to be the cause of a serious problem in the following period when 
many private banks went into bankruptcy. 
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sectors and implication on domestic income, wages and 
employment. Longer term uncertainty is heightened by the 
extent of the debt financing problem, a sensitive rice situation, 
and the possibility of another slide in oil price, all against a 
backdrop of slow overall economic growth rates, both in the 
recent past and (very likely) in the near future. 
In the following Repelita, 1989-1994, Indonesia experienced better 
conditions due to government commitment to continue policy 
deregulation through a series of trade and investment reforms: June 1991 
deregulation  package, July 1992, June and October 1993, and June 1994. 
In this period, Indonesia enjoyed high economic growth, which was on 
average 6.7 percent per year. In addition, the government had also 
successfully  increased non-oil exports. In the early 1990s, Indonesia was 
on the list of the Newly Industrialising Countries (NIC). In 1993, the 
World Bank characterised Indonesia as a one of the ―high performing 
Asian Economies‖. 
Booth (2002a) argued that if the growth process in Indonesia in the 
1960s-1990s, was not "export led", it certainly was "export facilitated". 
However, some experts were still unhappy with the deregulation policy 
due to the fact that policy implementation was too slow, much less 
comprehensive than they had hoped, and did not include various sensitive 
agricultural commodities and several manufacturing commodities 
(Aswicahyono and Firdhanustyawan, 2004: 14). 
Table 3.3 shows several important concerns. At least until the 
recession period, it was not the manufacturing sector that had the highest 
share of GDP growth, but was the services sector. It was only in 1987-
1992 that the share of manufacturing on GDP growth surpassed that of 
the services  and constituted the highest share of GDP growth. In 
addition, the share of agriculture in the period of 1982-1987, when the 
economy was in recession, increased significantly compared to the 
previous period. The increase was even higher than services, but then 
declined to the lowest rate. This implies that agriculture was playing an 
important role in stimulating the growth of the GDP when industry 
experienced a drop in its share due to declining oil prices. 
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Nasution (1991) argued that in the period of 1987-1990, Indonesia 
experienced two contradictory developments. First, during this period 
investment, non-oil exports, private consumption and growth of 
performance  were remarkable and unprecedented. Other  indicators, 
such as poverty incidence, improved. Second, in the beginning of 1990, 
Indonesia faced very serious problems concerning a high inflation rate, 
insufficient  infrastructure, a widening current account deficit, a growing 
foreign debt, and a fragile financial system. The inflation rate in 1990 
was almost two digits (9.5 percent) and much higher than the previous 
year (6.0 percent). The current account deficit increased sharply from 
$US 1.3 billion (2.2 percent) in 1989 to $US 3.4 billion (3.5 percent) in 
1990. At the same time, non-oil exports dropped from 20.0 percent to 6.1 
percent. 
Three decades after the New Order took power, regardless of having 
some problems, overall economic performance in Indonesia was 
extraordinary if we compare it with the conditions of the first year the 
New Order took power. Thee (2001) added that in spite of good macro 
economic performance, the economic structure had been transformed 
from a largely agrarian economy into one in which the manufacturing 
sector contributed more to the GDP (See also Van der Eng 2002a). This 
justified the argument that Indonesia was on the right track in 
modernising the country. 
In short, the period of 1967-1997 can be characterised as one in 
which a "growth miracle" occurred. However, Indonesia‘s development 
experience is not unique, since the now developed countries have also 
gone through a similar process. According to Van der Eng (2002a), the 
unique feature of Indonesia's experience is that the growth was higher 
than that of Western Europe in the past and higher than in most of Asia in 
the same period. He continued (Van der Eng, 2002a: 9): 
Very unique to Indonesia is that this process of rapid economic 
development was part and parcel of a process that involved the 
forging of a national economy and a nation state involving a 
number of disparate people and spanning a geographical area, 
and even a population of equivalent proportions to Western 
Europe in the past. 
Changing Indonesian Economic Performance 
52 
However, two important points should be borne in mind. First, at the 
end  of  the fifth  Repelita (1989-1994), Indonesia faced a very 
significant  current  account  deficit that was US$ 2.940 million. Second, 
obliged total foreign debt caused a very serious  problem. In the fourth  
Repelita (1984-1989), the  proportion of routine expenditures used to pay 
the foreign debt was 41.2 percent. This figure increased to 44.6 percent in 
the next Repelita (1989-1994). This meant that almost 50 percent of 
routine expenditures were to pay the foreign debt. These conditions were 
indicators  of how serious the problems the Indonesian government 
faced. It might be true to say that the country experienced ―involution‖ or 
pseudo development rather than development. 
In spite of this, there was also a problem related to employment. In 
the year 1988, when Indonesia experienced high economic growth, in a 
discussion hosted by Kompas daily newspaper (Sukamdi, 1996), there 
was a growing sceptical view regarding the future of employment in 
Indonesia as can be seen in the following statement: 
Saya tidak khawatir mengenai ekonomi Indonesia di masa 
depan. Saya tidak khawatir akan pertumbuhannya, investasinya 
atau ekspor nonmigasnya. Soal pembayaran hutang luar negeri 
pun saya tidak khawatir, tetapi kalau sudah soal kesempatan 
kerja, ya maaf, saya tidak punya dasar untuk yakin. 
I don't worry about Indonesian economy in the future. I don‘t 
worry about the growth, investment or non-oil exports. 
Concerning foreign debt payment I also don't have any worries, 
but if we turn to employment opportunities, sorry, I don‘t have 
any reason to be optimistic. 
Two important points can be derived from this statement. First, there 
was an optimistic view about the future of the Indonesian economy. This 
was reasonable since the macro economy indicators generally did not 
show any serious problems. Second, good economic performance does 
not guarantee that other factors, such as employment, are positively 
influenced.  Hasibuan  (1994) stated that even though economic growth 
in the First Long Term Development Plan (PJP I) was high enough and 
the per capita income was significantly increasing, there was no evidence 
that employment was also growing as fast as economic growth. Table 3.4 
shows that the employment growth in agriculture during 1961-1990 was 
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always higher than growth in industry. This means that industrialisation 
did not create sufficient employment to absorb the labour surplus in the 
agricultural sector. Moreover, the growth of industry was the lowest 
compared to both the agricultural and services sectors. 
 
Table 3.4 Employment by Sector, 1961-1990 
Sector 
Share (%) Growth (%) 
1961 1971 1980 1990 
1961-
1971 
1971-
1980 
1980-
1990 
Agriculture 73.0 65.8 56.1 50.1 28.2 24.4 34.1 
Industry 8.1 10.1 13.3 17.0 20.6 23.7 26.7 
• Manufacturing 5.9 7.8 9.2 11.6 18.2 13.6 18.1 
• Construction 1.8 1.9 3.2 4.1 2.6 7.5 6.5 
Services 18.9 24.1 30.6 32.9 51.2 51.8 39.2 
• Trade 6.9 11.0 13.1 15.0 32.4 20.1 20.0 
• Transportation 2.2 2.4 2.9 3.7 3.8 4.4 5.9 
• Finance 9.8 10.7 14.6 14.2 15.0 27.4 13.2 
Total (%) 100.0 100 100 100    
 (000) 32,911 39,163 51,196 70,608 6,252 6,810 19,412 
Source: Hill 2000, 33. 
Note: These are census years. 
 
One of the indicators that reveal this problem is open 
unemployment.15 In 1980, from a labour force of 52.4 million, 896 
thousand, or 1.71 percent, were looking for a job. This figure increased to 
3.2 percent in 1990, which was equivalent to 2.3 million in the labour 
force. This means that the number of unemployed increased by 3.3 
percent annually. In the period of 1982-1997, the open unemployment 
rate increased substantially (Figure 3.4) and in 1997, the number of 
unemployed reached 4.27 million, or increased by 18 percent annually, 
during the period of 1980-1997. This was higher than the increase of the 
                                                 
15
 The Open Unemployment Rate (OUR) is the percentage of the labour force that is looking for 
work. 
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labour force in the same period. Based on this figure, it is clear that the 
problem of both unemployment and underemployment was embedded in 
the fast increase of the labour force as a result of relatively high 
population growth and an increasing labour force participation rate 
during this period. 
In addition, a large part of the labour force was lowly educated. For 
example, in 1997 about 65 percent of the labour force had only primary 
education or less. During the New Order, educational development 
achieved good progress, but it was not enough to enable people to enter 
the industrial sector. 
 
Figure 3.4 Unemployment Rate 1982-1997 Figure  4. Unemployment Rate 1982-1997
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Source: ADB, 2000: Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 1982-
1999 
 
The open unemployment rate (OUR) was, of course, increasing; 
however, we must bear in mind that the problem of employment in 
developing countries is not very well represented by open 
unemployment, but rather by underemployment. The OUR is not a good 
indicator for the employment problem in developing countries because of 
the absence of social security, people are forced to work in any type of 
job. This explains why the structure of employment did not transform 
from agriculture to industry, but to services, given the fact that the 
services sector was mostly dominated by the informal sector, which is 
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very easy to enter. The result is that many people are underutilised. The 
number of under employed persons in Indonesia was about 36.5 percent 
of the total amount of labour performed, both for 1980 and 1990.16 
There are several reasons why we must worry about the problems of 
unemployment and underemployment (Turnham, 1993). First, mass 
unemployment may create social and political unrest. The chance is 
greater when unemployment is dominated by young, educated people, as 
can be observed in the Indonesian case. Secondly, while limited 
employment opportunities have forced people to enter unproductive jobs, 
which might be better than being unemployed, it does not eliminate their 
difficulties in fulfilling their basic needs. This in turn will create a new 
entrance into poverty. Even though it is not the only factor, it may 
generate a wider problem than the economic crisis. The Indonesian 
experience tends to prove this argument. 
 
Figure 3.5 Employment Share 1982-1997 Figure  5. Employment Share 1982-1997
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Source: ADB, 2000, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 1982-
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Another problem is that industrialisation in Indonesia has not 
provided enough employment opportunities in industry. As can be seen 
                                                 
16
 Underemployment based on working hours. Those working less than 35 hours per week were 
included as underemployment.  
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from Figure 3.5, during the period of 1982-1997, labour absorption in the 
industrial sector was limited. It is very clear that the structure of 
employment does not correspond to the model of the transition from 
agriculture to industry, but to the alternative model of the transition from 
agriculture to services. In 1997, one year before the crisis came to a peak, 
the services sector surpassed the agricultural sector, achieving more than 
45 percent. At the same time, absorption in industry was very limited, 
less than 15 percent. What we can conclude from this fact is that 
industrialisation in Indonesia has failed to transform simultaneously the 
structure of employment. 
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Chapter IV 
1993-1997: The Limits of Economic Growth 
and Regional Disparities 
Abstract 
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an analysis of economic 
growth, including the economic and transformation processes and 
regional disparities, in order to understand the process of economic 
development in Indonesia during the period prior to the crisis. As the 
financial crisis started in August 1997, the analysis focuses on the period 
of 1993-1997.The main question is about the character of the economic 
transformation processes that occurred in the period prior to the crisis at 
national, provincial and district levels. To address this issue, spatially and 
sectoral disaggregated descriptive data analysis is used. The finding 
shows that at the national and provincial level, Indonesia experienced 
what can be called ―weak industrialisation‖, characterised by relatively 
high economic growth particularly supported by the growth of industry 
that was not accompanied by sufficient employment creation in that 
sector. Not industry but agriculture absorbed most of the employment. In 
addition, the economic and employment structures transformed from 
agriculture to services, not to industry. 
IV.1 Weak Industrialisation 
The history of the Indonesian economy provides an example on how 
the country has gone through a very dynamic situation and the way the 
country has escaped from a series of crises, which in turn have had their 
own influence on the country‘s recent economic performance. It is also a 
fact that the crisis as understood at a macro level has a different impact 
on lower levels of administration units and even on the individual level. 
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Thus, it is important to understand the nature and impact of the crisis at 
all levels. 
The discussion is divided into three analytical levels. First, national 
economic development is the main focus of analysis for understanding 
the structural transformation of the economic and employment structure 
at the national level. Second, the analysis of regional disparities focuses 
on the provincial level in Java with a similar approach as that is used to 
understand the structural transformation. These two levels of analysis 
will form the basis of the investigation on the impact of the economic 
crisis at the national and provincial levels in Chapter V. Third, the 
discussion at the national and provincial levels is followed by an analysis 
at the district level. The focus of this analysis is economic growth, and 
transformation of economic and employment structure. Combined 
together these three analyses form the basis for the further examination of 
industrialisation at the district level. 
Discussion at the district level is very important especially in this 
chapter, since it provides the foundation to explain economic 
performance in the period prior to the economic crisis (1993-
1997). Economic performance at the district level in this period is also 
the basis for testing the first hypothesis: the more industrialised the area 
was before the crisis, the more drastic the decrease of both the percentage 
of people working in the manufacturing sector and the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to the Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) 
will be during the crisis. This hypothesis will be tested in Chapter V. 
There are two important aspects that should be taken into account for 
understanding contemporary Indonesian development. First, there are the 
factors related to the industrialisation process, the strategy that was 
chosen to foster economic development in Indonesia. These factors are 
correlated with the second aspect, that is, the regional component, 
especially in reference to disparity and inequality, which according to 
Hill (1992) is of great importance to national development. Williamson 
(cited in Brojonegoro, 2002) argues that the relationship between 
regional disparity and national development follows two stages (see also 
Szirmai, 2005). First, during the early stage of development regional 
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disparity grows wider and development tends to concentrate in certain 
areas. Second, in the more mature stage of national economic growth, 
regional convergence reduces the regional disparities significantly. 
An important aspect of industrialisation is the development of the 
manufacturing sector, referring to its contribution to both economic and 
employment structure. As mentioned by Colin Clark and Simon Kuznets 
(cited in: Szirmai, 2005: 260), economic development involves a 
structural transformation in which factors of production are transferred 
from agriculture to the industrial sector. This process is defined by the 
decline of the share of agriculture and the increase of the share of 
industry to the total employment structure. At the same time, the share of 
agriculture also declines in terms of its share in the gross domestic 
product, while the share of industry in the gross domestic product 
increases. 
Indonesia‘s development has been going through a very dynamic and 
fluctuating phase. According to Thee (2000), in the mid-1960s, 
Indonesia‘s manufacturing sector lagged behind compared to its 
Southeast Asian neighbours. 
 
Table 4.1 Indonesia’s Industrial Development in an Asian Perspective, 1965-
1997 
 
Value Added in 
Manufacturing 
(US$ Million) 
Annual Growth of 
Manufacturing Sector 
(%) 
Manufacturing 
Value Added 
(%GDP) 
Manufactured 
Exports (% of 
total exports) 
1970 1996 
1965-
1980 
1980-
1990 
1990-
1997 
1965 1997 1980 1997 
Asean 4 
Indonesia 994 58,244 12.0 12.6 10.8 8 26 2 42 
Malaysia 500 34,030 - 8.9 13.1 9 34 19 76 
Philippines 1,622 18,908 7.5 0.2 3.1 20 22 21 45 
Thailand 1,230 51,525 11.2 4.5 9.3 14 29 25 71 
Large Northeast Asian Developing Countries 
Rep of Korea 1,880 125,314 18.7 - - 18 26 90 92 
China 30,466 308,945 9.5 10.4 15.5 31 37 - 85 
Source: Thee (2000) pp. 421. 
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As can be seen from Table 4.1, the growth of the manufacturing 
sector in the period of 1965-1997 reached double digits. It was the 
highest amongst the four ASEAN countries, except during the period of 
1990-1997, when Malaysia achieved a higher growth than Indonesia. In 
addition to this, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the total 
exports of the country increased dramatically, from 2 percent in 1980, to 
42 percent in 1997. Hill (1996) argues that this was primarily caused by a 
series of deregulation measures in the trade, investment, and financial 
sectors, which started in the mid-1980s and lasted through the early 
1990s.17 It is quite impressive that the manufactured exports comprised 
the largest part of non-oil and gas exports. Hill (1996) observes a 
tremendous growth in manufactured exports from $500 million in 1980 
to $2.6 billion in 1986. The increase even more than doubled during the 
following two years, 1986-1988, and almost doubled again in 1988-1990. 
In the 1990s, manufactured exports tended to slow down. Three 
plausible factors can be proposed (Thee, 2001). First, there was a 
decrease of wood-based products and textile/garments exports that 
constituted the largest portion of manufactured exports. Second, there 
was a decline of export competitiveness in the resource-intensive 
manufacturing sector and low-skilled labour-intensive products, such as 
wood-based products, textiles, garments, and footwear. Third, the high 
increase of manufactured exports was due to its very low rate at the 
beginning of the period. Additionally, the global recession in the 1990s 
affected the growth of world trade, which in turn affected Indonesian 
manufactured exports. 
Table 4.2 shows the trend of manufactured exports in the period of 
1980-1993. The data provide evidence that export from manufactured 
products increased significantly in the period of 1980-1993 from 2 
percent to 53 percent. Throughout the entire period, the largest portion of 
manufactured exports came from labour-intensive products, except in 
1985 when resource-intensive products were the highest. The share of 
                                                 
17
 The description of deregulation measures can be found in Chapter II. 
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capital-intensive products was less than 20 percent at its highest level in 
1980. During the period of 1985-1993, the share was even lower at less 
than 15 percent. It is important to bear in mind that the annual growth of 
these products consistently increased, while the others declined. 
 
Table 4.2 Major Manufactured Exports, Indonesia, 1980-1993 
Sources of Exports 
Value of Exports Annual Export Growth (%) 
1980 1985 1990 1993 
1980-
1985 
1985-
1990 
1990-
1993 
1980-
1993 
Labour intensive (million of $) 287 785 4634 11344 22.3 42.6 34.8 32.7 
Percentage of all manufactures 57.1 38.4 51.3 58.4     
Major Item (million $)         
Clothing 98 339 1646 3502 28.2 37.2 28.6 31.7 
Woven fabrics 43 227 1132 2247 39.5 37.9 25.7 35.6 
Footwear 1 8 570 1661 51.6 134.7 42.8 76.9 
Electronics 94 77 204 1382 -3.9 21.5 89.2 23.0 
Resource Intensive (million of $) 119 992 3324 5364 52.8 27.4 17.3 34.0 
Percentage of all manufactures 23.7 48.5 36.8 27.6     
Major Item (million $)         
Plywood 68 941 2791 4586 69.1 24.3 10.4 -56.8 
Capital Intensive (millions of $) 97 266 1083 2729 22.4 32.4 36.1 29.3 
Percentage of all manufactures 19.3 13.0 12.0 14.0     
Total all manufactures (million 
of $) 
503 2044 9041 19437 32.4 34.6 29.1 32.5 
Three largest (% of total) 52 74 61 53     
Manufactures as percentage of 
Total export 
2 11 35 53     
Source: Hill (1996) Table 1. Export growth is calculated by the author. 
 
IV.2 Regional Disparities and Inequalities 
Spatial analysis on Indonesian development is very important for 
several reasons. First, it is self evident that Indonesia is a big country that 
clearly constitutes distinct cultures and regions. Hill (1991) aptly 
describes Indonesia as ―unity in diversity‖, whereas Dick (2002) refers to 
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the archipelago as ―diversity in unity‖. For many years, the country was 
divided into 27 provinces, but after decentralisation, some provinces split 
so that presently there is a total of 33 provinces.18 Each province has its 
own resources to support regional development, which not only affects 
performance at the provincial level but also at district levels. Meanwhile, 
regional contribution to the industrialisation process at the national level 
is also very important. 
Second, regional development became an important issue after the 
implementation of regional autonomy. Shifting power from the central to 
the local government was expected to bring about a better local economy 
that could reduce regional disparity. Third, in reference to the analysis of 
this chapter, understanding the regional diversity in terms of provincial 
and district economic performance is indeed important to establish the 
correct contextual analysis. 
Regional disparity and inequality represent the biggest challenges to 
Indonesian development. There are at least two approaches to 
understanding regional development (Aziz, 1991). The first approach 
starts from the economic base concept that considers a region‘s exports 
as determining factors in regional economic development. This implies 
that ―the regional problem is nothing but a balance of payments problem‖ 
(p: 56). The second approach views regional differentials in term of rates 
of return stemming from variations in environment and/or infrastructure, 
rather than from disequilibrium in the capital-labour ratio. Regions are 
becoming less developed because of low factors of productivity, not 
because of bad luck or market failure. 
This chapter will examine the important issues in regional 
development using total and per capita Gross Regional Domestic Product 
(GRDP) as indicators. In addition, there will be an analysis of regional 
development in terms of how the provincial, as well as district, levels go 
through the industrialisation process. We will focus on structural 
transformation using two main indicators: sectoral share of GRDP and 
employment. The assumption is that industrialisation should take these 
                                                 
18
 There is a great possibility that the number of provinces will increase in the future due to the 
increasing demand of several areas to establish new provinces. 
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two indicators in the same direction, shifting from agriculture to industry, 
then to services. 
 
Figure 4.1 Pathways to enhance Human Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic development indicators are not sufficient to examine 
regional diversity. According to the human development approach, 
economic development is only a means to achieve a higher-level goal, 
namely human well-being. Economic growth should be accompanied by 
a changing income distribution to achieve an improvement in the 
standard of living and reduction in poverty. At the same time, economic 
growth should be used by the government to allocate the money for more 
public social spending that will in turn create improvement in health care 
and education (see Figure 4.1). These three dimensions - economy, 
education, and health - are essential in understanding development goals. 
Based on this argument, the discussion in this chapter will also employ 
HDI (human development index) as an indicator in the assessment of the 
diversity of regional situations. 
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Source: Indonesia Human Development Report 2004, Box 3.2 
GDP growth 
income 
distribution 
public social 
spending 
private spending 
on education and 
health 
improvement in 
health and 
educationindicators 
improvement in living 
standards and 
reduction in poverty 
The Limits of Economic Growth 
64 
 
 
  
 F
ig
u
re
 4
.2
 
T
h
e 
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
G
D
P
 i
n
 1
9
9
6
 
 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 D
ic
k
, 
2
0
0
2
 
The Limits of Economic Growth 
65 
The gap between the more developed areas (Java, Sumatra, and Bali) 
and the less developed areas of Indonesia (Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Nusa 
Tenggara, Maluku, and Irian Jaya) reflects regional disparity in 
Indonesia. In 1971, for instance, Java island, which represents about 6 
percent of Indonesia‘s land area, was occupied by roughly 60 percent of 
the population and produced more than 50 percent of the total GDP. In 
contrast,  Irian Jaya with 20 percent of Indonesia‘s land area and 1 
percent of the total population contributed only 0.7 percent of the GDP. 
Ten years later, the contribution of Java slightly decreased to about 50 
percent and that of the other islands increased (see Hill 1991). Irian Jaya, 
for example, experienced an increase of 1.3 percent in 1983. 
In 1997, at the beginning of the crisis, Java‘s share to the national 
GDP was even higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s, at about 64.1 
percent, while Irian Jaya‘s was only 1.6 percent after excluding the oil 
and gas sectors (Akita and Alisjahbana, 2002). Data provided by Dick 
(2002) shows a similar pattern (see Figure 4.2). The share of Java to the 
GDP was about 64 percent, of which about 20 percent was the share of 
the Greater Jakarta region. This is because Java supplies most of the non-
oil exports of the country. Exports from Java were mainly dominated by 
three metropolitan areas (Greater Jakarta, Bandung, and Greater 
Surabaya), which according to Hill (1990a and 1990b) constituted about 
60 percent of the non-oil and gas manufacturing GDP of Indonesia. This 
shows that Java played a crucial role in both the national economy and 
the industrialisation process. Figures provided by Garcia and 
Soelistyaningsih (1998: 97) have also strengthened the conclusion that 
regional disparity is eminent in Indonesia. During the period of 1975-
1993, the contribution of Java alone to the national GDP increased from 
50 to 59 percent. Sumatra came second after Java in terms of contribution 
to the national GDP. It experienced a decline of its share to the GDP 
from 32 to 23 percent in the same period (1975-1993). These two islands, 
Java and Sumatra, together produced about 80 percent of Indonesia‘s 
GDP. Using Williamson‘s index of regional disparities, Brodjonegoro 
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(2002) comes to the conclusion that in the period of 1995-1997, regional 
disparities in Indonesia were relatively high.19 
Akita and Lukman (1995) as well as Akita and Alisyahbana (2002) 
conclude that at the provincial level, income equality remained stable. 
During the period of 1985-1993, for instance, the weighted coefficient of 
variation at the provincial level, after excluding the oil and gas sectors, 
was virtually constant. The coefficient was in the range of 0.54-0.55 
during 1985-1993 as measured by the GRDP by the 1983 constant price, 
and it was in the range of 0.66-0.67 in 1993-1997 as measured by the 
1993 constant price. The coefficient was much larger when the oil and 
gas sectors were included, but this gradually decreased with the fall of 
this sector‘s contribution. 
 
Table 4.3 Distribution of GDP by Sector and Main Island Group, 1975 and 1993 
Island 
1975 1993 
A M S A M S 
Sumatra 22 56 23 20 43 38 
Java 33 16 51 15 28 57 
Bali 48 4 49 22 8 69 
Nusa Tenggara 65 3 32 39 6 55 
Kalimantan 30 37 33 18 44 37 
Sulawesi 51 4 44 35 13 52 
Maluku+Irian Jaya 34 43 23 22 44 35 
Indonesia 31 30 39 18 31 51 
Source: Garcia and Soelistyaningsih (1998): Table 1 and 2 pp: 98-99 with 
modification 
Note: A = Agriculture; M = Manufacture; S = Services 
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 According to Brodjonegoro (2002), results from using another method, i.e., the entropy 
method, conflicted showing that economic activity in Indonesia was reasonably dispersed, but 
the Williamson Index is better for reflecting regional welfare, since it has the advantage of 
weighting the GRDP with the total population. 
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In 1975, the contribution of manufacturing to the GDP was low in 
Java, while in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Maluku and Irian Jaya it was the 
highest. Two decades later, the share of manufacturing in Java still was 
lower than these three islands/island groups. The increase of the 
manufacturing sector20 in Java during this period, however, was the 
highest (see Table 4.3), even higher than national growth. In the period of 
1975-1993, the share of manufacturing to the GDP in Java increased by 
12 percent, from 16 to 28 percent, while in Kalimantan it was only 7 
percent, and in Maluku and Irian Jaya it was 1 percent. In contrast, 
Sumatra experienced a significant decrease, which was about 13 percent 
in the same period. Garcia and Soelistyaningsih (1998) argue that Java 
exported mainly manufactured goods, while Sumatra and Kalimantan 
exported primarily oil and gas. The decrease of manufacturing in 
Sumatra then probably is due to the decreasing role of exports from oil 
and gas. 
From an economic geography perspective, the situation of recent 
Indonesian economic development concerning regional disparities is the 
best way to explain the spatial pattern of development and 
underdevelopment. Two interrelated aspects could describe this situation, 
namely regional context and historical context. In terms of regional 
context, the fact that Java, Sumatra, and Bali have been exposed and 
integrated into the world market might best explain why these areas are 
more developed. In contrast, the absence of networking with 
neighbouring economies might also explain why the rest of the regions 
are underdeveloped. This situation has been sustained since the early 18
th
 
century. 
Historically, the Dutch government paid more attention to Java than 
to the outer islands (Dick; 2002), parts of which were, according to 
Lindblad (2002: 82) ―only very loosely subject to Dutch colonial rule‖. 
Only specific areas in Sumatra and Sulawesi received attention from the 
Dutch government. Dick (2002) notes that there were only 15 small 
settlements outside Java: Padang, Bengkulu, Palembang, Muntok, Riau, 
Sambas, Pontianak, Banjarmasin, Makassar, Manado, Ternate, Ambon, 
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Banda, Kupang, and Bima. In recent economic development, most of 
these settlements have become economically advanced. Riau, Padang, 
and Bengkulu are important cities in Sumatra, while Pontianak and 
Banjarmasin are prominent cities in Kalimantan, while Manado and 
Ambon are influential cities in Sulawesi and Maluku, respectively. 
Kupang and Bima are the growing cities in Nusa Tenggara, the eastern 
part of Indonesia. These facts confirm the notion that a historical 
perspective is important to explain why certain areas are more developed 
than others. In other words, the presence and attention of the Dutch 
during the colonial period bears significant influence on regional 
development in recent years. 
IV.3 Interprovincial Disparities 
As the core of the country‘s economy, Java as a whole has benefited 
from development more than the other islands have. However, some 
areas in Java seem to have enjoyed more advantages than others, as 
disparities among provinces persist. 
Analysis of the distribution of the GDP among the 27 provinces in 
Indonesia (see Brodjonegoro, 2002) provides an example of how the 
economy had been centralised in Jakarta. In 1993, the share of Jakarta to 
the GDP, which is only 0.03 percent of total land area of the country, was 
as high as 17.5 percent. This figure increased from 8.8 percent in 1971, 
and 10.5 in 1983 (Table 4.5). Also, in the 1980s, Jakarta accounted for a 
significant share of Indonesia‘s estate product exports (Aziz, 1991: 59). 
Using categorisation developed by Hill (1992), Jakarta is the only 
province in the category of ―consistent economic and social variables‖, 
which has the highest per capita GRDP, the highest growth rate, and the 
best overall social achievement. As capital of the nation, Jakarta has 
benefited the most from development in comparison to the other 
provinces. 
In terms of per capita GDP, Jakarta is exceptional. This province is 
the richest, not only in comparison with the other provinces on Java, but 
also with Indonesia as a whole. Just as a comparison, in 1997, the per 
capita GDP of Jakarta was nine times higher than that of East Nusa 
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Tenggara, or almost four times higher than the other provinces on Java 
(Table 4.4). If we look back at the 1970s and 1980s (Table 4.5), the gap 
of per capita GDP between provinces on Java has already emerged. In 
1971, for instance, the per capita GDP of Jakarta was three times that of 
Yogyakarta, which was the lowest on Java. In 1983, the gap increased to 
more than four times higher. This gap did not change very much until 
1997 (Table 4.4). 
Yogyakarta province contributes the least to the GDP in comparison 
to the other provinces on Java. As can be seen in Table 4.5, this province 
contributed only 1.5 percent to the total GDP. Yogyakarta and Central 
Java were among the poorest provinces in terms of regional income 
statistics (see Booth and Damanik, 1991). In addition, per capita GDP of 
this province was also among the lowest, and was lower than the average 
per capita GDP of Java. 
However, special attention should be paid to the Special Region of 
Yogyakarta as we try to understand the relationship between economic 
and social development. Yogyakarta is unique in a sense that social and 
economic developments do not occur in accordance to theoretical 
expectations. Classical studies on the relationship between infant 
mortality and per capita income show that there is a negative correlation 
between the two: the higher the income, the lower the infant mortality 
rate, with the exceptions of Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, and Kerala. 
Yogyakarta is also one of these exceptions. Its per capita income is quite 
low compared to other provinces, but its infant mortality is among the 
lowest. According to Hill (1992), Yogyakarta, together with North 
Sulawesi, are among the provinces in the category of ―good social 
indicators; lagging economies‖. Comparing several social performance 
indicators, such as infant mortality rate, poverty rate, and junior high 
school enrolment, with the GRDP, Hill (1992) found out that these two 
province‘s social performances are superior to the national average, 
while their GRDP was below average. 
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Table 4.4 Per Capita GDP by Province in 1993-1998(without Oil and Gas) 
Province 
Per Capita GDP 
(in thousands IDR) 
Growth Rate (%) 
1993 1997 1998 
1993-
1997 
1997-
1998 
SUMATRA  1.342.1 1.717.5 1.583.8 6.4 -7.8 
Aceh 1.308.3 1.644.3 1.521.6 5.9 -7.5 
North Sumatra 1.648.5 2.186.6 1.981.1 7.3 -9.4 
West Sumatra 1.448.7 1.815.5 1.678.7 5.8 -7.5 
Riau 1.635.1 2.162.9 2.119.1 7.2 -2.0 
Jambi 1.077.9 1.296.7 1.180.1 4.7 -9.0 
South Sumatra 1.245.9 1.573.3 1.442.4 6.0 -8.3 
Bengkulu 1.100.1 1.255.7 1.171.2 2.7 -4.4 
Lampung 853.4 1.059.8 959.1 5.6 -9.5 
JAVA AND BALI 1.661.6 2.173.8 1.852.5 6.9 -14.8 
DKI Jakarta 5.801.7 7.424.2 5.979.2 6.4 -19.5 
West Java 1.377.3 1.882.3 1.546.5 8.1 -17.8 
Central Java 1.069.8 1.338.9 1.211.1 5.8 -9.5 
DI Yogyakarta 1.390.5 1.760.1 1.562.5 6.1 -11.2 
East Java 1.405.4 1.827.8 1.632.1 6.8 -10.7 
Bali 2.009.6 2.579.3 2.447.2 6.4 -5.1 
KALIMANTAN 2.043.5 2.681.6 2.585.0 7.0 -3.6 
West Kalimantan 1.506.3 1.963.1 1.888.8 6.8 -3.8 
Central Kalimantan 1.968.4 2.538.5 2.372.9 6.6 -6.5 
South Kalimantan 1.624.0 2.092.3 1.965.0 6.5 -6.1 
East Kalimantan 3.516.0 4.619.3 4.558.8 7.1 -1.3 
SULAWESI 1.007.5 1.264.1 1.200.8 5.8 -5.0 
North Sulawesi 1.091.3 1.465.4 1.443.4 7.6 -1.5 
Central Sulawesi 948.5 1.138.3 1.070.4 4.7 -6.0 
South Sulawesi 1.022.9 1.283.7 1.211.1 5.8 -5.7 
Southeast Sulawesi 860.8 995.1 917.1 3.7 -7.8 
OTHERS 872.6 1.096.2 1.030.1 5.9 -6.0 
West Nusa Tenggara 719.0 897.3 859.1 5.7 -4.3 
East Nusa Tenggara 610.1 771.4 718.3 6.0 -6.9 
East Timor 623.6 825.6 813.4 7.3 -1.5 
Maluku 1.219.8 1.441.5 1.342.6 4.3 -6.9 
Irian Jaya 1.398.2 1.828.8 1.694.3 6.9 -7.4 
TOTAL 1.520.9 1.973.8 1.738.1 6.7 -11.9 
Source: Akita and Alisjahbana (2002) Table 2. 
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Like Yogyakarta, the contribution of Central Java to the GDP was 
low and the per capita GRDP was even lower than that of Yogyakarta. In 
1971, its share was only 12.5 percent and even decreased to less than 10 
percent in 1983 (Table 4.5). The growth of the industrial sector in this 
province, together with Yogyakarta, was lower than the country as a 
whole (Booth and Damanik, 1991: 294). 
 
Table 4.5 GDP and GDP per Capita, 1971 and 1983 (Current Price) 
Provinces 
1971 1983 
Total GDP GDP per 
Capita 
(IDR. 
‘000) 
IGDP 
PC (with 
oil) 
IGDP 
PC 
(with-
out oil) 
Total GDP GDP per 
Capita 
(IDR. 
‘000) 
IGDP 
PC (with 
oil) 
IGDPPC 
(with-
out oil) 
IDR 
(billion) 
% 
IDR 
(billion) 
% 
Jakarta 329,0 8.8 71,8 228 248 7192.5 10.5 984.3 227 276 
West Java 550.1 14.6 25.4 81 88 9,185.9 13.4 309.7 71 87 
Central Java 470.4 12.5 21.5 68 74 6,740.9 9.8 253.3 58 74 
Yogyakarta 54.7 1.5 22.0 70 76 713.1 1.0 251.2 58 65 
East Java 656.8 17.5 25.7 82 89 10,347.8 15.1 339.6 78 97 
Java 2061.0 54.9 27.1   34180.2 49.9 356.7   
Indonesia 3,757.0 100.0 31.5 100 100 68,438.5 100.0 433.2 100 100 
Source: Hill (1991) Table 1.1. with modification 
Note: Figure for total GDP and GDP per Capita for Java are calculated by the author 
IGDP PC: Index GDP Per Capita 
 
In 1970s and 1980s, Hill (1992) included West Java in what he calls 
―prosperous economies; indifferent social records or growth without 
development‖. Since its location is adjacent to Jakarta, this province has 
benefited from fast economic development of its neighbouring province. 
The value of the GRDP of this province was the second highest after East 
Java, and the contribution of its GRDP to the GDP was higher than 
Jakarta. However, due to its large number of inhabitants, the per capita 
GDP of this province was much lower than Jakarta‘s. Daroesman‘s 
research (Hill, 1991: 255) concludes that: 
West Java has generally been the most prosperous of the 
provinces in Java. Its vast paddy fields produce more rice than 
any other provinces, its textiles produce two-thirds of all 
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domestic production, its population density is probably less 
and, to a casual observer its cities appear more prosperous than 
most of the large cities of Central and East Java and 
Yogyakarta. 
However, in terms of social indicators, such as educational 
achievement, it was lowest, and its infant mortality rate was the fourth 
highest in the country. 
East Java is a very densely populated and resource-poor (in terms of 
land-labour ratio). Hill (1992) considers this province as traditionally 
poor, but experiencing rapid improvement. The rapid development of this 
province is also seen by Mackie and Zain (1991) due to successful 
diversification, balanced growth, as well as commercialisation of the 
economy. In spite of that, this province is also a highly urbanised area 
with a high proportion of households working in industry. We can see in 
Table 4.5 that this province had the highest GRDP. It also had the highest 
contribution to the GDP. Similar to West Java, East Java‘s per capita 
GRDP was less than Jakarta‘s due to its large population. In the 1980s, 
when socio-economic changes had taken place, this province still faced a 
serious employment problem. Insufficient increase of employment 
opportunity resulted in unemployment and underemployment problems. 
The main question is whether the differences in the levels of 
economic development as described here can explain the effects of the 
economic crisis. If so, the next question is to what extent different effects 
of the crisis can be observed among the provinces in terms of 
employment and economic structure. Before discussing the effects of the 
economic crisis at the provincial level, the following section will 
examine the structural transformation in each province to create a 
baseline for comparison with the conditions during the crisis. 
IV.4 Economic and Employment Structure in Java (1993-1997) 
IV.4.1 Provincial Level 
This section will discuss the performance prior to the crisis (1993-
1997) with a focus on the island of Java, excluding Jakarta. The analysis 
will be based on two important variables: sectoral share and growth, both 
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in economic and employment structures. This analysis is very important 
as a foundation for an understanding of the results of the industrialisation 
process on Java, which in turn will be used to analyse household 
economic performance in the following chapter. In addition to analysing 
employment and economic structure, we will also analyse development 
performance from a human development perspective, using the Human 
Development Index (HDI), as well as its components separately. The 
analysis will be divided into two parts, which represent the situation at 
the provincial and district levels. 
a. Employment Structure 
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide evidence that the island of Java, excluding 
Jakarta, experienced a tremendous decline in the capacity of the 
agriculture  to absorb the labour force before the crisis. The decline of its 
share was more than 6 percent in the period 1993-1997. This decline was 
lower than the national level, which amounted to almost 10 percent. At 
the provincial level, the pattern is similar (see also Figure 4.1), showing a 
decline in all provinces. Among them, Central Java experienced the 
highest decline of agriculture‘s share of employment (7.6 percent) 
followed by, West Java (6.2 percent), Yogyakarta (6 percent), and East 
Java (4.2 percent). 
 
Table 4.6 Share of Employment by Sector in 1993 and in 1997 (%) 
Provinces 
1993 1997 
A M S Total A M S Total 
West Java 37.88 22.41 39.71 14613750 31.57 24.29 44.14 14968406 
Central Java 50.67 17.78 31.55 14171820 43.09 21.28 35.62 13805856 
Yogyakarta 45.83 18.03 36.14 1566441 39.82 18.97 41.21 1506376 
East Java 51.46 15.82 32.71 16177147 47.23 16.73 36.04 16080822 
Java  46.72 18.53 34.75 45349608 40.70 20.60 38.70 46515561 
Indonesia 50.60 11.92 37.49 79200000 40.73 13.92 45.35 85406000 
Source: BPS. 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1994d and BPS, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1998d. 
Note: A: Agriculture; M: Manufacture; S: Services 
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In contrast, the manufacturing sector in Java, which had become the 
main focus of economic development, was able to increase its absorption 
to merely 2.1 percent in the same period (see Figure 4.3), which was only 
half of the increasing share of service sector. This illustrates that 
manufacturing was not able to compensate for the limited capacity of 
agriculture to absorb labourers in the 1993-1997 period. 
Figure 4.4 shows that among the provinces, Central Java had the 
highest increase of manufacturing share of employment before the crisis 
(3.5 percent), which was higher than that of Java, as well as of Indonesia 
as a whole. The second highest was West Java (2 percent), while in 
Yogyakarta and East Java, the share of employment in the manufacturing 
sector increased less than 1 percent. Interestingly, the service sector on 
Java as a whole achieved a remarkable increase of its share in 
employment at 4 percent. It was even more than 5 percent in Yogyakarta. 
Agricultural employment declined significantly in relation to its share 
in total employment, as well as to the number of people working in this 
sector. The number of people employed in agriculture decreased from 
21.7 million to 18.7 million during the 1993-1997 periods. In other 
words, Java‘s agricultural sector lost 2.9 million agricultural workers in 4 
years, or 716,000 people annually. On the other hand, the capacity of the 
manufacturing and services sectors together increased by 2.7 million in 
the same period, or about 675,000 annually. Employment in Java 
experienced a deficit in this period of about 42,000 each year. Out of the 
4 provinces, only West Java experienced a surplus (355,000). The other 
three provinces had deficit employment, with the highest deficit in 
Central Java (366,000) followed by East Java (96,000) and Yogyakarta 
(60,000). The pattern of employment growth is shown graphically in 
Figure 4.4. 
What does this mean? First, relatively good economic development in 
terms of economic growth before the crisis failed to provide sufficient 
employment opportunities. Second, the shift of employment in Indonesia 
during a normal period was not from agriculture to manufacturing, but to 
services. This means that the transformation of the employment structure 
did not follow the patterns of industrialisation. This also tells us how 
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important the service sector is in employment development in Indonesia. 
The domination of the informal sector in the service sector is obvious. 
This enables the informal sector to expand its labour absorption capacity 
without any limitations. In the provinces where the growth of the 
manufacturing sector is stunted, the informal sector plays a significant 
role. This is especially true for the Special Region of Yogyakarta where, 
while the growth of the manufacturing sector came to a grinding halt due 
to limited resources, the expansion of the service sector in this province 
surpassed that of the other provinces. 
 
Figure 4.3 Changing Share of Employment by Province and Sector, 
1993-1997 
 
Source: BPS. 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1994d and BPS, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 
1998d 
 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 also reveal that, in general, agriculture still played 
an important role in employment, which can be seen from its share of 
employment, even though in the period of 1993-1997 its capacity had 
decreased substantially. However, a slightly different pattern can be 
found among the provinces. Yogyakarta experienced a shift in the 
employment structure from agriculture to services. In 1997, this province 
relied heavily upon the service sector to absorb labour. The situation was 
almost the same in Central Java and East Java where the employment 
structure transformed from agriculture to services, however until 1997, 
% 
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agriculture was still the most important sector in terms of labour 
absorption. This situation reflects Java‘s pattern in general. The province 
of West Java is the only province where the service sector dominates the 
economy. Since 1993, the service sector absorbed most of the province‘s 
labour force. Its capacity increased the most during the period of 1993-
1997. This may mean that in terms of employment structure, West Java is 
the only province that follows the pattern of industrialisation. 
 
Figure 4.4 Employment Annual Growth Rate by Province and 
Sector, 1993-1997 
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Source: BPS. 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1994d and BPS, 1998a; 1998b; 
1998c; 1998d 
 
b. Economic Structure 
In the last section the employment structure has been described. In 
this section the structure, pattern, trend, and growth of the economy will 
be addressed. As a measure GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product) is 
used in two variants: the growth of the GRDP and the sectoral share, or 
contribution, to the GRDP. 
In the period 1993-1997, the economic growth in the province of 
Yogyakarta was 4.8 percent annually, which was the lowest compared to 
other provinces on Java (Figure 4.4). Interestingly, the growth of the 
service sector at more than 5 percent was the highest compared to 
agriculture and manufacturing in 1993-1997 (Figure 3.4). This again 
% 
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shows that the service sector played an important role in the province‘s 
economy. Yogyakarta is also an example of a province where the service 
sector is the main driver of the economic growth. The contribution of this 
sector to the GRDP stood at almost 60 percent in 1993 and 1997 (Table 
4.7). Even during this period the share of the sector slightly increased. 
The importance of the service sector for Yogyakarta is now obvious on 
two fronts, namely economic and employment development. 
 
Table 4.7 Share of GRDP by Provinces and Sectors in 1993 and 1997 
Province 
1993 1997 
A M S A M S 
West Java 17.13 43.81 39.07 13.49 47.10 39.41 
Central Java 24.88 32.24 42.87 20.56 35.41 44.03 
Yogyakarta 16.60 24.63 58.77 15.28 25.78 58.94 
East Java 19.66 34.80 45.53 15.98 39.78 44.25 
Java 19.83 37.45 42.72 16.03 41.30 42.67 
Indonesia 17.88 39.68 42.44 14.88 43.16 41.96 
Source: BPS. 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1994d and BPS, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 1998d 
Note: A: Agriculture; M: Manufacture; S: Services 
 
Central Java experienced a much higher economic growth rate than 
Yogyakarta at 7.25 percent, but still lower than that of Java in general 
(Figure 4.4). The pattern of sectoral growth was different compared to 
Yogyakarta. The highest growth rate was achieved by the manufacturing 
sector (9.8 percent), followed by services (8 percent), while the lowest 
was agriculture (2 percent). It is very interesting to find that even though 
manufacturing grew the fastest, its share of the GRDP was not the 
highest. In terms of sectoral share, Central Java has shown a similar 
pattern to Yogyakarta in which the service sector contributed the highest 
portion to GRDP. This indicates that the service sector, and in particular 
the informal sector, still plays an important role when economic growth 
is high. 
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Data for West Java show a different pattern. In both 1993 and 1997, 
manufacturing contributed more than 40 percent to the GRDP (Table 
4.7). It was the only province in which the manufacturing sector made 
the largest contribution to the GRDP. During 1993-1997, the contribution 
of manufacturing increased to 54 percent, while services contracted from 
51.3 percent to 42.73 in the same period. In terms of annual economic 
growth, West Java‘s performance was the best compared to the other 
provinces, where the economy grew by 8.55 percent annually in the 
period of 1993-1997. West Java was also the only province with higher 
growth than that of Java and Indonesia in general. The economic 
condition of West Java is the best example of how economic growth was 
induced by the growth of manufacturing, which achieved double digits in 
this period. This is also supported by the fact that in terms of sectoral 
allocation of production, the share of manufacturing to the GRDP was 
also the highest compared to the shares of agriculture and services. 
 
Figure 4.5 Changing Shares of GRDP by Province and Sector, 
1993-1997 
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Source: BPS. 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1994d and BPS, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 
1998d 
 
The economic performance of East Java before the crisis was almost 
the same as it was in Central Java. East Java‘s economic growth was 
slightly lower than that of Central Java, but the pattern of sectoral share 
was the same in which service had the largest contribution to the GRDP, 
followed by manufacturing and services. 
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In terms of sectoral growth, the findings show that three types can be 
identified (see Figure 4.6). The first type was the province with low 
economic growth, while the growth and share of the services sector was 
the highest. We find this type in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. The 
second type was the province with high economic growth, high growth of 
manufacturing and a high share of manufacturing. These characteristics 
are found in West Java. The third type was the province with high 
economic growth, which was supported by the growth of manufacturing, 
while the share of service sector was the highest. This is the case of 
Central and East Java. This case suggests that manufacturing plays an 
important role in economic growth. In the cases where manufacturing 
does not perform well, such as in Yogyakarta, the total economic growth 
was the lowest. 
 
Figure 4.6 Annual Economic Growth by Province and Sector, 
1993-1997 
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Source: BPS. 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1994d and BPS, 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; 
1998d 
 
Data on economic and employment structure performance reveals 
also important findings. Before the crisis, Java experienced quite high 
economic growth, from 4.78 percent to 8.55 percent annually, but 
employment decreased overall. In contrast employment grew only in 
West Java and East Java while Yogyakarta and Central Java experienced 
a decrease in employment. This strengthens the argument that economic 
% 
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growth does not always leads to employment creation. In addition, there 
is very clear evidence that while manufacturing significantly contributes 
to economic growth, it does not always absorb labour in a significant 
manner. In Indonesia, which might not apply for other countries, the 
service sector fulfils the latter role, particularly in engaging labour 
surplus in the agricultural sector. 
 
Table 4.8 Human Development Index (HDI) by Province, 1996 
Province 
Life 
Expec- 
tancy 
(years) 
Adult 
Literacy 
Rate 
(%) 
Mean 
Years of 
Schooling 
(years) 
Adjusted 
per capita 
Expendi- 
tures 
(000 Rp) 
HDI 
HDI 
Rank 
West Java 62.9 89.7 6.4 591.6 68.2 14 
Central Java 64.8 81.3 5.5 594.5 67.0 17 
Yogyakarta 69.9 79.8 6.9 612.3 71.8 2 
East Java 63.8 77.7 5.5 594.3 65.5 22 
Indonesia 64.4 85.5 6.3 587.4 67.7  
Source: Indonesia Human Development Report 2001.pp: 78 
 
Surprisingly, the economic performance at the provincial level does 
not always relate positively to human development achievement. As can 
be seen in Table 4.8, Yogyakarta, which had the worst economic 
performance among provinces in Java, had the highest HDI scores. 
Among provinces in the entire country, this province occupies the second 
rank. It scored high in three components of HDI, namely life expectancy, 
mean years of schooling, and adjusted per capita expenditure. The 
province ranks third in the adult literacy rate. These figures again 
confirms Hill‘s (1992) statement that Yogyakarta, together with North 
Sulawesi, have ―good social indicators; lagging economies‖. 
However, based on district data, it is very clear that there is a positive 
correlation between economic growth and HDI with a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.496 (level of significance 0.001). A scatter 
plot diagram (Figure 4.7) also supports this finding and magnifies the 
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statement that economic growth is a means for achieving human 
development. From a methodological point of view is illustrates nicely 
that correlates on higher level (see Table 4.8) maybe absent while it 
exists at lower levels. 
 
Figure 4.7 Scatter Plot of Annual GRDP Growth 
in 1993-1997 (%) and 1996 HDI at District 
Level 
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Note: The plot is developed based on data provided by Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and the Indonesia Human 
Development Report 2001 
 
IV.4.2 District Level 
Before presenting the results at the district level it must be noted that 
not all districts and cities on Java are included to analyse the pattern of 
economic and employment structure due to the availability of data. The 
first focus of the discussion will be on the general pattern of employment 
and economic growth in Java during the period of 1993-1997. The next 
focus will be on the transformation of employment and economic 
structure in each province and also on the development of manufacturing 
both in terms of GRDP and employment growth. 
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In general, economic growth at the district level in Java before the 
economic crisis, 1993-1997, can be divided into two patterns (see Figure 
4.8). First, most of the districts and cities surrounding the big cities, like  
Jakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya, experienced high economic growth 
before the economic crisis. Second, some of the districts near these big 
cities experienced very low economic growth (like the district of 
Lamongan near the city of Surabaya). In the case of the district of 
Bandung for example, economic growth was lower compared to the city 
of Bandung. This implies that the economies of the big cities on Java 
may have two contrasting effects on their surrounding areas. First, 
economic development of the big cities spilled over into the nearby areas. 
This is an example of what is called ―generative cities‖. However, 
economic development of the cities also had negative effects or, at the 
least, no effect, on the economic development of some of their 
surrounding areas. This may indicate that the cities acted as parasites, 
wiping out the resources of nearby areas. 
Generative cities can be found around Jakarta, as it stimulates growth 
for surrounding areas such as the cities of Bekasi and Tangerang, and the 
District of Bekasi, Tangerang, Karawang, Serang, and Lebak.21 A similar 
phenomenon can also be found in cities surrounding other big cities, such 
as Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, and Yogyakarta. However, not all 
such cities benefit from close proximity to bigger cities as many of them 
lag behind in development. In terms of employment growth, there is no 
one single pattern among the districts. As can be seen in Figure 4.9, areas 
surrounding big cities that experienced high economic growth did not 
show high employment growth. The exceptions are both the city and 
district of Bekasi in West Java and also Sidoarjo in East Java, which have 
high employment growth. In contrast, several areas that are considered as 
low performance areas in economic growth, such as Bangkalan and 
Sampang on Madura, East Java, enjoyed the highest employment growth. 
                                                 
21
 The districts and cities of Tangerang, and the districts of Serang and Lebak are presently part 
of a new province called Banten.  
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a. West Java 
Appendix 1 and 2 provide figures of changes in employment structure 
in the period of 1993-1997. In 1993, there was no single district or city in 
which the manufacturing sector was able to absorb the majority of the 
labour force. There were only three districts and cities in which 
manufacturing employment reached more than 30 percent; the districts of 
Bogor and Tangerang, and the city of Bandung. For almost all districts, 
agriculture played an important role in absorbing the labour force. Only 
five of them relied on services, including the districts of Bogor, Bandung, 
Kerawang, Bekasi, and Tangerang. In addition, it is very clear that the 
service sector was most important to provide employment in the cities. It 
constituted more than 64 percent of the total employment. This means 
that more than two-thirds of the total employment was to be found in the 
services sector. The data thus reveal again that the agriculture and service 
sectors played important roles in absorbing the labour force in 1993. 
Four years later, in 1997, the pattern had not changed. The districts in 
which agriculture and the service sector were dominant in 1993 were still 
dominant in 1997. Only three districts changed their employment 
structure significantly. Cirebon, Majalengka and Serang no longer relied 
on agriculture, but on services. There was only one district where the 
contribution of manufacturing to employment was the highest, namely 
the district of Bandung. However, the percentage was almost the same as 
the service sector. 
We must bear in mind that during the period 1993-1997, the capacity 
of agriculture to absorb the labour force was declining. As can be seen in 
Appendix 2, there were only 5 out of 24 districts/cities22 in which 
agriculture employment was increasing. Almost half of the districts and 
cities show a decline in manufacturing employment, while the service 
sector was increasing in 17 out of 24 districts and cities. This implies that 
in the period of 1993-1997, the service sector played a more important 
role in terms of labour absorption than agriculture. 
                                                 
22
 For 1993, data for the city of Tangerang is not available, so the total number of districts and 
cities in West Java in that year was 24. 
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In terms of total employment growth in 1993-1997, it is interesting to 
find that more than half of the districts and cities experienced a decline in 
employment. In some districts, the decline was more than 3 percent, 
which is why the entire province experienced a very low increase, less 
than one percent, of annual employment growth in this period. The 
districts and cities that experienced an increase in employment were 
located around Jakarta (see Figure 4.10). 
In reference to employment growth of the manufacturing sector, a 
very high achievement can be found in the district and the city of Bekasi, 
and the district of Kerawang. These areas have acted for a long time as a 
buffer zone for Jakarta. It is interesting to note that Tangerang and 
Bogor, together with Bekasi, are included in an agglomeration that is 
called ―Jabotabek‖ (JAkarta, BOgor, TAngerang, and BEKasi). 
The economic structure of West Java provides a different picture. 
Agriculture was an important sector in employment, but not in the 
economic structure. As can be seen in Appendix 9, in 1993, there was 
only one district, Sukabumi, in which the contribution of agriculture to 
the GRDP was the highest. In 1997, in no single district agriculture was 
the most important in the local economy. The share of agriculture in 
Sukabumi declined significantly from 52 percent to 35 percent, so that 
the service sector became the highest contributor, due to its increase from 
33 percent to 45 percent in the same period. 
The service sector was dominant not only in Sukabumi, but also in 
the other 16 districts and cities. All cities in West Java relied heavily on 
the service sector. There were only 6 districts in 1993 and 7 districts in 
1997 that showed the dominance of manufacturing in terms of 
contribution to the GRDP. These districts had significant influence on 
provincial economic performance, so that the share of the manufacturing 
sector on the GRDP was the highest at the provincial level. 
Measured in terms of economic growth, agriculture suffered most in 
the period of 1993-1997. Amongst the 24 districts and cities, 7 of them 
experienced a negative growth in agriculture, even though in some 
districts an increase in agriculture reached double digits. At the same 
time, the manufacturing sector enjoyed significant growth in all districts 
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(see Appendix 10 and Figure 4.11), while services decreased only in one 
district, namely Bogor. This is the reason that, in general, annual 
economic growth in all districts and cities was substantial. In one district 
and four cities, economic growth was remarkably high, reaching double-
digits, higher than that of the provincial level. This high economic 
growth was attributable to the growth of the manufacturing and services 
sectors. 
 
Figure 4.12 Scatter Plot of GRDP Growth and Employment 
Growth in West Java, 1993-1997 
 
Note: The plot is developed based on data provided by Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) 
 
Employment and economic structure are among the important 
indicators of regional economic development. The question then is: what 
is the relationship between these two? In general, we can say that at the 
provincial level there is no parallel development of employment and 
economy. Furthermore, a correlation test between economic and 
employment growth at the district level in West Java shows that there is 
no significant correlation between these two, both for a total and sectoral 
base. This means that economic growth most probably does not influence 
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employment opportunities on district level. However, it is still interesting 
to clarify the relationship between these two indicators. To do so, we 
employ a scatter plot with provincial performance as reference. As 
described previously, annual economic growth of West Java was 8.55 
percent and employment growth was 0.60 percent annually. 
 
Figure 4.13 Scatter Plot of Annual GRDP Growth 
in 1993-1997and 1996 HDI in West Java 
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Note: The plot is developed based on data provided by Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
 
Figure 4.12 provides an interesting finding. There were only one 
district, Bekasi, and one city, Cirebon, which had higher economic and 
employment growth than that of the provincial level. We can say that in 
these two areas, economic growth was able to act as an engine of 
employment creation. In contrast, there were two cities, Sukabumi and 
Bogor, which had high economic growth, but low employment growth. 
The graph also reveals other important findings to prove that 
employment growth does not always run parallel with economic growth. 
There are at least three districts that show employment growth above the 
provincial level, but economic growth below the provincial level. 
As mentioned previously, development can also be seen from other 
aspects, namely HDI (Human Development Index). The following scatter 
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plot shows the relationship between the HDI and economic growth. The 
finding tends to support the argument that the HDI and economic growth 
are positively correlated. It is also affirmed by the correlation test, which 
shows a correlation coefficient as high as 0.599, significant at 0.01 level 
(see also Figure 4.13). 
However, Figure 4.13 reveals an important issue. It seems most likely 
that the positive correlation between economic growth and the HDI in 
West Java was influenced by three outlier cities (located in the right 
upper corner of the plot) that have extremely high economic growth. 
These cities are Cirebon, Bogor and Sukabumi, which have more than a 
14.5 percent annual growth rate. When we disregard these three cities, 
the correlation coefficient falls back to 0.264. All things considered, the 
correlation between these two variables is not significant. 
b. Central Java and Yogyakarta
23
 
Appendices 3-6 show the changing employment structure in Central 
Java and Yogyakarta. From Appendix 3, we can see how important the 
agricultural sector is in labour absorption in Central Java. In 1993, only 
three of 29 districts show low labour absorption in agriculture. These 
districts are Klaten, Sukoharjo, and Kudus. Furthermore, these three 
districts display different patterns of growth. In Klaten and Sukoharjo, 
services play an important role in absorbing the largest portion of 
employment by absorbing more than 40 percent of employment. 
However, in Kudus, manufacturing was the most dominant sector. It had 
a share of almost 40 percent of employment. When we talk about Kudus, 
we must bear in mind the several large cigarette (kretek) companies 
located there that are basically labour-intensive. These companies 
contribute significantly to the labour absorption in this area. We can also 
notice that in Central Java, all urban employment is predominantly in the 
service sector. 
 
                                                 
23
 Central Java and Yogyakarta are analysed together because Yogyakarta only has 5 
districts/cities.  
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In 1997, the pattern was almost stable except in the districts of 
Banyumas, Pemalang and Tegal, where agriculture was no longer 
dominant, and was replaced by the service sector. In addition to this, 
Jepara is the only district in which majority of the employment shares 
had shifted from agriculture to manufacturing. The cities displayed a 
similar pattern where the service sector had the largest employment 
share. 
At the same time, agriculture dominated employment share in only 
two out of five districts/cities in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, 
namely Kulon Progo and Gunung Kidul. The other two districts (Sleman 
and Bantul) and one city (Yogyakarta) relied primarily on the service 
sector in employment shares. The manufacturing sector was very limited 
in labour absorption, even though we find quite a high percentage of 
shares in the manufacturing sector in two districts, Sleman and Bantul. 
However, the sector only absorbed less than 30 percent of the labour. 
It is also interesting to find that before the crisis, employment growth 
of the manufacturing sector was high in most of the districts in these 
provinces (Figure 4.14). Only seven districts experienced a decrease in 
manufacturing employment. However, this pattern was not followed by 
the growth of the GRDP from manufacturing (Figure 4.15). The growth 
in most districts was more than 7 percent annually. We can also observe 
that higher growth was found primarily in the eastern part of the Central 
Java province. 
In terms of labour force absorption capacity during the period of 
1993-1997, the conclusion is that Yogyakarta and Central Java show 
similar pattern with West Java. First, agriculture experienced declining 
capacity in all districts and cities with the exception of six districts and 
one city, which experienced a rise in the number of people who worked 
in the agricultural sector (see Appendix 4 and 6). Second, in general, 
employment in manufacturing increased; although in some districts and 
cities it declined. It is quite interesting to find a very high (double digit) 
increase of employment in manufacturing in several districts, such as 
Purworejo, Klaten, Wonogiri, Batang, and also in the city of Yogyakarta. 
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Third, the service sector increased in all districts and cities, except in six 
districts and two cities. Due to all these changes, employment growth in 
almost all districts also declined in this period. The annual employment 
growth was positive in only a few districts and cities. 
With regard to economic structure, we find unchanged patterns in the 
period of 1993-1997. Among 35 districts in Central Java, there were 12 
districts with a domination of agriculture, five districts with a domination 
of manufacturing, and 18 districts and cities with the domination of 
services in the economic structure. This was true in both 1993 and 1997, 
except for the district of Demak, in which the economic structure shifted 
from agriculture to services. Meanwhile, in Yogyakarta, the economy of 
all four districts and one city was dominated by the service sector 
(Appendix 13). Thus, we can say that the service sector is the prominent 
sector in the economic structure of Central Java and Yogyakarta. 
 
Figure 4.16 Scatter Plots of Annual GRDP Growth (%) 
andEmployment Growth (in %) in Central Java 
and Yogyakarta, in 1993-1997 
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Note: The plot is developed based on data provided by Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
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Development in Central Java and Yogyakarta ran well before the 
crisis in terms of economic growth. The economy in all of the districts 
and cities in these two provinces grew substantially. In both the district 
and city of Semarang, the economy grew in double digits annually. When 
we compare the growth among sectors, we can conclude that the high 
growth in these provinces has been driven by the growth of the 
manufacturing sector, while, unfortunately, agriculture has experienced a 
decrease in several districts and cities (see Appendices 12 and 14). 
 
Figure 4.17 Scatter Plots of Annual GRDP Growthin 
1993-1997 (in %) and 1996 HDI in Central Java 
and Yogyakarta 
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Note: The plot is developed based on data provided by Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.16, using the average GRDP and 
employment growth of these two provinces as reference, we can see that 
there is no systematic pattern of the relationship between economic and 
employment growth. However, economic growth is positively correlated 
with the HDI, with a correlation coefficient of 0.452 and significance at 
0.01 levels. The scatter plot between economic growth and the HDI can 
be found in Figure 4.17. 
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c. East Java 
The employment structure in East Java in 1993 was a clear example 
of how agriculture became an important sector in the employment share. 
There was only one district out of 29 districts, namely Sidoarjo, in which 
agriculture was less important than manufacturing and services. The 
cities show the same pattern that can be observed in other provinces, 
where the service sector dominates the employment share (see Appendix 
7). In 1997, the pattern changed dramatically. The share of agriculture 
declined followed by an increase in the shares of both the manufacturing 
and service sectors. The general pattern is that the shift occurred from 
agriculture to services. There were four districts, namely Tulungagung, 
Mojokerto, Jombang, and Gresik, whose economic dominance shifted 
from agriculture in 1993 to the service sector in 1997. At the same time, 
the employment share in Sidoharjo shifted from agriculture to 
manufacturing. The pattern remained the same in cities, but the share of 
the services sector in employment increased. Therefore, in terms of the 
transformation of employment structure, East Java showed a similar 
pattern as in West Java, Central Java, and Yogyakarta. 
Sectoral capacity in labour absorption as shown by sectoral growth of 
employment in the period of 1993-1997 tends to support the above 
conclusion. Half of the districts and cities experienced a decrease in 
employment in the agricultural sector. In the district of Sidoarjo and the 
city of Malang, the decrease reached double-digits. A similar figure can 
also be found in the manufacturing sector. Among 37 districts and cities 
in this province, 19 of them witnessed a decline in the manufacturing 
share of employment. In some districts, the decline was very substantial, 
as can be seen in Ponorogo, Banyuwangi, Sampang, and Pamekasan. In 
contrast, manufacturing employment increased very substantially in 
Nganjuk, and the cities of Probolinggo, Pasuruan, and Mojokerto. 
However, this increase was not able to shift the pattern of employment 
share, because the service sector also increased in almost all districts and 
cities. It was only in Blitar, Pamekasan, and the city of Kediri that the 
service sector declined. 
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Overall employment in this region decreased slightly, although it was 
smaller than the decrease in Central Java and Yogyakarta. However, the 
data in Appendix 8 show a variation of employment growth among the 
districts and cities. Employment in the cities grew considerably, except in 
the city of Kediri, where employment dropped slightly. At the district 
level, 8 out of 29 districts witnessed a decrease in employment. 
 
Figure 4.20 Scatter Plots of Annual GRDP Growth 
andEmployment Growth in East Java, in 1993-
1997 (in %) 
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Note: The plot is developed based on data provided by Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
 
Before the crisis, the province of East Java enjoyed high economic 
growth, even higher than that of Java as a whole. The high growth rate 
also occurred in all districts and cities in this province. The city of Kediri 
showed the best performance in economic growth, reaching more than an 
11 percent annual growth rate in this period. The manufacturing and 
service sectors grew significantly. However, the agricultural sector 
seemed to have stalled. The production of the agricultural sector has 
dwindled in all of the cities and the district of Gresik. 
The Limits of Economic Growth 
101 
From Appendices 15 and 16, it is very clear that even though the 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the GRDP was not as high as 
the service sector, its growth was higher. This means that high economic 
growth in this province, as well as at the district level, was attributable to 
the high growth of the manufacturing sector. This growth did not 
correspond with employment growth in which the service sector played 
an important role. This is supported by the results of statistical tests that 
show a non-significant correlation that amounts to 0.154 (see also Figure 
4.20). 
As can be seen in Figure 4.20, most of the districts and cities fall into 
areas of lower economic growth and higher employment growth. In 
addition to this, we can also observe that when the district experienced 
relatively high economic growth, even though it was lower than the 
provincial level, employment growth remained low. 
 
Figure 4.21 Scatter Plots of Annual GRDP Growthin 1993-
1997 (in %) and 1996 HDI in East Java 
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Note: The plot is developed based on data provided by Central 
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 
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Analysis of the relationship between economic growth and the HDI 
yields a similar conclusion drawn from three other provinces. Correlation 
between these two variables is significant with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.570 and significance at 0.01 levels. This means that the higher the 
economic growth, the higher the HDI (Figure 4.21). 
IV.5 Summary of the Analysis at the District Level before the 
Crisis 
Our analysis at district levels in all provinces revealed that, in 
general, the employment structure shifted from agriculture to services. 
On the other hand, the economic structure transformed from agriculture 
to manufacture. It is only in some districts or cities that have a large-scale 
and labour-intensive manufacturing sector, such as Kudus in Central 
Java, Kediri in East Java, and the districts surrounding Jakarta, that 
manufacturing has played an important role in both the economyand 
employment structures. This in turn also generated disparities and 
inequalities among the districts. 
For all four provinces taken together, we found that economic growth 
in Java region was attributable to the growth rate of the manufacturing 
sector. We calculated that the overall correlation coefficient is as high as 
0.680 and reaches significance at 0.01 levels. This means that the higher 
the growth of the share of the manufacturing sector to the GRDP, the 
higher the economic growth. However, as has been stated previous 
section, there is non-significant correlation between annual economic 
growth and manufacturing growth in GRDP on the one hand, and 
manufacturing employment and total employment growth on the other 
hand. This means that economic growth did not generate sufficient 
employment opportunities. This point affirms the idea that 
industrialisation on Java failed with respect to absorbing the labour 
surplus from agricultural sector sufficiently. From an economic growth 
point of view, industrialisation seems to be on the right tract, but at the 
same time it creates employment problems, which in most cases, lead to 
poverty-related problems. 
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This does not mean that economic growth is not necessary, because 
there is evidence that in general, economic growth is most likely to 
correlate with the HDI, The higher the economic growth, the higher the 
HDI. However, this is not the case for West Java, since the existing 
strong correlation between the two was very much influenced by the 
extremely high economic growth in three cities. This tends to confirm 
Hill‘s (1992) conclusion that West Java was the area with contradictory 
tendencies, ―prosperous economies; indifferent social records or growth 
without development‖. 
The question now is how did these situations affect district 
performance during the crisis? The conceptual argument is that the more 
industrialised the area, the harder the area was hit by the crisis. As we 
learn from the analysis at the national level, the economic crisis hit the 
modern or manufacturing sector. We can expect that at the province and 
district level, the pattern would remain the same. However, we also 
expect that magnitude would be different across province and district. To 
analyse the impact of the crisis, the following chapters will discuss the 
impact of the financial crisis at the provincial level, followed by the 
analysis at the district level. 
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Chapter V 
The Crisis at National and 
Provincial Levels 
Abstract 
This chapter discusses the economic crisis  in 1998 and its structural 
consequences at national and provincial levels, especially focussing on 
the transformation of the production and employment structure. We 
address the question whether and how the production and employment 
structure has changed during and immediately after the occurrence of the 
crisis. Moreover, since geography matters, we further specify this 
question by focussing on differences in the adjustment process of the 
production and employment structures between provinces. For the 
analysis at the national level we mainly rely on data collected from 
previous studies and apply descriptive analysis to get a better 
understanding of the causes and consequences of the crisis. At the 
provincial level, additional data is gathered from the Central Bureau of 
Statistics and further analysed using scatter plots and growth rates 
comparisons. Findings show that the causes of the crisis were 
multifaceted and cannot be only derived from macroeconomic 
foundations. The crisis decreased real wages most strongly, but - 
interestingly enough - far less reduced employment. At the provincial 
level, some differences in the structures of the economy and employment 
were registered, but the overall development pattern was essentially quite 
uniform. So, the economic crisis did not have much influence on the 
predominant structures of economy and employment on the island of 
Java. 
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V.1 Indonesia in Crisis 
Financial economists generally distinguish three stages of financial 
crisis. In the first stage, the exchange rate becomes overvalued as a result 
of internal and external macroeconomic events. In the second stage, the 
exchange rate is defended, but at the cost of a substantial drain of foreign 
exchange reserves held by the central bank. Thirdly, the depletion of 
reserves, usually in combination with devaluation, triggers a panicked 
resource outflow. The trigger is in most cases the devaluation itself, 
resulting from an exhaustion of reserves. The sudden outflow of short 
term capital leads to a macroeconomic collapse, characterised by a sharp 
economic downturn, soaring interest rates, depressed equity prices and a 
plummeting currency (Sachs and Woo, 2000: 17). These descriptions fit 
fairly well with the Indonesian crisis, which experienced all three of 
these stages. 
As explained in the previous chapter, Indonesia had achieved a 
remarkable economic development success that led to large capital 
inflows in the 1990s. This is what Kindleberger (in: Montes, 2000: xix) 
calls the ―euphoria‖ preceding all financial crises: the credit boom is fed 
by intense investor interests and rising asset values, which seems to 
confirm investors demands. The capital inflows and fixed exchange rate 
policy created economic vulnerability characterised by an overvalued 
currency, falling foreign exchange reserves, and high levels of foreign 
debt. Sachs and Woo (2000) therefore argue that the Asian financial 
crises, including Indonesia, were a ―crisis of success‖ rather than a ―crisis 
of failure‖. 
Until the mid 1990s the macro-foundation of the Indonesian economy 
did not show serious imbalances, as seen in Table 5.1. Firdhanusetyawan 
and Pangestu (2004: 2) commented in this respect that ―the economic 
indicators up to November 1997 did not indicate that the Indonesian 
crisis would be much more severe than in other countries such as 
Thailand and Korea.‖ 
On the average, the Indonesian economy was still able to grow at 
almost 5 percent in 1997, compared to 7.8 percent in the previous year, 
with the exchange rate and short-term interest rate still under control. As 
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can be seen in Table 5.2, almost all sectors experienced positive growth 
rates in the year 1997. There were only some sub-sectors that 
experienced negative growth rates, namely food crops, energy and 
textiles. Therefore, Sadli (1999) argued that there was no evidence of 
structural weakness of the Indonesian macro economy. The inflation rate 
was still less than 10 percent and the current account deficit had 
increased only slightly from 3 to 5 percent of GDP. 
 
Table 5.1 Indonesia’s Economic Performance (1995-2000) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
GDP and Major Components (percent change from previous year) 
Nominal GDP (US$ billion)  202.2 227.3 218 103.1 144.2 151.0 
Real GDP growth 8.2 7.8 4.9 -13.7 0.31 4.8 
Total Consumption 11.2 8.9 5.9 -4.1 3.4 3.9 
• Private Consumption 12.6 9.7 6.6 -2.9 3.7 3.6 
• Government Consumption 1.3 6.6 0.1 -14.4 0.7 6.5 
Total Investment (GFCF)* 14.0 14.5 8.6 -33.0 -19.4 17.9 
Export of Goods and Services 7.7 7.6 7.8 10.6 31,6 16.1 
Import of Goods and Services 20.9 6.9 14.7 -5,4 40.7 18.2 
Fiscal and External Balances (percent of GDP) 
Budget Balance 1 1 0.4 -1,7 -7.9 -5.1 
Merchandise Trade Balance (f.o.b) 2.8 1.5 4.4 17.8 14 16.8 
Current Account Balance -3.4 -3.5 -2.3 4.2 3.9 5.3 
Economic Indicators (percent change from previous year) 
GDP Deflator 9.9 8.7 12.6 81.2 12.8 10.9 
• CPI (Consumer Price Index) 9.4 7.9 6.2 58.0 20.7 3.8 
• M2 (Money circulation) 27.6 29.6 23.2 62.4 11.9 15.6 
Short-Term Interest Rate (%) 14.3 13.8 18.0 35.6 15.7 14.5 
Exchange Rate (Local Currency/US$) 2,308 2,383 4,650 8,025 7,085 9,595 
Unemployment Rate (%)  7.24 4.89 4.68 5.46 6.36 6.14 
Population (millions)  194.8 198.2 200.4 204 206.5 209.5 
Notes: * Gross fixed capital formation. 
Sources: IMF forecasts, The World Economic Outlook Database (September 2001). 
 LINK forecasts, Project LINK World Economic Outlook (April 2001). 
 ADB forecasts, Asian Development Outlook 2001. Downloaded on 25 
November 2002 
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Hill (1999b: 14) provides a series of arguments why, until the middle 
of 1997, Indonesia performed better than Thailand, which was believed 
to be the first country hit by the crisis. First, Indonesia, as an 
authoritarian country at the time, was better able to respond to the crisis. 
This assessment was based on differences in the political systems 
between Indonesia and Thailand. Second, Bank Indonesia had not wasted 
its international reserves in fighting the foreign exchange market. Third, 
the Indonesian exchange rate system was far less rigid. Fourth, the IMF 
was invited in advance for a ―consultation‖.24 Fifth, many countries were 
involved in a rescue package, given the importance of Indonesia in terms 
of its geo-strategic position. 
 
Table 5.2 Sectoral GDP Growth Rate at Constant 1993 Market Prices 1996-
1998 (Percent) 
Industrial Origin  1996 1997 1998 
Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Fishery  3,14 1,00 -1,33 
Mining and Quarrying 6,30 2,12 -2,76 
Manufacturing Industry 11,59 5,25 -11,44 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 13,63 12,37 3,03 
Construction 12,76 7,36 -36,44 
Trade, Hotel and Restaurant 8,16 5,83 -18,22 
Transport and Communication 8,68 7,01 -15,13 
Financial, Ownership and Business Services 6,04 5,93 -26,63 
Services 3,40 3,62 -3,85 
Gross Domestic Product 7,82 4,70 -13,13 
Gross Domestic Product Non-Oil Gas  8,16 5,23 -14,22 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia, http: //www.bps.go.id/ index.shtml 
 
                                                 
24
 Later this policy was criticized by many experts who believed that bringing the IMF into the 
country did not solve the problem and even made the crisis worse.  
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Table 5.3 Major Events and Causing Factors: June 1997-May 1998 
Episode Major events Causing factors 
June – July 1997 Massive capital outflow from the 
Southeast Asia economies, 
including Indonesia 
The collapse of Thai economy exposed 
the region‘s vulnerability, changing 
perceptions of international investors, loss 
of confidence in Asian tigers 
Aug – Sept 1997 • Early drop of the Rupiah 
• Early increase in interest rate 
• Early signs of panic in the 
financial market 
• Speculative attacks on the Rupiah 
• Increase in SBI rates 
• Monetary policy was too tight, without 
any effort to lift up the market‘s 
expectation (unclear strategy by the 
government in dealing with a floating 
rate) 
Oct – Nov 1997 • Early signs of bank run, both 
from the sick and healthy 
banks 
• Loss of confidence in Suharto 
administration in handling the 
crisis 
• Liquidation of banks without any 
deposit guarantee in place 
• Suharto did not follow the first IMF 
reform package consistently 
• IMF package was not transparent – No 
information on foreign exchange 
exposures, the size of private debt, etc. 
Episode Major events Causing factors 
Dec 1997– 
Jan 1998 
Monetary development  
• Rupiah slides further 
• Massive capital outflow, 
including smuggling of Rupiah 
out of the country 
• Inflation starts to pick up 
• The banking sector starts to 
collapse 
• Indonesian L/Cs were not 
honoured internationally 
• Sudden increase in demand for debt 
payment 
• Money supply was out of control 
• People loss confidence in domestic 
banks (Government‘s blanket 
guarantee was not in place yet) 
 Real Sector  
 • Panic among domestic 
investors, especially in the 
Chinese community 
• Food rush 
• Foreign banks no longer trust domestic 
banks 
• Growing anti-Chinese campaign, 
followed by anti-Chinese riots in 
various small towns in Java 
 Social and Political changes  
 • Loss of confidence in Suharto 
administration in handling the 
crisis 
• Political situation became 
uncertain 
• People expected shortages of food 
• People did not trust the credibility of 
the government to follow the IMF 
agreement; unrealistic state budget 
• Rumours over president‘s health 
Source: Firdhanustyawan and Pangestu, 2004; Table 1.1, pp: 3 
 
It was only towards the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 that 
the full impact of the crisis became alarming. The GDP contraction was 
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the highest in Indonesian history, with a decline of 13.7 percent. The 
exchange rate almost doubled compared to the previous year, and interest 
rates became very high. From Table 5.2 we can see that the contraction 
occurred in almost all sectors (except electricity, gas and water supply). 
The sharpest reduction in growth rate occurred in the construction sector, 
with a decline of more than 36 percent. 
According to Firdhanustyawan & Pangestu (2004) the Indonesian 
crisis can be divided into three stages (see Table 5.3).The situation in 
1997 marks the Indonesian crisis as a part of the general Asian crisis. 
One year later (1998) Indonesians suffered a ‗total crisis‘, which was 
distinct from the other Asian countries. The last stage started in 1999, 
when Indonesia entered into the first phase of economic recovery while 
still suffering from social impacts of the crisis. 
Table 5.3 provides a step-by-step picture of the changing economic 
condition in Indonesia from 1997 to the middle of 1999. Until the second 
quarter of 1997, economic performance was still promising with an 
economic growth rate of almost 7 percent. The exchange rate was 
relatively stable, the volume of export was increasing and reserves were 
also increasing. However, starting in the third quarter of 1997, all these 
indicators began to deteriorate. The exchange rate declined sharply and at 
the end of January 1998 the exchange rate was at its lowest level; 
compared to the rate in mid-1997, the rupiah had depreciated by almost 
84 percent. This was the worst depreciation in comparison to other Asian 
countries25 
There are numerous studies dealing with the causes of the Indonesian 
economic crisis that have addressed both external and internal factors 
(see Firdanustyawan and Pangestu, 2004; Hill. 1999b; Montes 2000; 
Radelet, et.al 2000; Sach and Woo, 2000; Sadli, 1999). However, there is 
a need to point out several key structural factors behind the Indonesian 
crisis. First, I would argue that the macroeconomic foundations were not 
as strong as those who marvelled with pride at how ―strong‖ the 
                                                 
25
 This figure was the highest compared with Malaysian ringgit (-45%), Singapore dollar (19%), 
Phillipines peso (39%), Thailand bath (55%) and Korea won (49%) ( see Montes, 1998: Table 
U-1, p: xv) 
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Indonesian economy was assessed. This is what was previously referred 
to as ―involution‖. In spite of several general public sector disequilibria 
that have been outlined before, it is the private sector was the primary 
trigger of the crisis. Sadli (1999: 18) mentioned that ―the fundamental 
weakness in the economy lay within the private sector, which went on an 
investment spending spree, abetted by an ever increasing volume of 
foreign loans made available at minimum security and prudence‖. Figure 
5.1 shows the evolution of structure and trend in Indonesia‘s external 
debts during the period 1991-1998. As per 30 September 1998, out of 
Indonesia‘s external debt of US$141.9 billion, US$ 73.3 billion or 57.7 
percent was in the private sector (Hill, 1999b: 57). In the period of 1991-
1998, the private sector‘s external debt significantly increased by 20.5 
percent annually, compared to about 4.3 percent annually for public debt 
in the same period. In the period of 1987-1993, the external debt grew 
alarmingly, but the public sector debt decreased from 73 percent to 59 
percent, while in contrast private sector debt increased. The problem is 
that most of the private sector debt was of a short-term nature. 
Interestingly, Radelet (1995) argued that this was not noticed as an 
indication that Indonesia was approaching a debt crisis. He also warned 
that the slowdown of non-oil export growth, increasing short-term debts, 
and the risk from the overvalued exchange rate might cause serious 
problems. In a similar vein, authors like Sadli (1999) and Hill (1999b) 
explained that the private sector‘s external debt was indeed the key factor 
occasioning the crisis. 
Second, the country's economic order and national financial 
institutions proved unable to withstand the violent tremors against the 
nation's economic foundations (see: Hill, 1999b). The reforms in 
macroeconomic policies had not kept pace with the financial, legal and 
political institutional reforms. This lack of functioning institutions made 
the country vulnerable to shocks, as the lack of appropriate controls and 
oversight weakened the financial sector, and corruption increasingly 
impeded rational policy making. It has often been argued that the elite, 
who had a close relationship with political power, dominated the policy 
decision-making process. It is not an exaggeration to say that the 
achievements of national development of the previous three decades were 
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wiped out by the crisis within only a few months, and worsened when the 
local currency lost its value. 
 
Figure 5.1 Indonesia's External Debt, 1991-1998(US$ billion, year-end) 
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Figure 6. Indonesia's External Debt, 1991-1998 
(US$ billion, year-end)
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 Source: Hill (1999b) Table 12, p: 63. 
Note: Government short term debt was only 0.1 percent in the year of 1993, 
1994, 1996, and 1997 
 
Third, it is interesting to review the critics against the IMF handling 
of the Indonesian crisis (see Sadli, 1999; and Tempo, 2003). Some critics 
suspect that the IMF prescription may have contained a hidden agenda 
reflecting the interests of its major stakeholders (Sadli, 1999). Rizal 
Ramli accused the IMF of intending to tighten up monetary and fiscal 
policies solely to ensure that there was a surplus to repay creditors 
(Tempo, 2003). One of the triggers created by the IMF was the closure of 
16 banks in 1997, which - it was believed - created a domino effect both 
on the loss of investor confidence, as well as for capital outflow. 
V.2 Impact of the Crisis at National Level 
Firdhanustyawan (2002: 7) identifies three different channels for how 
an economic crisis transforms into a social crisis. The first channel is an 
adjustment at the macro level of output and input markets, especially the 
labour market. The crisis moves resources from the modern, non-trade 
and import-dependent sectors to traditional, tradable and export-oriented 
sectors. Local firms suffer through market adjustment in the form of 
declining levels of profit and real income, firm insolvency and company 
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closure. In contrast, export manufacturing and agriculture might benefit 
from the crisis, since the high inflation rate combined with labour market 
flexibility causes declining real wages and labour productivity, as well as 
a relatively small increase in unemployment. 
The second channel is an adjustment at the micro level, namely 
changing patterns of household income and expenditures. The economic 
crisis pushes people to work in lower income jobs or to move from the 
modern sector to the traditional sector or from formal to informal sector. 
This is translated into lower household income and reduced purchasing 
power. In this situation, households can rely on several strategies to 
survive, such as selling assets, maximising labour use in the household 
(mainly children and women), and changing consumption patterns. Since 
the income is low, the household will shift its expenditures from 
investments to basic needs. 
The third channel is direct transmission through reduced government 
expenditures, affecting the provision of public social services. The 
economic crisis has a serious impact on the government budget, which in 
turn affects government expenditures for public services, such as 
education and healthcare. Declining government expenditures on public 
services in turn creates problems for the people in accessing the services. 
Many scholars have tried to estimate the overall social impact of the 
Indonesian crisis. We focus on two important aspects, i.e., poverty and 
employment. There are several analyses made of the impact of the crisis 
on poverty (see: Suharyadi et.al. 2000; Frankenberg et. al., 1999, Said 
and Wenefrida, 2001; Pradhan et.al. 2000; Islam, 1998; Booth, 1999), 
none of which have arrived at a consistent figure of the magnitude of 
poverty incidence. However, there is agreement that poverty increased 
significantly during the crisis. Said and Wenefrida (2001) provide a clear 
picture of how much the crisis affected poverty. They conclude that the 
poverty rate increased from 15.7 percent in 1996 to 26.4 percent in 
December 1998, which accounts for the increase of the number of the 
poor from 31 million to nearly 54 million. 
Two factors play an important role in explaining the increase of 
poverty. The first one is the increase of the prices of essential 
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commodities (see Table 5.4). Based on the CBS data, Said and 
Wenefrida (2001) observe that during the period February 1996-
December 1998, the inflation rate for food commodities increased by 
approximately 149 percent. This situation was worsened by decreasing 
nominal wages. Firdausy (www.ismea.org/asialist/Firdausy.html) finds 
that average income per employment per year decreased from Rp. 3.7 
million in 1997, to Rp.3.5 million in 1998. Real wages also deteriorated 
from Rp. 70,700 per week in 1997, to Rp.68,000 per week in 1998. This 
implies that the crisis had an impact on declining purchasing power of 
the people. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that poverty incidence 
increased substantially during the crisis. 
 
Table 5.4 Price Increase of Essential Consumption Commodities, July 1997-
April 1998 (%) 
Commodities Java Outside Java 
Rice 50 37 
Salted Fish 56 42 
Palm Oil 134 80 
Granulated Sugar 36 31 
Salt 66 32 
Kerosene 8 6 
Washing Soap 77 72 
Textiles 38 39 
Batik 25 30 
General 51 39 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999 
 
The second effect refers to employment. It is quite interesting to find 
that the impact of the Indonesian crisis on unemployment was considered 
―not so serious‖. In the period of 1995-1997, the unemployment rate 
decreased substantially from 7.3 percent to 4.7 percent, even while 
economic growth decreased from 8.2 percent in 1995 to 4.9 percent in 
1997. Surprisingly, the unemployment rate only increased slightly to 5.5 
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percent in 1998, when economic growth (- 13.7%) was at its lowest level 
in modern Indonesia history (see Table 5.1). This provides some 
evidence that the impact of the crisis was not as severe as estimated.26 
Whereas most sectors experienced a very significant contraction, 
agriculture still had positive growth. In 1998, when the country was 
experiencing the worst of the crisis, the contraction in construction was 
39.8 percent, followed by the financial sector in which contraction was 
26.7 percent. Contraction in other sectors, such as manufacturing, 
transport and communication were also high, usually more than 12 
percent. Agriculture and utilities were the only sectors that maintained 
positive growth rates of 0.2% and 3.7% respectively (see 
Firdhanustyawan, et.al. 2004). This indicates that the ―traditional‖ sector 
is more resilient than the modern sector. Among nine sectors, only three, 
i.e. agriculture, mining and quarrying, and electricity, gas and water 
supply, showed an increase in employment in 1997-1998. The 
performance of agriculture was amazing, i.e., 432,400 extra jobs 
compared to manufacturing, which experienced a decrease in 
employment as much as 597,600 (Firdausy: www.ismea.org/asialist/ 
Firdausy.html). 
Two years after the peak of the crisis, all economic indicators seemed 
to have improved. Even though economic growth was still less than one 
percent in 1999 compared to the situation in 1998, it was already much 
better. In 2000, economic growth was as high as it was in 1997. Short-
term interest rates jumped back from 35.6 percent in 1998 to ―only‖ 15.7 
percent in 1999 and further decreased to 14.5 percent in 2000. Imports 
also increased substantially from minus 5.4 percent in 1998 to 40.7 
percent in 1999. However, imports then decreased to 18.2 in 2000. Other 
indicators, such as private and government consumption, were also 
improving. This indicates that the country was on its way to recovery. 
Comparing the 1930s depression and the 1990s crisis in Southeast 
Asia, Boomgaard and Brown (2000: 14) come to the conclusion that ―the 
1930s depression was overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon… The 1990s 
                                                 
26
 See also Chapter 1 for a summary of the discussion on the impact of the crisis in Indonesia. 
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crisis is essentially an urban crisis…‖. Thus, the 1990s crisis hit the 
urban economy far more than the rural economy (see also: Breman, 
2000; World Bank, 1999; Suharyadi, et.al. 2000; and Sussangkarn et.al. 
1999). From a sectoral differentiation point of view, this may explain 
why agricultural output tends to be rather constant (Hill, 1999b), and that 
―agriculture has been the strongest performing sector in the crisis 
economies...‖ (Hill, 1999b: 7). Especially in certain parts of rural Java, 
the economic crisis was not that severe (Koning, 2001). Indeed, there 
was even a dramatic increase in agricultural work (Manning, 2000). 
Boomgard and Brown (2000) have therefore argued that both in 1930 and 
in 1990 the rural areas coped better with the crisis. In line with these 
arguments, we can expect that the less-developed areas or less-
industrialised regions will be less severely affected in comparison to the 
more developed or industrialised areas. In addition to this, less-developed 
usually rural areas will be able to cope better with the crisis compared to 
more developed or urban areas. 
Based on the above discussion, it becomes clear that the Indonesian 
economy has undergone a very dynamic transition since the colonial 
period. Economic crises are not merely phenomena of the 1990s, but 
have a long history in this country and they have directly or indirectly 
influenced the present country‘s performance. We can identify at least 
three economic crises standing out in this country‘s economic past, i.e. in 
the 1930s, 1960s and 1990s.27 This may represent a thirty-year cycle of 
economic crises. Interestingly, the last two crises were followed by very 
drastic social and political changes. The crisis in the 1960s laid the 
ground for the replacement of the Old Order and the emergence of the 
New Order. Of course, there are always debates on critical issues whether 
the economic crisis came before the political crisis or the other way 
around. When we follow the sequence, it is clear that the economic crisis 
came first in the early 1960s, and then the Old Order fell in 1967. 
However, we must bear in mind that the relationship is not a simple 
causal one. 
                                                 
27
 Some argue that Indonesia also experienced a crisis in the 1980s, but the impact is not as 
significant in comparison to these three crises. 
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The situation was somewhat similar in the 1990s. Starting in mid-
1997, when the monetary crisis hit the country, the New Order became 
very unstable. Finally, in 1998 President Suharto resigned. As occurred 
in the 1960s, social and political unrest followed. We can conclude that 
the 1990 crisis was a starting point for very drastic changes in the 
governmental system, which was indicated by the implementation of 
regional autonomy. The centralistic system that gave very strong powers 
to the central government, slowly but surely has changed to give local 
governments more power in many aspects of social, economic and politic 
life. The problem is that - to some extent - local governments have not 
been equipped with sufficient capacities and capabilities to administer 
power and to manage their regions. This situation becomes worse due to 
the fact that local governments have also suffered from the economic 
crisis. However, there is still limited insight in the effect of the economic 
crisis on the local economy, which may vary according to the specific 
local economic conditions prevailing before the crisis. Hence, there is a 
need to understand how far the 1990s economic crisis has affected the 
local (provincial and district/city) economies. 
V.3 The Differential Impact of the Crisis at Provincial Level 
In 1997 all provinces experienced a decrease in their economic 
growth rate. Even the economic growth in the province of Nangroe Aceh 
Darussalam was negative at that time. However, three provinces suffered 
the most from the crisis – Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan and 
Irian Jaya- which experienced a decrease of economic growth of more 
than five percent in 1996-1997. The second layer consisted of three Java 
provinces – West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, - and also Jambi and 
South Sulawesi, where economic growth decreased four to five percent. 
East Java and Jakarta suffered less with a decrease of just less than four 
percent. There was only one province with a decrease of less than one 
percent: Southeast Sulawesi. 
We can divide the provinces into four quadrants using a median as a 
reference line (see Figure 5.2). The first quadrant encompasses provinces 
that had a lower GRPD growth than the median value both in 1996 and 
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1997. These include: Aceh, Riau, Bengkulu, Lampung, Central Java, 
Yogyakarta, and Maluku. The second quadrant consists of the provinces 
with a lower growth rate in 1997, but lower higher rate than median 
value in 1996. These include: Jambi, West Java, South Kalimantan, 
Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, and East Kalimantan. The third 
quadrant is the provinces having higher growth rate both in 1996 and 
1997. This comprises North Sumatra, Jakarta, Bali, West Kalimantan, 
Central Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, and East 
Nusa Tenggara. The rest were in the fourth quadrant that had a lower 
growth rate in 1996 and higher growth rate in 1997. None of the 
provinces on Java are in the last group. 
 
Figure 5.2 Scatter Plot of Provincial GRDP Growth Rates in 
1996 and 1997 
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Note: The plot is generated based on data provided by Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS 
 
When a scatter plot is made between the 1996 GRDP growth rate and 
the change in the GRDP growth rate during the period of 1996-1997, a 
clear negative correlation between the two indices appears. This is also 
shown by the correlation coefficient as high as -0.750 (significant at 
0.001 levels). This means that the higher the GRDP (economic) growth 
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rate in 1996, the lower the decrease of the growth in the period of 1996-
1997 (see Figure 5.3). As discussed before, the peak of the crisis was in 
mid 1998, but the crisis already started in mid 1997 (see also Table 5.2). 
This means that in the beginning of the crisis the more dynamic 
provinces were better able to withstand the crisis. The main reason is that 
in this period the manufacture sector was still surviving from the crisis 
and was able to support economic growth in the provinces. 
 
Figure 5.3 Scatter Plot between the 1996 GRDP Growth 
Rate and the Decrease of Growth Rate in the 
Period of 1996-1997 
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Note: The plot is generated based on data provided by Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS)  
 
V.4 The crisis in Java 
Over the period of 1993-1997, it was clear that in terms of economic 
and employment structure, West Java was the most industrialised 
province in Java, excluding Jakarta. In 1997, the symptoms of the 
economic crisis were actually felt more in West Java than in the other 
provinces. Economic growth in this province declined sharper than the 
others. However, at the provincial level, it is still not clear how this 
relates to industrialisation. East Java, which ranked second in terms of 
level of industrialisation, experienced the least decline in economic 
growth. 
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Several analysts consider the period of 1997-1998 as the worst period 
of the crisis: the ―total crisis‖. In this period, at the national level 
economic growth declined almost 14 percent and the whole 
macroeconomic performance fell to the lowest level of the modern 
economic history of the country.28 In fact, Java was hit by the crisis 
harder than Indonesia as a whole. However, the details of economic 
growth on Java, at the provincial level, do not confirm the hypothesis that 
the higher the degree of industrialisation, the worse the province was hit 
by the crisis. It can be seen from the fact (see Table 5.5) that contraction 
in West Java was the lowest (< 5%). It was even lower than Yogyakarta, 
where industry was not the highest contributor, both to economic and 
employment development. The data also shows that the highest 
contraction occurred in East Java, where industrialisation levels were 
considered more advanced. 
 
Table 5.5 Annual Economic Growth (%) by Provinces and Sectors in 1997-1998 
Province 
1997-1998 
Agriculture Manufacture Services Total 
West Java -2.62 -6.25 -3.95 -4.82 
Central Java -3.70 -11.92 -11.66 -10.12 
Yogyakarta 2.33 -16.16 -9.21 -9.23 
East Java -5.02 -23.62 -13.38 -16.12 
Java -6.14 -20.77 -13.36 -15.26 
Note: calculated from CBS of various years. 
 
Data at the district level reveals a different conclusion. Correlation 
analysis between economic growth before the crisis (1993-1997)29 and 
during the peak of the crisis leads to the conclusion that economic growth 
before the crisis is most likely to correlate negatively with economic 
growth during the crisis, with a correlation coefficient of -0.276 
(significant at 0.01 level). This means that the higher the economic 
                                                 
28
 A detailed discussion of this is presented in Chapter Two. 
29
 A discussion on economic performance in 1993-1997 periods can be found in Chapter 3. 
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growth before the crisis, the higher the economic decline during the 
crisis. If economic growth can be treated as an indicator of 
industrialisation - since much of this growth was driven primarily by the 
manufacturing sector - this confirms the hypothesis that the higher the 
degree of industrialisation, the worse the province was hit by the crisis. 
Figure 5.4 reveals some other important findings. During the peak of 
the crisis, especially the manufacturing sector lost most of its capacity to 
support economic growth. This sector suffered most, as is shown by the 
lowest economic growth compared to agriculture and services. 
Interestingly, agriculture suffered less than the other two sectors. This 
strengthens the conclusion that the economic crisis hit the manufacturing 
sector harder than the agriculture and services sectors. 
 
Figure 5.4 Change of GRDP's Sectoral Share by Province -1997-
1998 (%) 
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Source: calculation is based on CBS data 
 
In terms of the sectoral shares in the GRDP, services dominated the 
structure of the economy in all provinces, except West Java, which is 
dominated by the manufacturing sector. Due to the decline in 
manufacturing share in the GRDP, its importance reduced in all 
provinces. Interestingly, the share of both agriculture and services 
increased in all provinces except Central Java, which experienced a 
decline of share from the services sector (see Figure 5.4). This decline 
does not reflect its importance in the economic structure of the province 
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because its share to the GRDP was still the highest. The importance of 
agriculture in the economic structure during the crisis is prominent. In all 
provinces, without exception, as well as in Java in general, the share of 
the agricultural sector in GRDP consistently increased. 
During the peak of the crisis, agriculture‘s role increased not only in 
terms of the economy, but also of employment absorption which 
increased substantially in all provinces (see Table 5.7). This supports the 
finding that the agricultural sector played an important role in labour 
absorption during the peak of the crisis, not only for the new labourers, 
but also for those who lost their jobs because of the crisis. During this 
period, the overall employment structure in all provinces did not change 
very much. In 1998, when the crisis was at its peak, the service sector 
was able to absorb most employment needs. 
 
Table 5.7 Share of Employment by Sector in 1997 and 1998 
Province 
1997 1998 
Agri-
culture 
Manu-
facturing 
Services 
Agri-
culture 
Manu-
facturing 
Services 
West Java 31.61 24.33 44.06 32.19 23.34 44.47 
Central Java 43.09 21.28 35.62 43.38 20.84 35.77 
Yogyakarta 39.82 18.97 41.21 39.81 19.11 41.08 
East Java 37.12 22.86 40.01 37.58 22.14 40.29 
Java 37.21 22.74 40.05 37.65 22.04 40.31 
Note: calculated from CBS of various years 
 
In terms of sectoral share of employment, Yogyakarta is exceptional 
compared to other provinces. Agriculture and services, which were 
already very dominant in 1997, decreased slightly in 1998, while the 
other four provinces experienced an increase during the same period. In 
contrast, the share of manufacturing in Yogyakarta increased during the 
peak of the crisis and decreased in the other provinces. We have to bear 
in mind that the manufacturing sector in Yogyakarta was dominated by 
medium and small-scale industry that were mostly capital intensive. In 
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other provinces in Java, the large-scale and capital-intensive 
manufacturing sectors were more important. In most cases we observed 
that the crisis hit more the large-scale and capital-intensive industries. In 
addition, medium and small industries were easier to enter due to their 
relatively lower skill of labour requirement. This is the reason why the 
manufacturing sector in Yogyakarta still absorbed labour, while the other 
three provinces were severely hit by the crisis. 
 
Table 5.8 Annual Employment Growth by Province and Sector, 1993-1997 and 
1997-1998 
Province 
Agriculture Manufacture Services Total 
1993-
1997 
1997-
1998 
1993-
1997 
1997-
1998 
1993-
1997 
1997-
1998 
1993-
1997 
1997-
1998 
West Java -3,78 3,67 2,76 -2,36 3,13 2,73 0,6 1,79 
Central Java -4,60 2,90 3,92 0,15 2,41 2,69 -0,65 2,26 
Yogyakarta -4,39 0,90 0,29 1,70 2,33 0,64 -0,97 0,94 
East Java -2,27 3,27 1,26 -1,24 2,30 2,72 -0,15 2,02 
Java -3,48 3,19 2,59 -1,16 2,63 2,65 -0,09 1,98 
Note: calculated from CBS of various years 
 
Comparing the growth of employment by sector during 1993-1997 
(before the crisis) and 1997-1998 (during the peak of the crisis) reveals 
some interesting findings (see Table 5.8). First, in general, employment 
growth decreased before the crisis, but increased almost 2 percent 
annually during the crisis. The increase was attributable primarily to the 
increase in the agricultural sector (+3.2 percent). The increase occurred 
in all provinces, with West Java performing best. This supports the 
arguments of the importance of agriculture for labour absorption during 
the crisis. Second, manufacturing, which increased most compared to the 
two other sectors prior to the crisis, lost its capacity to absorb labour, 
resulting in a reduction in employment by more than 1 percent annually 
during the crisis. In terms of employment, the crisis hit manufacturing 
more than the other sectors. 
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The decrease of employment in manufacturing during the crisis 
occurred primarily in West Java and East Java, which were the most 
industrialised provinces compared to the other two, while Yogyakarta 
and Central Java continued to enjoy an increase in manufacturing 
employment. In addition to this, the pattern of growth of the services 
sector varies amongst the provinces. As can be seen in Table 5.8, the 
capacity of this sector to absorb the labour force in Java increased both 
before the crisis and during the crisis due to the increase in Central Java 
and East Java. However, in West Java and Yogyakarta, this sector 
experienced quite significant decrease in labour force absorption. This 
difference lays in the fact that the service sector in West Java and 
Yogyakarta had been very much associated with tourism. The crisis also 
affected the tourism industry in these two provinces (see Prabawa, 2010). 
The overall figures reveal that it is a mistake to state that the 
economic crisis had a negative impact on employment creation. Our 
findings undermine experts‘ estimate that economic crisis is likely to 
create unemployment.30 One important explanation of this situation was 
the existing labour force‘s market flexibility. When manufacturing lost 
its capacity to absorb the labour force, the agriculture and services 
sectors acted as ―the saviours‖. The two sectors provided almost 
unlimited labour absorption. This supports the arguments for the 
importance of the agricultural sector functioning as a safety belt for the 
economy of this region. 
However, we must be careful in interpreting the apparent increase of 
employment in agriculture. Not all people losing manufacturing sector 
jobs during the crisis moved to agriculture, rather many of them may 
have moved back to rural areas waiting for better economic condition to 
re-enter the manufacturing sector; they may have reported their 
occupations as ‗agriculture‘ but not necessarily engaged significantly in 
agricultural work. 
                                                 
30
 As we can see in Chapter I, the ILO and several experts estimated that the crisis would 
increase the unemployment rate. 
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V.5 Economic Performance after the Crisis 
After experiencing tremendous decline in economic growth in 1997-
1998, economic performance in the following two years gradually 
improved. At the national level, the economy started to make progress 
with better performance. In 1999, economic growth regained the 
momentum to reach almost 1 percent.31This was very impressive 
compared to conditions in 1998, but according to Thee (2000) it would 
be more accurate to interpret the growth as stagnation, rather than 
recovery. Moreover, he considered that the slight economic growth in 
1999 was mainly driven by increased private household and government 
consumption that grew at 1.6 and 8.4 percent, respectively, after negative 
growth in 1998. 
 
Figure 5.5 Share of GDP at Current Prices in 1998-2000 
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics various years 
 
Manufacturing gained in importance in supporting economic growth 
in this period. In 1998, the growth of this sector fell by 14 percent, but 
one year later the growth was 2 percent. A similar situation was also 
evident in the service sector, where growth dropped by minus 16.5 
percent in 1998, and recovered to grow minus 1 percent in 1999. The 
highest growth in 1999 was achieved by agriculture, but this sector 
                                                 
31
 Other data, such as that provided by Van der Eng (2009), shows a lower figure, i.e., 0.39 
percent in 1999. 
The Crisis at National and Provincial Levels 
126 
suffered the least in 1998 with a contraction of only 1.3 percent. This 
means that the service and manufacturing sectors actually achieved better 
progress. The sectoral shares to the GDP did not change very much 
during the period of 1998-1999. The share of manufacturing to the GDP 
fell slightly from 45.2 percent in 1998 to 43.4 percent in 1999. This was 
the only sector that experienced a decrease in its share. The other two 
sectors, agriculture and services, were growing (see Figure 5.5). 
In terms of economic growth, the country started to recover relatively 
fast, although not as fast as other neighbouring countries. During the 
period of 1999-2000, the economy grew significantly to reach 5 percent 
growth rate in 2000. Compared to 1999, sectoral growth was more 
balanced with a strong increase in manufacturing. The agricultural sector 
grew at a modest level in 1998 and at an even lower level in 1999. This 
provides evidence to support the conclusion that agriculture in a better-
off (macro) economic situation could not compete with the other sectors, 
mainly manufacturing, to foster economic growth and recovery. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.5, the manufacturing share to the GDP was 
the largest and increased substantially from 43 percent in 1999 to 46 
percent in 2000. At the same time, the shares of agriculture and services 
declined. Export had become the engine of growth, especially 
manufactured goods, which comprised of 68 percent of the total exports. 
Non-oil and gas exports reached USD 47.8 billion in 2000, or a 23.2 
percent increase in value over 1999. Other exports, such as electronics 
and electrical equipment, as well as wood and paper products, textiles 
and garments, grew strongly in 2000 (http: //jakarta.usembassy.gov/ 
econ/crossroad.html). 
As the economy grew, two years after the crisis employment also 
increased with more than one percent (Table 5.9). However, growth 
amongst the sectors showed a rather different pattern. In the first year 
after the total crisis, employment in agriculture decreased substantially, 
but then experienced a very dramatic rise in the following year to reach 
almost six percent. In contrast, employment in manufacture grew very 
fast in the period of 1998/99, which was more than fifteen percent, but in 
the period of 1999/2000, employment declined. A similar pattern can 
The Crisis at National and Provincial Levels 
127 
also be observed for the services sector with a small increase in 1998/99 
and a faster decline in 1999-2000. The overall growth for two years 
shows that manufacturing enjoyed the benefits of better economic growth 
by increasing its capacity to absorb the labour force by more than seven 
percent annually. This situation implies that those moving out from the 
manufacturing sector during the peak of the economic crisis re-entered 
the sector when the economy recover. The better economic performance 
of manufacturing is a consequence of the unchanging government policy 
that had put priority more on industry development than other sectors. 
We must bear in mind that the increase of employment in 
manufacturing did not influence the economic structure very much. The 
agricultural sector still dominated labour absorption, and its capacity 
even increased in the period of 1999-2000. The service sector was the 
second largest sector to absorb employment and manufacturing was the 
least. The tendency of a decreasing capacity of manufacturing can be 
observed in the period of 1999-2000. 
 
Table 5.9 Employment Growth by Sector in 1998-2000 
Sector 1998-1999 1999-2000 1998-2000 
Agriculture -2,63 5,99 1,59 
Manufacturing 15,39 -0,63 7,08 
Services 1,46 -3,14 -0,87 
Total 1,31 1,15 1,23 
Source: calculated from data downloaded on 3 November 2008 from 
http:www.adb.org/documents/books/key indicators/2004/pdf/INO.pdf 
 
All these figures provide us with a clear picture that at the national 
level, the economy was better off two years after the ―total crisis‖ and 
employment growth was quite high, especially in manufacturing. 
However, the structure of employment remained virtually similar in the 
sense that agriculture played the most important role, followed by 
services and then manufacturing. 
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V.6 Economic and Employment Adjustments in Java (1998-
2000) 
We will finally discuss the economic performance in Java during the 
period of 1998-2000. As in the previous sections, we will concentrate on 
two variables, i.e., the economic growth and employment structures. The 
discussion will be focused first at the provincial level and then followed 
by an examination of the district level. This is important to the 
determination of whether a pattern can be found to explain subsequent 
household conditions. 
On average, the economy of Java grew almost three percent during 
this period 1998-2000. This was similar as for all of Indonesia. Among 
the four provinces in the present study, Central Java was the fastest to 
recover with the highest economic growth (> 3 percent), which was 
higher than all of Java. At the same time, Yogyakarta was the province 
with slowest recovery. 
 
Table 5.10 Annual Economic Growth and Employment Growth (%) by 
Provinces and Sectors (1998-2000) 
Province 
Agriculture Manufacture Services Total 
Produc
-tion 
Employ
-ment 
Produc
-tion 
Employ
-ment 
Produc
-tion 
Employ
-ment 
Produc
-tion 
Employ
-ment 
West Java 2.17 0.98 0.80 1.22 1.82 5.45 2.87 3.06 
Central Java 1.70 0.99 3.28 0.25 4.07 3.13 3.28 1.61 
Yogyakarta 1.14 6.18 -0.25 4.29 2.15 0.03 1.41 3.36 
East Java 1.44 0.99 2.78 0.79 2.10 4.47 2.23 2.37 
Java 2.47 1.17 2.31 0.88 3.16 4.34 2.71 2.40 
Note: Calculated from Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data of various years. 
 
It is interesting to note that in Java it was not manufacturing that grew 
fastest, but the services sector. This was different from what happened in 
Indonesia as a whole, where the growth of manufacturing was higher in 
comparison with agriculture and services. In this context, we can say that 
the recovery of economic growth in Java was supported primarily by the 
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services sector. This also can be observed from the GRDP structure in 
which the share of services was the highest, both in 1998 and 2000. 
However, we will find a different pattern across the provinces. 
Manufacturing tended to recover faster in Central Java and East Java 
compared to West Java. Even in Central Java, the manufacturing sector 
increased faster than in Java in general, reaching more than three percent 
growth annually, while in East Java it was slightly lower. Manufacturing 
grew very slowly in West Java during this period. Even though this 
province achieved more advancement in manufacturing development 
before the crisis, because it had suffered very badly during the crisis, 
recovery was difficult. The only province that showed negative annual 
growth rate in manufacturing was Yogyakarta. We must bear in mind 
that before the crisis the growth of manufacturing in this province was 
also lowest. 
In addition, in most provinces the structure of the economy followed 
the same pattern as in Java, where the service sector was dominant, with 
the exception of West Java where manufacturing was the most important 
sector in stimulating the economy. Agriculture was generally small in 
terms of GDP share (15-22%) and this sector played a slightly larger role 
only in West Java, while its contribution to the economy decreased in the 
other three provinces. 
Employment in Java also grew relatively well, at more than two 
percent annually (Table 5.10). This was even higher than the growth rate 
before the crisis, which was minus 0.09 percent annually. However, the 
pattern of sectoral growth did not change in comparison to the situation 
before the crisis in which the services sector played a key role in driving 
overall employment growth in this region. In Java, employment growth 
in the service sector achieved more than 4 percent annually, followed by 
agriculture (1.77 percent) and manufacturing (less than one percent 
annually). Again this provides evidence that manufacturing was not able 
to increase its ability to absorb labour in spite of the fact that economic 
growth was quite high. Looking at this pattern we can expect that during 
this period, the economic gap between manufacturing on the one hand 
and agriculture on the other hand would widen. 
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Similar conditions can be found in all provinces, except Yogyakarta, 
which showed a very high growth of employment in manufacturing. The 
contribution of agriculture to absorb the labour force was also high; its 
share increased during the period of 1998-2000, when other provinces 
experienced a decline in the share of agriculture. This is surprising since 
the GRDP growth for manufacturing was negative during this period. 
The positive development of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) 
may be the explanation. These sectors have the capacity to absorb large 
numbers of labour force, but their contribution to the GRDP was rather 
limited. Also, it was only in Yogyakarta that employment in agriculture 
grew at a very high rate surpassing the employment growth in 
manufacturing. This influenced the overall growth of employment, 
becoming the highest among all provinces. Therefore, in terms of 
employment or labour force absorption, Yogyakarta performed best 
during this period. 
 
Figure 5.6 Per capita GRDP Growth and GRDP Growth in 1997-1998 
and 1998-2000 in Java 
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In Java, the agricultural sector played a key role in employment 
absorption. In the period of 1998-2000, the shares of the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors decreased slightly while the other sectors 
increased. However, agriculture was still able to absorb more labour 
force than manufacturing. It is interesting to see that in Java it was not 
manufacturing that had the fastest growth, but the services sector. This 
was different with what happened in Indonesia as a whole. Even when 
we compare the growth of the manufacturing with the growth of the 
agricultural sector, it was slightly lower. In this context, we can conclude 
that the recovery in terms of economic growth in Java was supported 
mostly by the service sector. 
Since the main objective of this study is to find out if there is any 
diverging pattern of recovery amongst the areas, it is interesting to 
compare economic growth during and after the crisis. As we can see from 
Figure 5.6, in terms of per capita GRDP, West Java suffered most during 
the crisis, followed by Yogyakarta, East Java, and Central Java. 
However, a different conclusion emerges when we look at the GRDP 
growth variable. It was not West Java, but East Java where the economy 
experienced the sharpest contraction, followed by Central Java, 
Yogyakarta, and West Java. In 1998-2000, this severe economic 
contraction was reversed in all provinces as the GRDP grew in a positive 
way. However, the pattern of the economic growth in 1998-2000 did not 
follow the earlier pattern of both the per capita GRDP growth and GRDP 
growth from 1997-1998. This means that at the provincial level, we do 
not have evidence to claim that the area most severely hit by the crisis 
will be the area to recover fastest. 
What can we learn from the above analysis? Even though there was a 
difference in the structures of the economy and employment at the 
provincial level, the recovery pattern was essentially rather uniform. 
Gradual growth of the share of the manufacturing sector in the GRDP 
was observed in the period of 1993-2000. The structure of employment 
shows a less severe shift between sectors, where the dominance of the 
services and agricultural sectors still remains prominent in almost all of 
the provinces. This means that the economic crisis did not have much 
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influence on the predominant structures of the economy and employment 
on the island of Java. In order to examine more closely the relationship 
between these two conditions, the following chapter will focus attention 
on the district level. 
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Chapter VI 
Coping with the Crisis 
at District and Household Levels 
Abstract 
This chapter deals with the determinants of economic growth and 
recovery at the district and household level, and the possible lock-in 
effects related to preceding growth patterns. There are two main types of 
analysis in this chapter. First, the association is described between the 
economic performances of the districts and cities before and during the 
crisis. Second, some important factors at household level and at district 
level are described as related to the household economy. The results 
show that in general, using district as a unit of analysis, the higher the 
economic growth before the crisis, the lower the economic growth during 
the crisis. However, the economic performance during the recovery 
period seems unrelated to the economic performance of the districts/cities 
during the crisis period. The other important finding is that economic 
growth has not been accompanied with sufficient employment 
opportunities, which is in line with our previous conclusions. When 
analysing the determinants of household economy levels, we found that 
education is an important factor, but, more importantly, the influence of 
educational attainment becomes stronger in districts having higher 
economic growth. The latter is in line with human capital theory.  
VI.1 Introduction 
The analysis of the impact of the economic crisis at the national level, 
as described in Chapter 5, led to the conclusion that the main two aspects 
of life that were seriously affected by the crisis were poverty and, to 
some extent, employment. The impact on other aspects of life, such as 
education performance, appears to be minimal. The rate of school 
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dropouts, for instance, seems to be not significantly different (see 
Strauss, et.al. 2002). 
An important next question is how strong the crisis hit the district-
level economy on the island of Java. There are two important reasons for 
this. First, Java has become the driving force of the national economy 
primarily due to its large contribution to GDP. It has been often said that 
Java is the core economy, while the outer Indonesian islands represent 
the periphery. In accordance with the general conclusion that the crisis 
hit urbanised areas more than the hinterlands, we found that the effects of 
the crisis were harsher on Java than on the outer, less urbanised islands. 
Second, economic development in Java has created diversified areas with 
widening economical gaps amongst its districts.32 Understanding the 
conditions of the districts has now become more important due to the 
implementation of regional autonomy that gives more power, both 
economic and political, to the districts. Thus, it is necessary to examine 
whether the effects of the crisis within these districts were different from 
those at the national and provincial levels. 
At the district level, there are three hypotheses that will be tested. 
First, it is hypothesized that the higher the economic growth before the 
crisis, the lower the economic growth during the crisis. This hypothesis 
was already addressed in the previous chapter, where it was found that 
the economic crisis in Indonesia hit manufacturing most severe. In 
addition, it was shown also that the main contributing factor of economic 
growth prior to the economic crisis was the manufacturing sector. From 
this we may expect the area having high economic growth before the 
crisis will experience low economic growth during the crisis. This refers 
essentially to the so-called lock-in hypothesis (North, 1990; Arthur. 
1994) that argues that lumpy investments in a sector create increasing 
returns for technologies, infrastructure and institutions. New institutions 
often entail high set-up or fixed costs. There are also significant learning 
effects for organisations that arise because of the growth opportunities 
provided. In periods of economic decline, however, these sectors adapt 
less flexibly to changing circumstances. Consequently, they suffer from 
                                                 
32
 Discussed in Chapter 4. 
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more decline and stagnation because of dysfunctional institutional 
design. Switching costs may therefore be high. 
This hypothesis is tested by analysing the performance of three 
sectors (i.e., agriculture, services, manufacturing) separately. The time 
period will be 1993-1997 for the pre-crisis period and 1997-1998 for the 
crisis period. The impact of the crisis will be examined using annual 
economic growth performance. With regard to our first hypothesis three 
scenarios are conceivable. First, there can be an overall positive relation 
between rates lower than 1, this means that economic growth slowed 
down. Second, the relationship can become negative, meaning that 
economic growth turned into negative growth. Third, the relationship 
may be negative while there is also an extra (constant) negative growth 
rate for all districts. We depicted these three scenarios in Figure 6.1. 
Scenario‘s 2 and 3 would be in line with our first hypothesis. From the 
results in previous chapters we expect scenario 3 to be more likely than 
the second scenario.  
 
Figure 6.1 Three possible scenarios of the relationship between annual 
economic growth rates before and during the crisis 
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The second hypothesis is that the stronger the area was hit by the 
crisis, the better it was able to recover from the crisis. This implies that 
the crisis destroyed formerly dysfunctional institutions and that economic 
recovery in certain sectors is less constrained by lock-in effects. This is 
particularly true for the manufacturing sector that is assumed to recover 
better than the other two sectors, agriculture and services. As we 
observed at national and provincial level, the contribution of 
manufacturing to GRDP grew faster than agriculture and services 
(Chapter V). With manufacturing growing faster we can expect it will 
influence the economic growth strongest in the districts due to its 
importance in driving the total economy as before the crisis.  
It is also important to know how economic growth rates helped to 
accelerate employment growth. This question will be answered for the 
island of Java. As Java is considered to be the core of the economy of the 
nation, it is very interesting to determine whether the economic trend at 
the provincial level in Java during the period of 1998-2000 followed the 
national trend. The analysis will then go to the lower levels in order to 
understand the pattern of structural transformation across the districts. 
Our third hypothesis therefore addresses the association between 
economic growth and employment opportunities. We expect that 
economic growth is not associated with employment creation in the case 
that lock-in effects prevail, even after taking into account a certain time 
lag. This hypothesis is based on results both at the provincial and national 
level, where economic growth was also not accompanied by extra 
employment opportunities. This hypothesis has its ground on the 
researches done by Ananta and Fontana (1995) and Sukamdi (1996). The 
findings show that the economic growth was mostly supported by large 
scale and capital-intensive industries that absorbed a very limited labour 
force. In turn this also affected sectoral disparities as well as income 
inequality (see Kuznets, 1955). 
Next, in the second part of this chapter we will address two new 
research questions. The first question relates to household survival. The 
main focus is on what factors best explain household conditions in terms 
of household per capita expenditures changes during 1998-2000. 
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Regression analysis will be used to answer this question. Secondly, we 
combine both the district level and the household level and investigate 
which economic conditions of the districts and cities, together with 
household characteristics, explain household survival. Multi-level 
analysis will be the main statistical tool to address this last research 
question. 
VI.2 District Economic and Employment development 1993-
2000 
In Chapter V we observed that the economy clearly recovered in 
terms of economic growth in the period of 1998-2000, both at national 
and provincial level. However, the pattern of economic and employment 
structure had not changed very much. At the national level, the service 
and manufacturing sectors actually achieved better progress. It is 
especially the manufacturing sector that grew by 2 percent in 1999 and 
almost 6 percent in 2000, after a fall of 14 percent in 1998. In Java, the 
economy grew faster than average. This means that on Java, the economy 
recovered better than that at national level. At the provincial level, 
Central Java‘s economy accelerated more than in the other three 
provinces on Java. However, we also noticed that the structure of 
economy and employment did not change very much over the years. 
An examination of the regional pattern of economic growth during 
the crisis reveals that almost all of the big cities and their surrounding 
areas experienced worse conditions than those of the hinterland, which 
depended heavily on traditional economy (agriculture) prior to the crisis. 
At the same time, areas that benefited from developments prior to the 
crisis performed worse after the crisis. The districts with higher economic 
growth were clustered in Central Java and Yogyakarta, while they were 
scattered in West Java and East Java. We therefore conclude that the 
areas that relied on the agricultural sector were less affected by the crisis. 
A similar pattern for employment growth does not emerge. There is 
no pattern of employment growth at the district level during the crisis 
(1997-1998). Districts that were better off in terms of economic growth 
did not show significant employment growth. Further, economic low-
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growth areas in the southeast section of East Java, such as the districts of 
Lumajang, Jember, and Banyuwangi, still enjoyed employment growth 
rates of 3 percent or more annually. We can also find similar cases in 
Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Pacitan, and Lamongan, as well as several other 
districts in Madura, Central Java, and West Java. 
In the period of 1998-2000 (two years after the crisis), employment 
growth seemed to be scattered across the region even though many of the 
districts with high growth rates were concentrated in West Java. High 
employment growth occurred in areas surrounding three major cities on 
Java, i.e., Jakarta, Bogor, and Bandung. Several areas, including the city 
of Bogor, and the districts of Bogor, Sukabumi, Cianjur, Serang, and 
Bandung, enjoyed employment growth rates of more than 4 percent 
annually, while several other districts – Lebak, Tasikmalaya, Kuningan, 
and Purwakarta –benefited from high employment growth ranging from 2 
to 4 percent annually (see Appendix 2). High employment growth in 
West Java was due primarily to a relatively high growth in both the 
services and manufacturing sectors. However, there were some areas 
where agriculture contributed significantly to employment growth. 
Comparing the average annual GRDP growth during 1993-1997 and 
1997-1998, it is clear that the crisis hit the district level very hard. During 
1993-1997, the districts enjoyed a high economic growth, 6.39 percent 
annually, which then contracted into -11.38 percent annually in 1997-
1998. The rate however, was lower than that at national level (-13.7 
percent annually). The next question is how these growth rates in all 
three periods are interrelated. We hypothesized that during the crises the 
districts with high growth rates were affected the hardest. In Figure 6.2a 
the relationship between annual growth rates before and during the crises 
is shown, together with an OLS regression slope.  
From this, we can infer that on Java virtually all districts experienced 
a negative growth rate during the crisis. If the growth rate was 2.5 in 
1993-1997 (lowest rate), then the rate in 97-98 was estimated to be about 
-7 percent (-4.76 + 2.5 * -1.016). Interestingly, the higher the district‘s 
rates before the crises, the more negative the growth rates during the 
crisis. In fact, the crisis hit that hard that all positive growth rates turned 
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into negative rates regardless their previous growth (scenario 3). So, on 
the level of districts Indonesia suffered from lock-in effects. These 
findings do support our first hypothesis: the higher the economic growth 
in a district before the crises, the less growth during the crisis. Next, we 
tested the hypothesis per sector, i.e., agriculture, manufacturing and 
services. From the results (see Figure 6.2b, 6.3 and 6.4) we conclude that 
in all three sectors on average the economic growth was lower during the 
crises. Although we have to add that only in figure 7.4 (services) scenario 
3 is at work. 
 
Figure 6.2a The relationship between annual total economic growth rates before 
and during the crisis (n=96) 
 
Note: 
1. GRDP Growth is calculated based on data provided by Central Bureau of Statistics  
2. City of Cirebon, City of Bogor, Cilacap,Serang, andBogor turned out to be influential 
outliers and were left out of the OLS equation (based on Cook‘s Distance 
 
 
 
Intercept = -4.76 
Slope estimate = -1.016  
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Figure 6.2b Therelationship between district-level annual agricultural economic 
growth during and after the crisis (n=96) 
 
Note:  
1. GRDP Growth is calculated based on data provided by Central Bureau of Statistics  
2. Serang, City of Bogor, City of Sukabumi ,City of Surabaya, Bekasi were left out. 
 
Figure 6.3 The relationship between annual economic growth during and after 
the crisis within manufacturing (n=97) 
 
Note: 
1.  GRDP Growth is calculated based on data provided by Central Bureau of Statistics  
 2. Serang, City of Cirebon, Cilacap ,Sumenepwere left out 
Intercept = -7.424 
Slope estimate = 0.817  
Intercept = -22.12 
Slope estimate = 0.167  
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Figure 6.4 The relationship between annual economic growth during and after 
the crisis within services (n=95) 
 
Note: 
1. GRDP Growth is calculated based on data provided by Central Bureau of Statistics  
2. Serang, City of Bogor Cilacap Bogor Sukoharjo Jeparawere left out based on Cook‘s 
distance. 
 
Next, we tested whether the districts recovered faster, the harder they 
were hit by the crisis (Hypothesis 2). We tested this again on the total 
growth and on growth per sector.  
From Figure 6.5 we conclude that there is hardly any relationship 
between the rates during the crisis and after the crisis. All districts on 
average had a positive growth rate of about 2.5 percent no matter how 
hard they were hit by the crisis. This means we have to reject the second 
hypothesis, which claimed that the worse the area was hit by the crisis, 
the better it was able to recover from the crisis. As Figure 6.5 is almost 
identical for all three sectors separately analysed, we do not present them 
here. 
 
Intercept = -8.361 
Slope estimate = -0.31  
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Figure 6.5 The relationship between annual total economic growth rates 
during and after the crisis (n=97) 
 
Note: Kulon Progo, Cilacap,  Serang, and  Indramayu were left out of the OLS 
equation because they are too influential  
 
VI.3 The Impact of the Crisis at the District Level: Jobless 
Growth? 
In Appendices 1 to 16, we observe that when the economy contracted 
at a very high level and most of the areas experienced a two-digit decline, 
employment still increased. This is due to the labour market flexibility 
existing in Indonesia (Manning, 2000). When someone loses his job, 
he/she can enter the informal or agricultural sectors, because these two 
sectors are characterised by their unlimited ability to absorb labour. 
Correlation analysis on the district level also supports this finding 
showing very low correlations between annual economic growth and 
employment growth (see Figure 6.6), even if we take into account a time 
lag. The only exception is a correlation of 0.107, which hints at some job 
creation after the crises. These findings also apply more or less to the 
relationships between economic and employment growth within 
manufacturing, agriculture, and services (Figure 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9). This 
underscores once more that economic growth did not foster employment 
in Indonesia in the period 1993-2000. Therefore, the third hypothesis is 
Intercept = 2.387 
Slope estimate = -0.05  
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accepted. There is evidence that even though the correlations are rather 
low, a negative relationship exists between economic growth and 
employment growth in manufacturing, agriculture, and services at some 
points (see Figure 6.7: -0,117 (during crisis – recovery period), Figure 
6.8: -0,213 (recovery period) and services -0,136 (pre-crisis-during 
crisis). So at some moments economic growth might even have hindered 
employment creation.  
 
Figure 6.6 Correlations between Total Economic and Employment Growth (a 
few districts were omitted due to high Cook’s distances) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Correlations between Total Economic and Employment Growth 
within manufacturing (a few districts were omitted due to high 
Cook’s distances) 
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Figure 6.8 Correlations between Total Economic and Employment Growth 
within agriculture (a few districts were omitted due to high Cook’s 
distances) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Correlations between Total Economic and Employment Growth 
within services (a few districts were omitted due to high Cook’s 
distances) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI.4 Survival from the Crisis at Household Level 
An important finding concerning the crisis has been discussed 
previously both at the beginning of Chapter VI: namely that the impact of 
the crisis on economic growth varies across districts/cities. The next 
research question is whether this economic variation at the district/city 
level has led to variation in household expenditures. One of the main 
hypotheses to be tested states that economic growth at the district level in 
the period of 1998-2000caused household expenditures to be higher in 
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1998-2000. This is based on the argument that the household will benefit 
from the better economic conditions in that area (Cortright, 2001).It is 
further hypothesized that human capital caused household expenditures 
to be higher in 1998-2000. We expect this human capital effect to be 
highest in districts with highest economic growth.  
We will include two levels of analysis: district (macro or aggregate 
level) and household (micro level). As mentioned by Robinson (1950), as 
well as Roberts and Burstein (1980), usage of aggregate or macro level 
data only is open to the charge of ecological fallacy and aggregation bias 
and unrecognized individual variation (see: Jones, 1997: 20). Likewise, 
when working at the micro level only, one runs the risk of atomistic 
fallacies (Alker, 1969) and misses the context in which individual 
variation occurs (see: Jones, 1997: 20). To cope with these problems, 
multilevel analysis incorporating both macro and micro level data at the 
same time is a common solution (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). 
A macro analysis was used in chapter 4 at national and provincial 
level and in the previous sections at district level to investigate 
correlations between economic indicators. We now focus on the micro 
level to determine the impact the crises might have had on Indonesian 
households. To compare our results with previous studies, we will first 
use OLS regression analyses to determine important household 
characteristics that influence variation in household expenditures. 
In a macro perspective, traditional neoclassical growth models view 
the extra output of an economy as a result of larger input of physical 
labour. This model conforms to a law of diminishing returns in which 
technological progress is seen as exogenous to the system. Early 
neoclassical growth models therefore did not consider education as 
important factor in production. In the 1980s, based on the experience of 
East Asian developing economies, a new paradigm was introduced that is 
now commonly known as the endogenous growth model (see Romer, 
1990; Cortright, 2001). Viewing the importance of investments in both 
education and health, the whole concept of capital has been broadened to 
include human capital in this model (Nerlove, 1974). 
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The importance of education and health in the household economy 
was also stressed in Schultz‘s (1981) Nobel lecture. He argues that 
investing in both children's health and education will help to escape from 
poverty. This argument has been supported by many research findings 
showing that education and health are essentials in increasing people‘s 
economic welfare (see: Wei, 2001 and Riddell, 2006). At the household 
level there is also evidence that education is raising household income 
and expenditures as proxies for the household economy. For instance 
Jamison and Lau‘s survey of the literature on schooling and household 
farm income in over 35 studies from Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
(Jolliffe 1997) has shown that the level of education obtained by the head 
of household positively affects farm income. A study by Jolliffe (1997) 
in Ghana concluded that education is an important (positive) predictor of 
household income. Similar findings can also be found in Weir‘s study 
(1999) in rural Ethiopia. In Indonesia, Ananta and Sugiharso (1988) have 
found that education measured by both the level of education achieved 
and years of schooling by head of household has a positive correlation 
with household income. 
Work by Himaz and Aturupane (2011) based on the study in Sri 
Lanka during the period 1985-2006 has supported above findings saying 
that education has a positive effect on household welfare. For education 
levels between 1-10 years the impact is between 1 and 5 percent, while 
for higher levels it is 9-16 percent. Another study in rural China shows 
thatthe households with higher levels of education, better average health 
and more skilled workers had higher levels of per capita net income. In 
addition, human resources, like education, turn out to contribute more to 
household income level than land and financial capital (Wei 2001). 
VI.4.1 Analysis at Household Level: Determinants of Household 
Economies 
Based on the previous arguments, the first hypothesis to be tested is 
that education plays an important positive role in explaining the 
economic recovery of the household during the crisis. Testing this 
hypothesis requires two steps. First, we will use OLS regression analysis 
to examine the influence of all independent variables separately. In these 
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analyses the log transformed per capita expenditure in 2000 is the 
dependent variable and per capita expenditure in 1997 (also log 
transformed) serves as the control variable.33 By doing so, we are actually 
analyzing the difference of per capita expenditure of the household 
between 1997 and 2000. This way we take into account bottom and 
ceiling effects (i.e., it is easier to spend more money in 2000, when little 
was spent in 1997, and it is more difficult to spend more money in 2000, 
when a relatively high amount in 1997 was spent). We define a 
household more successful in coping with the crisis if the difference in 
expenditure is positive (i.e., the standardised expenditure in 2000 is 
higher than its counterpart from 1997). Next, we include one of ten 
household variables: (1) residence, (2) age, (3) level of education of 
household head, (4) proportion of household members who achieved 
higher education, (5) proportion of household members working in 
industry, (6) occupation of household head, (7) occupational status of 
household head, (8) sex, (9) marital status, and (10) proportion of 
household members who are working (see Table 6.1 for detailed 
description).Among these variables, four represent human capital as 
introduced in the human development indicators (HDI), they are 1) 
economy (per capita expenditure in 1997), 2) health (age of the 
household head), 3) education (level of education of the household head 
and 4) proportion of household members achieving higher education. 
Second, all independent variables will be entered in multiple 
multilevel analyses together with relevant variables on the district level. 
For area (district/city) context, we include four variables, i.e. total growth 
rate of GRDP in 1998-2000; the GRDP change of manufacturing share in 
1998-2000; the growth of employment in manufacture during 1998-2000 
and change of employment share of manufacture in 1998-2000. The first 
variable represents economic growth during the period of 1998-2000, 
while the second variable is an indicator of the changing contribution of 
manufacture to GRDP in the period of 1998-2000. The last two variables 
are employment variables to figure out the importance of manufacture in 
                                                 
33
 Because of their skewed distribution, we take from these variables the logarithms to have a 
more normal distribution. In addition, per capita expenditure for both years is standardised (see 
for standardisation details Strauss et.al. 2002: 50-53) 
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the economy from increasing number and share of employment in 
manufacture during the period of 1998-2000. 
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Household Variables      
Per capita expenditure in 2000 2898 2.83 8.55 5.1469 .70945 
Per capita expenditure in 1997 2898 2.80 10.34 5.1362 .79598 
Place of residence (urban = 1) 2898 .00 1.00 .4110 .49210 
Age of household head 2898 19.00 105.00 49.5055 13.56222 
Average education level of the 
household member 
2898 1.00 6.00 2.7567 1.61489 
Proportion of household member 
having high education 
2898 .00 1.00 .1666 .25373 
Proportion of household members 
working in industry 
2898 .00 1.00 .2041 .34812 
Occupation of household head 
(industry = 1) 
2898 .00 1.00 .1994 .39965 
Occupational status of household 
head (formal vs informal with 
formal = 1) 
2898 .00 1.00 .4448 .49703 
Sex of house hold head (male = 1) 2898 .00 1.00 .8406 .36613 
Marital status of household head 
(married = 1) 
2898 .00 1.00 .8326 .37336 
Proportion of household members 
who working 
2898 .08 1.00 .5016 .25056 
Valid N (listwise) 2898     
Area Variables      
Districts/cities identification 
number 
69 3201 3578 3397.45 129.996 
Mean of economic growth 1998-
2000 
69 -9.43 7.26 2.7760 2.42923 
Mean of the GRDP change of 
manufacturing share in 1998-2000 
69 -12.52 7.32 .0685 2.61418 
Mean of employment growth 1998-
2000 
69 -11.48 21.35 2.2306 7.15313 
Mean of employment change in 
manufacture 1998-2000 
69 -6.05 9.63 .7743 3.11761 
Valid N (listwise) 69     
Note: Household data is calculated based on the 1997 and 2000 Indonesian Family Life 
Survey and distrcit data are based on Central Bureau of Statistics various years  
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Table 6.2 OLS Regression analysis at household levels (bivariate analyses) 
(y=log transformed expenditure in 2000, x1 = log transformed 
expenditure in 1997, x2 = one of 11 household characteristics) 
estimates are (un) standardized parameters. N=2898, listwise deletion 
of missings 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(b-coefficient) 
Estimate 
(standardized) 
Standard 
Error 
Log Per capita Expenditure 1997 
(control variable) 
0.469 0.526 0.014** 
Household characteristics:    
Residence (rural = reference vs. urban)  0.131 0.091 0.023** 
Age -0.001 -0.015 0.001 
Education of Household Head 0.059 0.134 0.007** 
Proportion of household members with 
higher education 
0.666 0.238 0.047** 
Proportion of household members 
working in industry 
-0.104 -0.051 0.032** 
Occupation of household head (non- 
industry = reference vs. industry) 
-0.056 -0.032 0.028* 
Occupational status of household head 
Informal = reference vs. formal 
0.005 0.003 0.023 
Sex (female=reference vs. male) -0.031 -0.016 0.031 
Marital status (not married=reference 
vs. married) 
-0.078 -0.041 0.030* 
Proportion of household members who 
are working 
0.368 0.130 0.044** 
Note: ** and * denote significance at .01 and .05 level, respectively. 
 
At the household level, when the independent variables are treated 
separately, there are three out of ten variables that have no significant 
influence on the difference in per capita expenditure 1997-2000, i.e., age, 
sex and, occupational status of the head of the household, (see Table 6.2). 
These findings are quite interesting since occupational status and 
occupation are apparently not factors that help to explain abetter 
household economic condition. It is also interesting to see the effect of 
working in the industrial sector is negative. This might be due to the fact 
that in 2000 the industry had not yet fully recovered from the impact of 
the crisis. This finding is also consistent with other findings that show the 
negative effect of occupation of household head (see Table 6.1), meaning 
that those working in industry have less chance to improve their 
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economic status. Table 6.2also shows that households in urban areas had 
a better chance to improve their household economy during the period of 
1998-2000.  
Among the seven significant predictor variables, two variables 
concerning education, i.e. education of the household head and 
proportion of household members having higher education, are among 
the factors having a positive effect on the economic condition of the 
household. Additionally, the proportion of household members that 
achieved higher education has the strongest positive effect (in terms of 
standardised beta estimates) on the economic condition of the household. 
The higher the education of its members, the higher the 2000 expenditure 
compared to 1998. This result confirms the hypothesis that education (in 
terms of the proportion of household members that have higher 
education) is the best predictor for coping with the crisis. 
VI.4.2 Multilevel Analysis 
1. Model fit for several multilevel models 
The hypothesis to be tested in the multilevel analysis, is that the effect 
of education on the ability to cope with the crisis will be higher in the 
areas showing better economic performance, but smaller in the areas with 
poor economic performance. This hypothesis rests on arguments from 
human capital theory in which investment in education is said to be an 
important factor in stimulating the economic condition of the household. 
However, as argued by Cortright (2001), the geographical (area) 
condition is also important. If we assume that people react rationally 
towards their environment it is expected that the better the economic 
condition of the area people live in, the more families will invest in 
human capital because the investment is expected to pay off. As a result, 
households with highly educated members in those areas will be better 
off after the crises. In case that same household would reside in areas 
with low economic performance the educational effect is expected to be 
lower. 
The hypothesis that claims an interaction between education and 
geographical area is important for two reasons. First, there is no research 
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on the Indonesian crisis focusing on economic performance at the district 
level that affects household survival. Second, from a methodological 
point of view, combining macro (district) and micro (household) levels in 
one multilevel model introduces a new approach in understanding 
household survival. 
 
Figure 6.10 A multilevel causal scheme explaining household economic 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steps in the analyses 
Yij = βo + eij+ uj (null-model) 
Yij = βo + β1 xij + eij+ uj (model with individual variables) 
Yij = βo + β1 xij + β2zj + eij+ uj (model with both individual and 
contextualvariables) 
Yij = βo + β1 xij + β2zj + β3xijzj +eij+ uj (model with cross-level 
interaction) 
Y = Household economic performance (per capita expenditure) 
X = Household characteristics 
Z = Area variables (district level) e.g., economic growth using 
GRDP growth as an indicator 
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To test the hypothesis we use data that is hierarchically structured, 
consisting of two levels (Figure 6.10). As previously explained, the first 
level contains household data derived from the 1997 and 2000 
Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), including two groups of 
variables. The first group contains characteristics of the household as 
predictors for per capita expenditures in 2000. We use again all 10 
household variables as explanatory variables, plus the control variable 
per capita expenditure in 1997. 
In the multilevel estimation, higher-level units, such as community or 
district characteristics, need to be tested whether they show variation in 
the dependent variable. Following a criterion used by Goldstein (1995), 
Amin et al. (1997), and Rasbash et al. (2000), using the confidence 
interval, we  conclude that there is sufficient variation in household 
expenditure among Indonesian districts if the value of 0 is not included in 
the confidence interval with alpha=0.05. 
Since the data sources are panel surveys we only used households that 
were successfully interviewed in both surveys. Level 2 in the analysis is 
the district level. We use a set of indicators for industrialisation in each 
district: (1) economic growth measured by the annual GRDP growth in 
the period of 1998-2000, (2) changing employment structure measured 
by the growth of employment in the manufacturing sector in 1998-2000, 
and (3) changing economic structure measured by the growth of the 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to GRDP in 1998-2000. All 
variables are gathered from data published by the Central Body of 
Statistics in Indonesia.34 For all analyses we used the MLwiN program 
(Rasbash, et al. 2000). 
There are several steps in the analysis. The first step (model 1) is a 
base line model estimation containing only a random intercept (βo) and 
variance estimates at the household level (eoij) and also at the district 
level (uoj). 
                                                 
34
 This is the first time that the series of data on the GRDP at the district level on the island of 
Java are used as contextual variables in combination with household data.  
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Estimates of these variance parameters (Table 6.2) show the variance 
in per capita household expenditures on the district and household level. 
The t-tests for the variances and intercept are both significant, hence it 
can be concluded that districts do indeed differ in the average household 
expenditure in the year 2000 (variance = 0.042, t-statistic = (0.042 / 
0.003) = 14). 
In the second step, we include all level 1 (households) variables 
(model 2) to explain the observed variance in per capita expenditures in 
2000. If these variables have an effect on per capita expenditures and if 
their distribution varies across districts, then they are a compositional 
explanation for the variance at the district level (Snijders and Bosker, 
1999). As can be seen in Table 6.2, the level 2 variance is reduced from 
0.042 to 0.010. In addition, the -2log likelihood has also reduced 
significantly. This implies that the level 1 variables taken as a whole do 
have an effect on per capita expenditure and it also means that they 
explain to a large extent the observed variance between the districts. 
In the third step, we include level 2 (district) variables in a step-by-
step procedure (we entered them separately and kept significant effects in 
the model). Of the three district variables, only the annual GRDP growth 
is significant. Hence, we treat this variable as the only district variable in 
predicting per capita expenditure differences. The level 2 variance, as 
well as the -2log-likelihood, is slightly reduced. Conceptually, the GRDP 
growth is a representation of economic growth in the district that also 
partly explains the variation of recovery achievement across districts. 
The fourth step is to check whether the effect of education of household 
members and the effect of the proportion of household members with a 
job varies across districts by estimating the slope variances.  
The -2 log likelihood now is 4928.752, which is a reduction by 6.016, 
compared to the previous model (Model 3) at the cost of only two 
degrees of freedom namely two variance components (co-variances were 
nearly zero and fixed to zero in subsequent analyses). Therefore, this is a 
significant improvement and indicates that effects may vary across 
districts. The crucial question now is whether this variation is caused by 
economical growth at the district level; this is tested in a fifth step. 
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Table 6.3 Level 1 and Level 2 Variance and -2*log likelihood  of multi-level 
models, n1=2898, n2=69 
 
Per capita expenditure 2000 
Estimate 
Standard 
error 
Δlog/df 
Model 1: base line    
Level 1 variance (eoij) 0.459 0.012  
Level 2 variance (uoij) 0.042 0.009  
-2*log-;likehood (IGLS) 6391.793   
Model 2: Model 1 + all variables on Level 
1 
   
Level 1 variance (eoij) 0.316 0.008  
Level 2 variance (uoij) 0.010 0.003  
-2*log-;likehood (IGLS) 4942.246  -1449.547/11 
Model 3: Model 2 + district economic 
growth 
   
Level 1 variance (eoij) 0.316 0.008  
Level 2 variance (uoij) 0.008 0.003  
-2*log-;likehood (IGLS) 4935.885  -6,361 
Model 4: Model 2 + effect proportion of 
household members with higher education 
set random & proportion household 
members who are working set random 
4928.752  -6,016/2 
Model 5a: Model 3 + interaction variable 
proportion of household members with 
higher education and district economic 
growth in 1998-2000 
4923.116  -4,170 
Model 5b: Model 3 + interaction variable 
proportion household members with a job 
and district economic growth in 1998-
2000 and proportion of household 
members with higher education and 
district economic growth in 1998-2000 
4918.946  -5.572 
 
 
This fifth step consists of two parts. In the first part, a model that 
includes an interaction between the proportion of household members 
with higher education and economic growth in 1998-2000 is tested. The  
-2 log likelihood now has gone to 4923.116 with just one extra 
parameter. With a reduction of about 4, this is significant. The second 
step involved the inclusion of an extra interaction between the proportion 
household members with a job and district economic growth. This again 
reduced the -2 log likelihood in a significant way. 
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2. Understanding the influence of household characteristics on 
household economy 
Now that we tested our models we will describe the effects of each 
predictor variable (see Table 6.3). The individual determinants of per 
capita expenditure are examined in the multiple multilevel Model II. In 
the endogenous growth model (Schultz, 1981; Romer, 1990; Cortright, 
2001; Wei, 2001; Riddell, 2006) education and health as human capital 
indicators are important factors influencing people‘s economic welfare. 
Thus we hypothesise that education is an important factor to influence 
per capita expenditure. In this analysis of Model II, the proportion of 
household members with higher education is again found to be positive 
and significant to per capita expenditures, after taking into account all 
other individual characteristics and variation in average expenditure 
across districts. As in our OLS regression, household head's education 
again turns out to have an insignificant effect on per capita expenditures 
in 2000 controlling for 1997 expenditures. This is different from findings 
in other studies, such as Fane (1975), Wu (1977), and Jamison and Mock 
(1984), which show the effect of education of the household head on 
household income (see Jolliffe; 1997). The reason for this difference may 
lay in the fact that these previous studies focus on household farms only, 
while this present study includes all types of households. 
A striking figure is shown in the negative effect of the proportion of 
household members engaged in industrial sectors (which already showed 
up in Table 6.1): the more the relative share of industrial workers in a 
household, the less this household‘s expenditure in 2000 was in 
comparison to expenditures in 1997.35 Vulnerability of this sector to 
macroeconomic shock might explain this variability. In line with this 
research, regional data has shown that the manufacturing sector suffered 
the most during the crisis. This phenomenon might be reflected at the 
household level, where a higher share of industrial workers had lower 
expenditure rates in 2000. 
                                                 
35
 As explained in Strauss, et.al (2002: 50) to calculate real values, the price deflator to pce was 
applied using December 2000 as the base. The mean rupiah-US$ exchange rate in December 
2000 was Rp. 9,400. Urban households are assigned a cpi for the nearest city from the BPS 
list, while rural households are assigned a cpi based on their province of residence.  
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Table 6.4 Multilevel Analysis(y=log transformed expenditure in 2000. Estimates 
are standardized parameters (n1=2898, n2=69) 
Explanatory variables Model II Model III 
Intercept 3.187** (.098) 3.152** (.099) 
   
Expenditure 1997 .353** (.015) .351** (.015) 
   
Residence (rural = reference vs. urban) .043(.029) .041 (.028) 
   
Age -.0032**(.001) -.003** (.001) 
   
Head of HH Educ -.002(.010) -.001 (.010) 
   
Proportion of High Educ. in HH .681**(.064) .689** (.064) 
   
Proportion of HH members in industry -.153**(.047) -.151** (.047) 
   
Occupation of HH Head .033(.041) .031 (.040) 
(non- industry = reference vs. industry)   
Occupation status of HH Head -.036(.023) -.038* (.023) 
(Informal = reference vs. formal)   
Sex (female=reference vs. male) .037(.047) .037 (.046) 
   
Marital Status 
(not married=reference vs. married) 
-.055(.047) -.057 (.047) 
   
Proportion of working in HH .462** (.046) .464** (.045) 
   
GRDP Growth  0.016** (.006) 
   
Estimates of residuals   
Household Residual .316**(.008) .316* (.008) 
District residual .010 ** (.003) .008** (.003) 
   
N 2898 2898 
-2loglikelihood ratio 4942.246 4935.885 
Note: ** and * denote significance at 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Explanatory variables Model Va Model Vb 
Intercept 3.555** (.100) 3.562** (.101) 
   
Expenditure 1997 .350** (.015) .349** (.015) 
   
Residence (rural = reference vs. urban) .036 (.028) .036** (.028) 
   
Age -.003** (.001) -.003** (.001) 
   
Education of household head  -.002 (.010) -.002 (.010) 
   
Proportion of high education in household .701** (.066) .624** (.078) 
   
Proportion of household members in 
manufacturing sector 
-.153** (.046) -.145** (.046) 
  
Occupation of HH Head 
(non- industry = reference vs. industry) 
.031 (.041) .030 (.040) 
   
Occupation status of householdhead  -.037* (.023) -.036* (.023) 
(Informal = reference vs. formal) 
 
  
Sex (female=reference vs. male) .035 (.046) .035 (.046) 
   
Marital Status (not married=reference vs. 
married) 
-.053 (.047) -.053 (.046) 
   
Proportion of working in HH .482** (.055) .487** (.053) 
   
GRDP Growth .015** (.006) .014** (.006) 
   
Interaction of Prop. Educ and GRDP 
Growth 
.042** (.017) .043** (.018) 
  
Interaction of Prop. Work and GRDP 
Growth 
 
Estimates of residuals 
Household residual 
 
Variances on district level 
Intercept 
Prop. Educ (mean centred) 
Prop. Work (mean centred) 
 .040** (.019) 
 
 
 
.312 (.008) 
 
 
.008 ** (.003) 
.010 (.020) 
.048 * (.029) 
 
 
 
.312 (.008) 
 
 
.008 ** (.003) 
.011 (.020) 
.036 (.029) 
N 2898 2898 
-2loglikelihood ratio 4923.116 4918.946 
Note: ** and * denote significance at 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Further we find age of the household head to be negatively related to 
expenditure: the older the less one could improve expenditure.  
The third multilevel model introduces explanatory variables at the 
district level. As with expenditures in 1997, age, the proportion of 
household members with higher education, and the proportion of 
working household membersall continue to have a positive and 
significant effect on per capita household expenditure differences. This 
result confirms that education and economic aspects continue to be 
important as pathways for improving per capita household expenditures. 
In contrast, the larger the share of household members engaging in the 
industrial sector in both periods, the more deterioration of per capita 
household expenditures. 
The results also again show the negative age effect of household head 
on the higher-level characteristic, namely annual GRDP growth. The 
effect confirms our hypothesis: the household expenditure in 2000 is 
higher compared to 1997 if a households lives in an area that enjoyed 
economic growth between 1998 and 2000. 
In Model V we finally test our hypothesis that the educational effect 
is stronger if a household lives in an area with economic growth. This 
indeed turns out to be the case. In case the economic growth is average 
(2.77), the effect of the proportion of highly educated household 
members is 0.701 and it rises to 0.701 + 0.042 * 4.49 =0.89 when growth 
is at its maximum. When growth is at his minimum the effect is 0.701 + 
0.042 * -12.02 =0.19 (not significant). This tells us that households with 
a higher share of highly educated members will survive better if they live 
in areas that have better economic conditions. We have shown this 
mechanism in Figure 6.11. 
In the last model we added the interaction between economic growth 
and the proportion of the household members that work. We find results 
that are comparable to that of the interaction with education. The effect 
of the proportion of working household members is strongest when 
economic growth is strongest, and becomes less strong when there is less 
economic growth in a district. Again, we show this interaction in a graph 
(see Figure 6.12).  
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Figure 6.11 The effect of proportion of highly educated household members 
under 3 conditions of economic growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 The effect of proportion of household members with a job under 3 
conditions of economic growth 
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In sum, the interactions found tell us that household variables, i.e., 
education of household members and the proportion of working 
household members, together with the area variable, i.e., economic 
growth of the district, are important in explaining the better economic 
conditions in the period of 1997-2000. Providing access for education, as 
well as employment, become important factors for households to 
improve their economic condition. However, this must be supported by 
favourable economic conditions as expressed by economic growth. 
Economic growth, then, is important even though some argue that it 
might create a wider economic gap amongst people. 
These results bring us to the notion that economic performance of 
districts in the years following the crisis may play an important role in 
understanding the economic conditions of the households. The next 
chapter will examine the economic performance of the provinces, as well 
as the districts, in the period of 2000-2007, the continuation of the 
recovery period. 
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Chapter VII 
2000 - 2007: Recovery Continued 
Abstract 
The period of 2000-2007 was marked by the introduction of regional 
autonomy: switching the power from central government to district or 
local government. This has been seen as a milestone in Indonesian 
development and expected to stimulate local development performance. 
This chapter addresses the question whether recovery started in 
1999/2000 was continuing in the period 2000-20007. The analysis is 
based on economic growth performance and the production as well as 
employment structure at national, provincial, and district level. At district 
level we analyse if regional autonomy functions as stimulating factor for 
local economic growth. The findings show that the recovery continued 
with a remarkable increase in economic growth, which almost reached 
the level before the crisis. However there is no evidence that regional 
autonomy was able to stimulate local economic growth 
VII.1 Introduction 
Many experts were sceptical about Indonesia‘s future economy after 
the crisis. The country did not only have to struggle out of the economic 
crisis, but also had to rebuild social and political structures. Social 
conflicts occurred in several parts of the country, like Pontianak, Ambon, 
Aceh, East Timor, and Poso, which in turn made it even more difficult 
for the country to rebound from the crisis. 
Social conflict disrupted economic development because, to a certain 
degree, its effects were damaging the economic infrastructure and 
activities. It also caused distrust to the individual economic actors that 
led the capital outflow. Under these conditions it was very difficult for 
the government to quickly restore the national economy. This was also 
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complicated by political turbulence during a period of at least five years 
after the fall of Suharto, which caused political instability and 
uncertainty, and in turn created similarly unstable and uncertain 
economic conditions. 
On one hand, Suharto's downfall brought new hope, at least in terms 
of democratisation, but the political euphoria of the Habibie and 
Abdurrahman Wahid administrations, to a certain extent, became an 
obstacle to the recovery effort. 
The downfall of the Suharto regime was followed by an increasing 
demand for regional autonomy. The government then introduced a new 
policy of decentralisation and regional autonomy, which is outlined in 
Law No. 22/199936 concerning ―Local Government‖, and Law 
No.25/199937 concerning ―The Fiscal Balance Between the Central 
Government and the Regions‖. These laws are based on five principles 
(Usman, 2002): (1) democracy, (2) community participation and 
empowerment, (3) equity and justice, (4) recognition of the potential and 
diversity within regions, and (5) the need to strengthen local legislatures. 
Law No. 22/1999 transfers functions, personnel and assets from the 
central government to provincial, as well as to district and municipal, 
governments. The main objectives of regional autonomy are to promote 
better public services and raise good governance practices. However, 
much remained unclear about the scope and implications of their 
implementation. 
The basic principles for the implementation of decentralisation in 
Indonesia are: 
• To shift the rights, authorities and accountability/responsibilities 
from the central government to the regions to rule and govern the 
regions in accordance with national laws, 
                                                 
36
 This law was replaced by Law No. 32/2004 concerning Regional Government, and then 
substituted by Law No. 12/2008. This is not the first law on decentralisation in Indonesia. 
There were several laws prior to the 1999 law, such as Law No. 5/1974, Law No. 18/1965, 
Government Decree No. 6/1959, Law No. 1/1957, Law No. 22/1948, Law No. 1/1945, and 
Desentralisatie Wet 1903.  
37
 This law was replaced by Law No. 33/2004 concerning The Fiscal Balance between the 
Central Government and the Regional Government. 
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• To delegate authority from the central government to the lower 
entities to undertake certain duties. 
The 1999 Regional Autonomy Law passed a lot of governmental 
power to the city and district levels, not to the provincial level. To some 
extent, this has created problems in coordination between the provincial 
and district levels. Many cases of poorly formulated local regulations 
(Perda) have been identified during the implementation of regional 
autonomy. These local regulations contradicted the higher laws, 
disturbed public activities, or hampered the region‘s investment climate. 
During the period of 1999 to 2007, there were 1,406 Perda annulled due 
to the above reasons (Butt, 2010). 
Regional autonomy has not only affected the decentralisation of the 
central government‘s power to local governments. It is believed that the 
laws have functioned as an engine to split provinces and districts, thus 
increasing the total number of provinces and districts. Since 1999 to the 
end of 2007, 179 pemekaran, or new autonomous regions, have been 
legalised. One of them is Banten Province, which has separated from the 
province of West Java. 
In addition to this, the first five years of the implementation of 
regional autonomy witnessed the constant emergence of new problems. 
Law No. 22/1999 was quite ambiguous and, thus, was interpreted 
differently to cater to the interests of the local elite. Some regions took 
advantage of the regional autonomy laws to maximise their regional 
revenues from taxation and retributions, and/or to exploit natural 
resources (Dwiyanto, et al., 2003: 174). Corruption, collusion and 
nepotism (familiarly referred to as KKN, korupsi kolusi nepotism, in 
Indonesian) were also other common issues that found fertile ground in 
regional autonomy (Ananta and Eko Riyanto, 2006). In this situation we 
can question whether the autonomy at district level would lead to better 
economic performance or not. 
In the first part, this chapter is to discuss the economic transformation 
7 years after the crisis. It mainly focuses on economic growth 
performance and the production, as well as employment structure at 
national and provincial level, while at district level the analysis focuses 
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on economic growth and sectoral share. The analysis of this chapter will 
provide understanding whether and how the country and Java island had 
recovered from the economic crisis. It is also to understand whether the 
economic growth during the recovery era led to a changing economic and 
employment structure. We are therefore interested to ascertain whether 
economic growth could create sufficient employment in this period. 
In addition, since we know that economic growth at the district level 
is an important factor in explaining the household welfare conditions (see 
Chapter 5), then by understanding the economic performance at the 
district level we can also predict in which locations households will get 
more chances in improving their livelihoods. However, due to the lack of 
detailed data at household level, our analysis will not be able to identify 
individual household variables. 
VII.2 Weak Industrialisation: Unchanged Production and 
Employment Structure 
The discussions in Chapters IV and V have clearly shown that in two 
years immediately following the total crisis all macro-economic 
indicators at the national level showed improved performance. 
Surprisingly, in 2000 economic growth was remarkably high, achieving a 
similar rate as in 1997, the year before the crisis. Bank interest rates in 
2000 also dropped more than half compared with that in 1998. Other 
macroeconomic indicators, such as the inflation rate, decreased to less 
than 10 percent compared to 77.6 percent in 1998 (Bank Indonesia 2001). 
Consumption and exports also increased substantially, while the 
exchange rate remained relatively stable after 2000 (see Figure 7.1). 
During the period of 2000-2007, economic growth continued to increase 
and on the average the growth was almost 5 percent annually (Figure 
7.2). 
However, overall economic performance in the period of 2000-2007 
still lagged behind the achievements during the period of 1993-1997. The 
economy in this period grew at 4.73 percent annually; compared to 7.06 
percent during the 1993-1997 periods (see Table 7.1). Several factors 
contributed to the slower economic growth. One important factor was the 
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large debt, which at the end of 2005 was US$ 130,709 million. In 
addition to this, various structural problems, such as deficient law 
enforcement, labour regulations, and the implementation of regional 
autonomy, had hindered economic recovery (Bank Indonesia, 2005). 
Table 7.1 shows that even though agriculture grew at a lower rate in 
2000-2007, it surpassed the annual growth rate before the crisis (1993-
1997). While manufacturing grew far less compared to its achievement in 
1993-1997, mining lost its capacity to support economic growth with 
very low growth rate (less than 1 percent) in 2000-2007. The other 
sectors performed quite well, but still below the rate in 1993-1997. The 
service sector grew slightly higher in 2000-2005 than it had performed in 
1993-1997. This was attributed to high growth rates in the transportation 
and communication sub-sectors, as well as other services. 
 
Figure 7.1 Exchange Rates of Rupiah against the Dollar 1990-2007 
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Source: www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/2008/country.asp downloaded 
on 10 December 2008 
 
When we examine sectoral growth of GDP, we find an interesting 
pattern (see Figure 7.2). First, it was the service sector (S) which had the 
highest growth and was consistently growing, except in 2004-2005. We 
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can say that this sector had the highest contribution to economic growth 
in this period. Second, agriculture (A) started with a higher rate than 
manufacturing/industry (M), but it ended with a lower rate. There was a 
tendency towards decreasing growth of agriculture. This means that 
agriculture performed worse than manufacturing in terms of economic 
growth. Manufacturing tended to increase, although not as high as the 
service sector. Hence, the sectoral performance of the service sector (S) 
was the highest, followed by manufacturing/industry (M) and agriculture 
(A). The annual growth during this period has also confirmed this finding 
showing the highest annual growth rate of the service sector (6.81 
percent) followed by the manufacturing/industrial sector (3.88 percent), 
and finally, the agricultural sector (3.21 percent). 
 
Figure 7.2 Economic Growth in 2000-2007 
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
               GDP
               Agriculture
               Industry
               Services
 
Note: Calculation based on data downloaded from www.adb.org/documents/books/ 
key_indicators/2008/country.aspdownloaded on 10 December 2008 
 
Table 7.1 has also strengthened the above argument that - at the 
national level - Indonesia was on the track to recover. After having 
suffered from the crisis with a 1.33 percent decrease at the peak in 1997-
1998, agriculture increased by more than 2 percent in 1998-1999. It 
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decreased again slightly in 1999-2000, but then grew by more than 3 
percent annually in the 2000-2007 period. Manufacturing, after having 
been hit very badly with a decrease of almost 14 percent in 1997-1998, 
enjoyed an increase of almost 2 percent one year after the total crisis and 
then jumped to almost 6 percent in 1999-2000. The increase of 
manufacturing in 1998-1999 was mostly because of a significant increase 
in the manufacturing and electricity, gas and water supply sub-sectors. 
Surprisingly, mining and construction grew at negative rates in 1998-
1999, but in the following year, experienced a tremendous increase by 
5.5 percent per annum and 5.6 percent per annum consecutively. 
Compared with 1999-2000, in the manufacturing sector only construction 
had a higher growth rate in 2000-2007, while the other sub-sectors were 
lower. Unlike the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, only the service 
sector, as explained above, consistently increased during the period of 
1998-2000. Even in the period 2000-2007 the growth rates were beyond 
the total GDP growth rate. Almost all sub-sectors in the services sector 
had higher growth rates than the over-all GDP growth rate, with the 
exception of the public administration sub-sector, which grew at a lower 
rate than the over-all GDP growth rate. This is evidence that in terms of 
economic growth, services recovered better than the other sectors. 
In terms of sectoral shares, it is very clear that manufacturing 
contributed most to the GDP in the country. During the recovery period, 
2000-2007, the sector composition did not change very much (see Table 
7.2). However, the share of two sectors, i.e., manufacturing and 
agriculture, decreased about two percent during this period, while the 
services sector increased its contribution to the GDP by five percent in 
the same period. Again, these facts reinforce the conclusion that the 
service sector had become an important sector in the economic 
development of the country. It was trade that had become an engine of 
growth in the service sector. The manufacturing sector having the highest 
contribution to the GDP also implies that the economy of the country was 
on the right track. It shows that the structure of economy had transformed 
from agriculture to manufacture. 
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Table 7.1 Growth Rate of Real GDP in 1993-2007 
Sector 
1993-
1997 
1997-
1998 
1998-
1999 
1999-
2000 
2000-
2007 
AGRICULTURE (A) 2.26 -1.33 2.16 1.88 3.27 
 Mining 5.17 -2.76 -1.62 5.51 0.31 
 Manufacturing 9.98 -11.44 3.92 5.99 4.88 
 Electricity, gas, and water 13.60 3.03 8.27 7.55 7.05 
 Construction 11.94 -36.44 -1.91 5.64 6.87 
MANUFACTURING (M) 9.33 -13.95 1.97 5.89 4.09 
 Trade 7.38 -18.22 -0.06 5.66 6.07 
 Transport and communications 8.13 -15.13 -0.75 8.59 11.91 
 Finance  8.27 -26.63 -7.19 4.59 6.86 
 Public administration 1.27 -7.32 1.66 1.37 2.18 
 Others 7.05 1.89 2.36 3.77 7.68 
SERVICES (S) 6.76 -16.46 -1.03 5.17 6.80 
TOTAL GDP  7.06 -13.13 0.79 4.92 5.06 
Sources: 
1. The growth for 1993-2000 is calculated based on data downloaded from http: 
//www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/2004/pdf/INO.pdf on 3 November 
2008 
2. The growth for 2000-2005 is calculated based on data downloaded from 
www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/2008/country.asp on 10 December 
2008 
 
The improved economic conditions can be derived from several 
indicators. In 2007, for instance, the investment rate was relatively high, 
averaging 22.9 percent of the GDP. This was high enough to sustain a 
growth rate of 5 to 6 percent, but increased investments were needed to 
spur more rapid growth and faster gains in productivity. However, some 
argue (see Sari, 2009) that the very low rate of public sector investment 
emerged as a major obstacle to achieve a faster growth rate due to the 
country‘s weak infrastructure. The other constraint for faster growth is 
the poor business environment related to high cost economy, weak 
governance, and a very rigid labour market. 
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Another indicator is per capita GDP rebounding from a level of $516 
(in current U.S. dollars) in 1998 to $1,947 in 2007 (or $3,724 in terms of 
purchasing power parity [PPP] dollars). The average income is now 
above the global median for L&MI countries of $1,608 (or PPP $3,693), 
using the World Bank‘s income classification. 
 
Table 7.2 Sectoral Share of GDP (%) in 2000-2007 
Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
AGRICULTURE (A)  15.60 15.64 15.39 15.24 14.92 14.50 14.20 13.83 
 Mining 12.07 11.66 11.29 10.63 9.66 9.44 9.10 8.73 
 Manufacturing 27.75 27.60 27.86 28.01 28.37 28.08 27.83 27.40 
 Electricity, gas, and water 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.69 
 Construction 5.51 5.55 5.61 5.68 5.82 5.92 6.08 6.21 
MANUFACTURING (M) 45.93 45.44 45.42 44.97 44.51 44.09 43.66 43.02 
 Trade 16.15 16.24 16.16 16.26 16.37 16.77 16.92 17.26 
 Transport and  
 Communications 
4.68 4.87 5.06 5.42 5.85 6.24 6.77 7.28 
 Finance  8.31 8.53 8.74 8.90 9.12 9.21 9.21 9.35 
 Public administration 5.00 4.86 4.68 4.51 4.37 4.21 4.15 4.11 
 Others 4.34 4.42 4.55 4.69 4.86 4.97 5.09 5.15 
SERVICES (S) 38.47 38.92 39.19 39.78 40.57 41.41 42.13 43.15 
Note: Calculated from www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/2008/ 
country.asp downloaded on 10 December 2008 
 
VII.3 Employment Growth and Employment Structure 
Economic growth, along with changing its structure, showed 
promising outcomes during the period of 2000-2007. However, important 
questions concerning its impact on employment creation remain. The 
earlier forwarded conclusion that industrialisation in Indonesia has failed 
to create sufficient employment requires further elaboration. 
During the period of 2000-2007, employment creation remained a 
major problem in Indonesian development. In this period, the labour 
force grew at 2.05 percent annually, while employment grew at only 0.94 
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percent annually. This difference between the growth rates of the labour 
force and employment caused an increase of unemployment by 15.4 
percent annually in the same period. Looking into the yearly trend is also 
interesting. The period of 2000-2001 was the only phase when the 
growth of employment was higher than the growth of the labour force 
(see Figure 7.3). A year later, the labour force grew at its highest rate, 
while employment grew less than 1 percent. This created a widening gap 
between the two. In the period of 2002-2005, the growth of employment 
was always lower than the growth of the labour force. During this period, 
the number of unemployed almost doubled from 5.8 million in 2000 to 
11.9 million in 2005. The unemployment rate increased from 6.1 percent 
to 11.2 percent in the same period. On the other hand, economic growth 
increased steadily to reach the highest point in 2007. The situation was 
exactly similar to the situation in 1993-1997, explaining the process of 
industrialisation without job creation. High economic growth does not 
mean high employment growth. Even the period of 2003-2005 has 
clearly supported the notion that higher economic growth was followed 
by lower employment growth. 
 
Figure 7.3 Annual Growth Rates of GDP, Labour Force, and Employment (%) 
in 2000-2007 
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Note: Calculated from www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/2008/ 
country.asp downloaded on 10 December 2008 
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Table 7.3 Sectoral Employment Growth (%) in 2000-2007 
Sector 
2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2000-
2007 
Agriculture -2.29 2.24 5.93 -5.65 4.22 -5.17 6.16 0.67 
Manufacture -0.65 5.43 -4.03 -1.01 6.21 -2.76 3.27 0.85 
Services 5.35 -1.81 -1.91 9.24 -5.44 9.70 -1.12 1.85 
Total 1.08 0.93 1.27 0.98 0.25 1.30 2.53 8.62 
Note: Calculated from www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/2008/ 
country.asp downloaded on 10 December 2008 
 
Table 7.3 provides additional evidence that during the period of 2000-
2007, employment conditions were not yet stable. The growth of 
employment for all sectors fluctuated. In 2000-2001, employment 
increased at a relatively high rate because of the growth of services. The 
following year, the increase of employment was attributed to the increase 
in agriculture and manufacturing/industry. During the next period 
employment in agriculture continued to increase at a rate double that of 
the previous year (2001-2002). In this period, employment in agriculture 
grew by almost 6 percent, and this was the highest growth it had in 2000-
2005. In contrast, manufacturing dropped by more than 4 percent in the 
same period. During the period of 2003-2004, agriculture lost its capacity 
by -5.65 percent and then increased again at a high rate in 2004-2005. In 
2003-2004, when agriculture decreased at its highest rate, the services 
sector enjoyed a very high growth rate, more than 9 percent. By the end 
of 2004, the services sector went through it‘s the worst period with 
employment decreasing by 5.44 percent. The overall figures show that in 
this period the annual growth of employment in agriculture was the 
lowest, followed by services, and the highest growth was in 
manufacturing/industry. 
Even though the annual GDP growth for manufacturing was 
relatively high in the period of 2000-2007, the share of manufacturing to 
total employment was the smallest (see Table 7.4). The share of 
manufacturing to employment did not exceed 14 percent. On the one 
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hand, agriculture absorbed almost 45 percent on average, while services 
absorbed slightly more than 41 percent. This tells us that development of 
manufacturing/industry was not capable of providing sufficient 
employment. On the other hand, agriculture, which contributed very little 
to the GDP, had to absorb most of the labour force. This reveals the wide 
gap between sector development and the unemployment rate. This 
situation caused not only economic problems, but also social and political 
tensions. 
 
Table 7.4 Sectoral Share of Employment (%) in 2000-2007 
Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Agriculture 45.28 43.77 44.34 46.38 43.33 45.04 42.17 43.66 
Manufacture 13.54 13.31 13.90 13.18 12.92 13.68 13.14 13.23 
Services 41.18 42.92 41.76 40.45 43.76 41.27 44.69 43.11 
Total (000) 89838 90807 91647 92811 93722 93958 95177 97583 
Unemployment 
(000) 
5813 8005 9132 9820 10251 11899 11105 10548 
Labour Force (000) 95651 98812 100779 102631 103973 105857 106282 108131 
Note: Calculated from www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/2008/ 
country.asp downloaded on 10 December 2008 
 
The problem of unemployment can be observed from the fact that the 
unemployment rate remained beyond 9 percent in 2007. In the period of 
2005-2006, the unemployment rate was decreasing after experiencing a 
dramatic increase in 2000-2005 (see Figure 7.4). However, we must bear 
in mind that the decrease of the unemployment rate in 2006-2007 
occurred together with an absolute decrease in the number of 
unemployed persons. In 2005, the number of unemployed persons was 
11.9 million and decreased to 10.5 million in 2006. This is the first time 
in the post-war period that a decrease occurred in both the rate and the 
number of unemployment. 
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Figure 7.4 Unemployment Rate (%) in 2000-2007 
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Note: Calculated from www.adb.org/documents/books/key_indicators/2008/ 
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The problem of unemployment was worsened by the fact that most of 
the unemployed persons were educated (graduates of senior high school 
and above), representing more than 42 percent in 2005. One of the 
reasons for this is the failure of the industrial sector to create enough 
qualified jobs. As explained in previous chapters, this is what is referred 
to as ―weak economic transformation‖. 
VII.4 Provincial Performance 
In line with Indonesia as a whole, economic performance in Java 
(excluding Jakarta) during the period of 2000-2007 was promising. In 
2006-2007, economic performance almost reached levels comparable to 
those before the crisis. This was quite surprising considering the 
pessimistic views about the Indonesian economy at the beginning of the 
recovery period ( see: Mubyarto, 2001; Sadli, 1999). 
Four typical patterns can be identified based on the GRDP growth. 
The first pattern concerns provinces with high growth at the beginning of 
the period, but slower growth at the end of the period. Such was the case 
of the province of Banten38 in which the GRDP grew from 3.67 percent 
                                                 
38
 Banten was previously part of the province of West Java. 
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in the first year to 4.87 percent in the second year. The increase was 
slower in the following three years and decreased in the fifth year, to 
increase again at the end of period. This means that the economy of the 
province was not yet stable. The second pattern is for provinces with very 
slow progress in the first two years, but high growth in the later years. 
This pattern can be found in the provinces of East Java and Central Java. 
These two provinces performed better in the later years with stable 
growth to show better recovery. The third pattern concerns provinces 
with slow growth in the first three years, but with very significant GRDP 
growth in the last four years to reach the highest growth rate at the end of 
the period. This pattern can be found in West Java. This province showed 
the best performance in terms of economic growth. We can expect that 
this province would also recover better and faster than the other 
provinces. The last pattern is for the provinces that started with the 
highest growth (2000-2001), but ended with the lowest growth rate 
(2006-2007). This occurred in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. At the 
end of the period, the economy of the province of Yogyakarta was 
growing; however it was far below the levels of the other provinces 
(Figure 7.5). 
 
Figure 7.5 Growth of GRDP by Province in 2000-2007 (%) 
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In 2006-2007, all provinces enjoyed economic growth by more than 6 
percent, except for Yogyakarta, which was only 4.3 percent. The highest 
economic growth was in West Java, followed by Central Java, East Java, 
Banten, and Yogyakarta. High economic growth in the four provinces, 
especially in 2006-2007, in fact has different explanations. 
In West Java, for instance, we would expect to see the role of industry 
as an engine of growth since this sector has been developed in the 
province more than in the other provinces. In addition, this province has 
also enjoyed the advantage of being located close to Jakarta. However, 
the high economic growth in 2006-2007 was attributed not to the 
advantages of its location, but to high growth in the transportation, 
communications and finance sub-sectors, which made double-digit 
increases in their growth. Trade also made a significant contribution with 
an 8 percent growth rate. These three sub-sectors are incorporated in the 
services sector. On the other hand, in the sub-sectors included in 
industry, only construction and manufacturing had growth rates above 
average. Even the mining sub-sector contracted more than 7 percent, and 
this sub-sector did not recover, but has exhibited minus growth rates 
since 2000-2001. The contraction for this sub-sector reached the highest 
rate in 2002-2003 with a decline of more than 50 percent. We can 
conclude that the high growth rate in 2006-2007 can be attributed to the 
growth of the services sector rather than to the growth of manufacturing 
sector. 
However, we cannot ignore the importance of manufacturing for the 
economy of the province. The share of the manufacturing sub-sector to 
the GRDP was significant in the period of 2001-2007, reaching 44.8 
percent in 2007. The overall manufacturing sector contributed more than 
52 percent of the GRDP, while the service sector‘s contribution was 35 
percent, which was followed by agriculture with less than a 15 percent 
share. As we can see in Figure 7.6, the share of manufacturing (including 
mining, electricity, water, and construction) declined together with 
agriculture, while at the same time, the service sector increased. 
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Figure 7.6 Sectoral Share of GRDP in West Java, 2000-2007 
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In Central Java, the economy almost doubled in the period of 2000-
2007. In 2000-2001, growth was only 3.6 percent, but six years later it 
was recorded as high as 6.3 percent. The most impressive performance 
was trade, which rebounded from minus 0.97 percent in 2000-2001 to 
6.54 percent in 2006-2007. Looking at the growth in 2006-2007, it is 
more likely that the high growth during this period was possible because 
of the contributions of the service sector, comprised of trade, transport 
and communication, finance, and services itself. The only sub-sector 
showing two-digit growth was also part of the services sector that is 
transport and communication. The manufacturing sector grew at a 
modest rate, while agriculture suffered, growing at less than 3 percent. 
This sector even experienced a minus growth rate in the year 2002-2003. 
In Central Java, in the period 2000-2007, the sectoral contribution to 
the GDP did not change very much with comparable shares of the 
manufacturing and services sectors accounting for about 40 percent. 
These two sectors together played an important role in fostering the 
economy in this area. Agriculture still lagged behind with a contribution 
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of about 20 percent, but this number is higher than its equivalent in West 
Java. The trend indicates a decline in agriculture in the future. 
 
Figure 7.7 Sectoral Share of GRDP in Central Java, 2000-2007 
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Comparing the growth before and during the recovery, we can 
observe contrasting trends. Before the crisis, the sectoral growth of 
GRDP exhibited a consistent pattern, i.e., a decrease in agriculture and an 
increase in manufacturing and services. This pattern does not appear 
during the recovery period, 2000-2007, as all sectors fluctuate. This may 
be an indication of an unstable economy in the midst of unstable non-
economic conditions. 
As explained previously, the Special Region of Yogyakarta showed a 
different pattern. This province had the lowest economic growth rate. 
Due to a very dynamic pattern of sub-sector growth, it is quite difficult to 
determine which sub-sector contributed most to the GRDP. We can see 
that from year to year, the highest and the lowest sub-sector growth 
changed from one sub-sector to another. In 2000-2001 and 2001-2002, 
electricity, gas and water showed the highest growth. In the following 
year (2002-2003), construction was the highest. Transport and 
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communication exhibited the highest growth in 2003-2004, while 
construction increased in the following two years. In 2006-2007, 
surprisingly the growth of mining was the highest, while in the previous 
years this sub-sector was the lowest, except in 2005-2006 when 
electricity, gas and water reached minus growth rates, making the growth 
of this sector the lowest. We must be careful in interpreting the high 
growth of mining. Unlike in other provinces, mining in Yogyakarta refers 
to small-scale activities that are referred to as ―C group‖ (golongan C). 
Its capacity to support economic growth is minimal. Together with 
manufacturing, this sector has understandably lagged behind, considering 
the limited resources available in the area. 
 
Figure 7.8 Sectoral Share of GRDP in Yogyakarta, 2000-2007 
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We can see from Figure 7.8 that the largest part of the GRDP of the 
province came from the services sector. It comprised more than 56 
percent of the GRDP in 2007, an increase from 54 percent in 2000. 
Agriculture lost its contribution from 20.6 percent in 2000, to 18 percent 
in 2007. There is a great possibility that this sector will continue to 
decline. Manufacturing had been stable at 24 percent. We estimate this 
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sector will remain stable in the future. If this is the case, we can expect 
that this province will depend largely on the services sector. Since the 
services sector in this province has been dominated by tourism and 
related industries, any occurrence which potentially hampers the tourism 
industry will affect the province‘s economy. 
In spite of having a progressive increase of economic growth, it is 
only in East Java that construction grew at a very slow rate, on an 
average of less than 2 percent. On the other hand, mining held a high 
growth rate in the last three years after only an approximate 2 percent 
increase in the period of 2000-2004. It seems to me that mining in East 
Java grew before the crisis. Together with West Java, East Java is a 
province in which economic growth was stimulated by the growth of the 
manufacturing sector. 
 
Figure 7.9 Sectoral Share of GRDP in East Java. 2000-2007 
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Nevertheless, the services sector has also played an important role as 
an engine of growth. Among the four sub-sectors in this sector, only the 
services sub-sector showed a lower than average growth rate. This means 
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that trade, transportation and communications, and finance were 
important as driving forces for economic growth in East Java. 
Data on sectoral shares strengthen the above statement. As we can see 
from Figure 7.9, the largest contribution to the GRDP in East Java is 
from the services sector. This sector increased in the period of 2000-
2007, from 42.9 percent in 2000, to almost 50 percent (49.8 percent) in 
2007. It was accompanied with an increase of its growth rate from 6 
percent to almost 8 percent. Interestingly, the share of the manufacturing 
sector decreased from 37.4 percent to 33.5 percent in the same period, 
when growth more than doubled from 2.4 percent in 2000-2001 to 5 
percent in 2006-2007. It is very clear that the services sector was the 
most important sector for the economy of the province during the 
recovery period. 
Banten is a new province that had previously been part of the West 
Java Province. The establishment of this new province would influence 
the economic performance of West Java, because some areas close to 
Jakarta are now part of this new province. As this is a new province, it is 
difficult to analyse development in the period of 2000-2007 in 
comparison with performance during the crisis era. Therefore, the 
explanation in this part will include data from West Java. 
The performance of the economy in Banten during the period of 
2000-2007 is shown in Figure 7.10. The economy grew significantly and 
consistently only in 2004-2005, and in 2005-2006 growth decreased 
slightly. Interestingly, no single sub-sector experienced consistent 
economic growth. The growth of all sub-sectors fluctuated. Of the sub-
sectors, transportation and communication experienced a high growth 
rate throughout the entire period, while agriculture showed the least 
growth. 
Unlike in East Java, the high growth rate in the services sector did not 
have a parallel of its share of the GRDP. The share of the services sector 
in Banten increased in 2000-2007, but it was still lower than the 
manufacturing sector, which experienced a decreased share during the 
same period (Figure 7.10). The services sector increased from 31.24 
percent in 2000 to 36.5 in 2007, while manufacturing decreased from 59 
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percent to 55.5 percent with a stable growth rate at 3-4 percent in the 
same period. 
 
Figure 7.10 Sectoral Share of GRDP in Banten. 2000-2007 
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Again, as it was in other provinces, the growth pattern of sectors was 
inconsistent across the years. Our conclusion is that this is a sign of 
economic instability during the recovery period that is apparent in all 
provinces, without exception. This conclusion may apply for the entire 
island of Java, if Jakarta is included in the analysis. Considering the fact 
that Java constitutes a major part of the country, it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that the situation in Indonesia as a whole was not far 
from this. 
With the assumption that economic growth will generate 
employment, we can expect that the pattern of employment growth rate 
will also follow the pattern of economic growth. However, data of 
employment growth (Figure 7.11) does not confirm this assumption. 
Employment growth fluctuated and varied across the provinces. In the 
last two years, at least four out of five provinces included in this analysis 
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showed a high employment growth rate. It was only in Yogyakarta that 
the employment growth rate declined. The relationship between the 
employment growth rates and the economic growth is very difficult to 
understand. As discussed above, although none of the provinces 
experienced a negative economic growth rate, employment rates declined 
in several provinces, especially in the years of 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 
and 2005-2006. 
 
Figure 7.11 Growth of Employment in 2002-2007 (%) 
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As an illustration, Figure 7.12 outlines a comparison between 
economic growth and employment growth in Java in 2002-2003 by 
sector. Agriculture is the sector that grew more than 3 percent and its 
capacity to absorb employment increased at almost the same rate. On the 
other hand, employment growth in manufacturing, which enjoyed 
economic growth of more than 3 percent, declined. A similar situation 
could also be observed in services sector. 
Figure 7.13 provides a likewise explanation. This figure tells us that 
economic growth was able to stimulate employment opportunities so that 
the labour absorption capacity for each sector also increased significantly 
(albeit not always proportionally). This is confirmed in agriculture, but 
not in the manufacturing and services sectors. This is the main factor that 
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explains why the number (not only the rate) of unemployment strongly 
fluctuated in the last two years. 
 
Figure 7.12 Comparison between Economic and Employment Growth by Sector 
in Java, 2002-2003 
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When we calculate the average annual employment and economic 
growth in the period of 2002-2007,39 the general pattern of sectoral 
growth can be identified. Table 7.10 shows a very clear picture of how 
economic growth was not able to stimulate employment creation, also 
called Jobless Growth. With an annual economic growth of more than 5 
percent, employment grew only less than 2 percent. Employment in 
agriculture was declining in three provinces, i.e., West Java, Yogyakarta 
and Banten. However, interestingly, in East Java, employment growth in 
agriculture was higher than employment growth in manufacturing. At the 
same time, economic growth for manufacturing in East Java grew higher 
                                                 
39
 This calculation is made in a different period because data for employment is available only 
for the period of 2002-2007. 
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than for the same in agriculture. There is clear evidence that the 
manufacturing sector was incapable of generating sufficient employment. 
The best performance of employment growth in manufacturing was in 
Central Java where it achieved more than 2 percent. This was the only 
area in which employment in manufacturing grew higher than that in 
services. In the four other provinces, employment in the services sector 
grew with the highest rate. Economic growth for the services sector was 
the highest in all provinces except Yogyakarta, where manufacturing was 
highest. These figures have also supported the notion that in both 
employment and economic growth, the services sector, not 
manufacturing, played a leading role. Any policy to direct future 
economic development in this country must consider this fact. Moreover, 
we must bear in mind that most of the services sectors were dominated 
by the informal sector. 
 
Figure 7.13 Comparison between Economic and Employment Growth by Sector 
in Java, 2006-2007 
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Table 7.5 Sectoral Annual Employment and Economic Growth in the Period 
2002-2007 
Province 
Annual Employment Growth 
(%) 
Annual Economic Growth (%) 
A M S Total A M S Total 
West Java -0.93 1.09 4.18 1.92 4.10 4.96 6.39 5.32 
Central Java 0.79 2.07 1.79 1.47 2.82 5.82 6.40 5.41 
Yogyakarta -2.05 1.70 4.26 1.53 2.57 5.09 4.88 4.48 
East Java 1.87 0.94 2.65 1.97 3.00 4.41 7.62 5.67 
Banten -3.87 -0.94 4.96 1.01 2.25 4.49 8.76 5.72 
Total Java 0.56 1.22 3.13 1.74 3.22 4.91 7.02 5.48 
Sources: 
1. BPS, 2005b; 2008b, 2011 
2. BPS, 2003; 2004; 2005a; 2006; 2007; and 2008a 
 
Is it true that economic growth was not able to generate employment? 
Table 7.11 provides an answer this question. We use this table to 
calculate growth/employment ratios. The method compares the annual 
growth of employment with the annual economic growth. The formula is 
as follows: 
Ee = 
Yae 
Where 
Eg 
Ee : Estimated number of additional employment when the economy grows by 1 
percent 
YAe : The number of yearly additional employment 
Eg : Annual economic growth 
 
The smallest employment creation was found in Yogyakarta and 
Banten, with roughly 6,000 employed per 1 percent of economic growth. 
The largest number was in East Java, followed by Central Java and West 
Java. This variation was related primarily to a sectoral pattern of growth. 
When the labour force increases by 2 million annually, the economy 
must grow by more than 10 percent just to absorb the entrance of new 
members of the labour force. This only maintains the unemployment rate 
at a stable position. If the government wants to decrease unemployment, 
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the economy must grow at a rate of more than 10 percent, depending on 
the sectoral composition of the regional economy. 
During the New Order, using similar calculations, every 1 percent of 
economic growth was able to create an additional 400,000 employed. 
With the same addition of 2 million to the labour force annually, it 
required at least a rate of 5 percent of economic growth. Even though the 
economic growth reached about 5.5 percent in 2000-2007 as a sign of 
economic recovery, it is not sufficient to generate employment. We can 
simply conclude that the conditions in 2000-2007 had not reached the 
conditions of the New Order period in terms of employment creation. 
Regional differences in both economic growth and employment are 
based on the fact that large and medium scales of the manufacturing 
industry have been concentrated in two provinces: West Java and East 
Java. During the period of 1985-2001 for instance, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and domestic investment in both provinces represented 
40.2 percent of total investment in the country, while in Yogyakarta and 
Central Java it was only 13.4 percent (Santosa and McMichael, 2004). 
According to a study by Wahyudi and Jantan (2011) on distribution of 
the manufacturing industry in three provinces, West Java, Central Java 
and East Java, medium scale manufacturing industries concentrated in 
East Java, while large scales are in located more in West Java. The effect 
is visible on both sides of the equation, economy growth and 
employment creation. The manufacturing industries stimulate economic 
growth and at the same time create job opportunities. As shown by 
Santosa and McMichael (2004) the amount of employment was also 
concentrated in East Java and West Java. East Java mostly relied on 
kretek (clove cigarette) industries and West Java was based on garment 
industries. 
The important remaining question refers to the driving forces of 
economic performance at the district level. How does economic growth 
and structure correlate with employment growth and structure? These 
questions are important for understanding the results of the previous 
chapter that outlined how economic performance at the district level is an 
important contextual factor for households to survive. 
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Table 7.6 Estimation of Employment Creation 
Province 
Average 
Annual 
Economic 
Growth,  
2000-2007 (%) 
Average 
Annual 
Employment 
Growth, 2002-
2007 
(persons) 
Total 
Additional 
Employment 
2002-2007 
(persons) 
Additional 
Employment 
per 1 % 
Economic 
Growth 
West Java 6.10 287,216 1,436,083  47,084 
Central Java 4.63 229,840 1,149,202 49,641 
Yogyakarta 4.46 26,011 130,055 5,832 
East Java 5.14 347,981 1,739,909 67,700 
Banten 5.30 3,3293 166,469 6,281 
Sources: Calculated form Table 1.1-1.5 
1. BPS, 2005b; 2008b, 2011 
2. BPS, 2003; 2004; 2005a; 2006; 2007; and 2008a 
 
VII.5 District Performance 
The analysis in this part will focus on economic growth at the district 
level and how growth explains the employment variables. Unlike the 
previous section, Banten will be analysed as part of West Java because 
this province has only six districts/cities (the districts of Pandeglang, 
Lebak, Tangerang, Serang city of Cilegon, and the city of Tangerang). 
However, data on economic growth is only available for the period 2000-
2005, while employment data is only available for 2001-2004. Hence, the 
results of the analysis will not represent the entire period of 2000-2007. 
Economic growth in West Java varied across districts ranging from 
the highest of 7.24 percent in the city of Cilegon and the lowest of 6.96 
percent in Indramayu. Among the districts in the province of West Java, 
only Indramayu had a minus growth rate in the year 2000-2005. One 
important reason for this is that contraction in manufacturing reached two 
digits in this period (-10.53 %). In addition to this, when we look at the 
data in detail, we will see that the contraction for manufacturing occurred 
for years during this period, meaning that manufacturing had not been 
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able to develop well. A more intensive study should be done to 
understand why this area became the exception in terms of economic 
development in West Java. 
Overall performance was relatively high because out of 31 districts 
and cities in this province, 13 districts (more than one third) grew by 
more than 5 percent annually, and 8 districts grew by 4-5 percent 
annually. Economic growth was driven mostly by the growth of 
manufacturing and services. However, there were some districts that 
showed the importance of agriculture, such as Sukabumi, Subang, 
Purwakarta, the city of Bogor, and Tangerang. In these districts/cities, 
agriculture was able to grow by more than 5 percent, and in two districts, 
Sukabumi and Subang, the growth was more than 5 percent. In 
Indonesia, the first three of these districts are well known as lumbung 
padi (rice stockhouses). These districts produce the best quality of rice 
and have become a safety belt for the national rice stock. Bogor was the 
only city in this province in which agriculture still played an important 
role in stimulating economic growth. It may be the site of developing 
urban farming activities; however this needs further clarification through 
careful study. 
With regards to the correlation between economic development and 
employment growth, a correlation test has been conducted, concluding 
that the correlation between the two is not significant (α = 0.153). This 
means that economic growth does not have any direct association with, 
or influence on, employment creation. A similar result is also found in 
the correlation tests for provinces of Central Java and Yogyakarta. The 
correlation between economic growth and employment growth is not 
significant (α = 0.152). This reconfirms the previous conclusion that 
economic development occurred in West Java, Central Java and 
Yogyakarta without employment creation. 
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Table 7.7 Annual Economic Growth in West Java by District in 2000-2005 
District 
2000-2005 (%) 
A M S Total 
Bogor -0.80 5.17 7.14 5.24 
Sukabumi 5.79 7.95 6.01 6.44 
Cianjur 3.64 3.03 3.97 3.74 
Bandung 3.80 5.25 5.27 5.11 
Garut 3.11 4.26 4.31 3.69 
Tasikmalaya 2.46 3.70 3.93 3.32 
Ciamis 2.82 3.41 5.19 4.03 
Kuningan 1.49 3.63 6.94 4.16 
Cirebon 3.81 4.60 5.16 4.56 
Majalengka 1.91 5.49 4.16 3.78 
Sumedang 2.54 4.59 4.67 4.02 
Indramayu 2.29 -10.53 6.54 -6.96 
Subang 5.11 -2.60 7.64 3.23 
Purwakarta 4.63 2.00 5.26 3.55 
Karawang 1.36 7.74 5.45 6.07 
Bekasi 2.73 5.49 5.85 5.48 
City of Bogor 4.45 5.99 5.94 5.95 
City of Sukabumi 1.81 7.03 5.53 5.50 
City of Bandung -1.69 7.78 7.24 7.40 
City of Cirebon 3.96 3.68 4.96 4.37 
City of Bekasi 2.32 5.11 5.56 5.29 
City of Depok 3.55 7.25 5.57 6.32 
City of Cimahi 3.43 4.04 6.65 4.72 
City of Tasikmalaya 1.37 5.35 4.31 4.29 
City of Banjar 0.65 2.63 5.79 3.96 
Pandeglang 3.89 4.53 5.95 4.92 
Lebak 3.30 4.91 4.12 3.91 
Tangerang 4.32 5.09 7.39 5.60 
Serang 3.39 3.29 5.89 3.92 
City of Tangerang 2.38 4.50 7.74 5.78 
City of Cilegon 1.86 7.19 8.16 7.24 
Source: calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) various years 
 
Data on Central Java and Yogyakarta reveals some important issues 
(see Table 7.13). First, unlike in West Java and Banten, the gaps between 
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the highest and the lowest growth rates were not so wide. We can 
observe that the lowest economic growth rate occurred in the district of 
Wonosobo (2.19 percent) and the highest in the city of Tegal (5.81 
percent). The gap is only about 3.6 percent compared to West Java and 
Banten, which reached double digits. Second, in general, manufacturing 
developed better with no contractions during this period. In many 
districts, manufacturing grew by more than 5 percent in districts such as 
Purbalingga, Purworejo, Magelang, Klaten, Wonogiri, Karanganyar, 
Sragen, Pati, Kudus, Demak, Tegal, Brebes, and Sleman. Boyolali is the 
only district with a growth rate of less than 2 percent. Third, on an 
average, the growth of manufacturing was higher (4.70 percent annually) 
than that of services (4.68 percent annually) and agriculture (1.78 percent 
annually). The growth of manufacturing in this region became an 
important factor in supporting economic growth of the region. However, 
as mentioned in the previous section, the growth of manufacturing failed 
to stimulate employment opportunities. 
Agriculture performed well in some districts with growth rates of 
more than 4 percent, such as in Boyolali (4.61 percent annually), 
Karanganyar (5.01 percent annually), Jepara (4.04 percent annually), and 
Brebes (4.94 percent annually). Boyolali and Jepara were the districts 
where agriculture grew higher than the average economic growth. This 
reflects the importance of agriculture in influencing economic 
performance in the region. The performance of manufacturing in East 
Java varied and the gap between growth rates among the districts was 
quite high. As we can see from Table 7.13, two districts experienced 
negative growth rates, i.e., Sumenep (5.02 percent annually) and 
Probolinggo (3.80 percent annually). At the same time, some districts 
enjoyed high growth rates, such as Ponorogo, Blitar, Kediri, Malang, 
Banyuwangi, Pasuruan, Mojokerto, Jombang, Bojonegoro, Bangkalan, 
and Blitar. Manufacturing in these districts grew by more than 6 percent 
annually, and even in four of them, i.e., Kediri, Banyuwangi, 
Bojonegoro, and Bangkalan, it grew by more than 7 percent. In general, 
manufacturing developed strongly in this province. 
 
Recovery Continued 
191 
Table 7.8 Annual Economic Growth in Central Java and Yogyakarta by District 
in 2000-2005 
District 
200-2005 
A M S Total 
Cilacap 2.74 4.06 7.26 5.63 
Banyumas 3.42 3.73 4.20 3.89 
Purbalingga 2.80 5.23 3.73 3.66 
Banjarnegara 0.02 3.36 4.47 2.42 
Kebumen 1.94 2.89 2.96 2.53 
Purworejo 2.31 5.82 5.22 4.22 
Wonosobo 1.46 2.42 3.17 2.19 
Magelang 0.89 5.38 5.29 3.83 
Boyolali 4.61 1.88 5.18 4.25 
Klaten 1.47 6.15 5.13 4.54 
Sukaharjo 2.91 3.73 4.30 3.80 
Wonogiri 1.77 7.05 4.35 3.21 
Karanganyar 5.01 6.79 3.10 5.52 
Sragen 2.02 5.51 5.07 4.02 
Grobogan 3.98 4.42 4.24 4.25 
Blora 2.96 4.19 3.15 3.19 
Rembang 3.92 2.60 3.89 3.77 
Pati 1.09 5.86 4.09 3.48 
Kudus 0.60 6.62 5.41 5.99 
Jepara 4.08 4.07 3.76 3.94 
Demak 1.89 5.00 3.98 3.23 
Semarang 0.52 4.85 3.63 3.78 
Temanggung 2.95 4.25 3.96 3.70 
Kendal 2.02 2.98 3.90 3.02 
Batang -0.31 3.52 3.39 2.36 
Pekalongan 2.64 2.82 4.19 3.36 
Pemalang 1.31 3.42 5.38 3.60 
Tegal -0.45 7.74 5.68 4.93 
Brebes 4.94 6.31 4.99 5.14 
City of Magelang -0.25 4.30 4.02 3.93 
City of Surakarta -6.10 4.74 5.62 5.23 
City of Salatiga 2.96 3.67 4.59 4.21 
City of Semarang 3.01 4.41 4.49 4.43 
City of Pekalongan 0.51 4.90 4.04 3.82 
City of Tegal 1.38 6.30 6.66 5.81 
Kulonprogo 2.75 3.94 5.26 4.25 
Bantul 2.86 4.30 5.81 4.59 
Gunung Kidul 2.09 3.57 5.18 3.55 
Sleman 3.40 6.12 4.94 4.98 
City of Yogyakarta -8.79 4.42 4.80 4.62 
Source: calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) various years 
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Table 7.9 Annual Economic Growth in East Java by District in 2000-2005 
District 
2000-2005 
A M S Total 
Pacitan 0.78 5.52 3.22 2.62 
Ponorogo 0.65 6.69 4.58 3.85 
Trenggalek 4.04 4.80 3.59 3.92 
Tulungagung 1.87 5.78 6.24 5.27 
Blitar 2.12 6.60 5.12 3.72 
Kediri 1.51 8.43 4.97 4.46 
Malang 2.73 6.29 4.41 4.30 
Lumajang 4.28 4.52 7.40 5.62 
Jember 2.20 4.77 6.49 4.29 
Banyuwangi 3.15 7.22 6.11 4.84 
Bondowoso 2.21 5.10 4.24 3.33 
Situbondo 3.12 4.00 4.35 3.90 
Probolinggo 1.77 3.05 7.20 4.06 
Pasuruan 1.29 6.92 6.34 5.15 
Sidoarjo 2.41 2.43 9.42 4.75 
Mojokerto 2.90 6.03 5.46 5.10 
Jombang 0.29 6.48 6.63 4.34 
Nganjuk 1.24 3.77 5.42 3.75 
Madiun 0.03 4.21 3.86 2.54 
Magetan 1.09 3.57 4.98 3.36 
Ngawi 0.12 2.89 4.95 2.86 
Bojonegoro 0.95 7.59 5.31 3.96 
Tuban 0.43 5.69 7.52 4.76 
Lamongan 2.19 5.30 7.04 4.60 
Gresik 3.79 5.07 7.42 5.61 
Bangkalan 0.84 7.82 5.37 3.87 
Sampang 3.41 2.92 4.80 3.80 
Pamekasan 2.65 4.39 4.26 3.35 
Sumenep 4.56 -5.02 3.07 2.74 
Kediri 3.13 0.92 6.60 2.30 
Blitar 2.21 6.79 4.72 4.87 
Malang -0.21 3.51 4.70 4.22 
Probolinggo 8.15 -3.80 6.96 4.63 
Pasuruan 3.68 3.09 5.65 4.90 
Mojokerto -0.25 4.71 8.00 7.11 
Madiun 0.58 3.77 6.58 5.38 
Surabaya 4.07 3.18 8.97 6.54 
Batu 2.54 2.39 6.99 5.58 
Source: calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) various years 
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However, we must bear in mind that it was not the growth of 
manufacturing that contributed most to overall economic growth in this 
region, but rather, the services sector. On average, manufacturing grew 
by 4.5 percent annually, while services grew by 6 percent annually. Table 
7.14 shows that the services sector in almost half of the districts and 
cities grew at more than 6 percent. Some of them, i.e., Sidoarjo, 
Mojokerto and Surabaya, even grew by more than 8 percent. 
Agriculture developed quite well, as only two districts had a negative 
growth rate, i.e., Malang and Mojokerto. At the same time, the growth of 
agriculture reached more than 4 percent in Trenggalek, Lumajang, 
Sumenep, and Probolinggo. One important aspect is that in Probolinggo, 
agriculture grew by more than 8 percent annually and this was higher 
than in manufacturing and services. In this district, we know that 
manufacturing experienced a contraction by almost 4 percent. Thus, 
agriculture was the most important factor for economic growth in 
Probolinggo. 
Statistical tests of the relationship between economic growth and 
employment growth reveal similar results as in other provinces. There is 
no significant correlation between the two (r = 0.167). It is, thus, also to 
be expected that the correlation between the two for all provinces 
combined will be also insignificant. Indeed the statistical test proves this 
(r = 0.089). This means that during the recovery period the situation did 
not change in comparison to the situation prior to and during the 
economic crisis. Economic growth had not been able to create sufficient 
employment opportunity. This may continue in the following years. 
VII.6 Decentralisation and Economic Growth 
The following discussion will focus on answering the question 
concerning the effect of regional autonomy on economic performance of 
the district. The association between decentralisation and economic 
growth has its foundation in the neoclassical model of economic growth 
explaining the direct and indirect effect of decentralisation on economic 
growth through public sector efficiency and macroeconomic stability. We 
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can observe this from disaggregation model that shows exogenous 
Conditional Convergence Hypothesis from Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991) 
Iimi (2005) has identified two contradictory findings with regard to 
the relationship between growth and fiscal decentralisation (see also: 
Tirtosuharto, 2009). A study in China during the period of 1986-1992 
reveals that higher degree of fiscal decentralisation was associated with 
the lower regional economic growth. Another study in USA from 1948 to 
1986 shows the effect of decentralisation on regional growth is hardly 
significant (see: Iimi, 2005 and Tirtosuharto, 2009). However several 
studies have shown a positive correlation between decentralisation and 
growth. Study by Jin (1009) find out that fiscal decentralisation would 
have beneficial effect on economic equalization and growth, but not in 
India. The study by Iimi (2005) supported the finding that there is a 
significant positive relationship between fiscal decentralisation and per 
capita growth rate. Using province as unit of analysis, Tirtosuharto 
(2009) finds out that in Indonesia there is no indication that the incentive 
structures from decentralisation are associated with higher growth, 
despite the fact that fiscal decentralisation is the determinant of state 
efficiency. Using different predictors, the study by Ismail and Hamzah 
(2006) shows different results. They provide evidences that at provincial 
level, expenditures positively and significantly influence economic 
growth, while revenue indicators influence economic growth negatively. 
They also find that investment is negatively associated to economic 
growth. Pepinsky and Wiharja (2011) based on their study at district 
level have also concluded that decentralisation has had effects on 
Indonesian development between its onset in 2001 and 2007. We can 
conclude that in general there is no common finding regarding the 
relationship between decentralisation and district-level economic growth. 
This section is to test the relationship between decentralisation and 
economic growth. As indicator of decentralisation we will employ fiscal 
transfer as a proxy variable. There are two policy variables included, that 
are: General Purpose Grant (GPG) and Specific Purpose Grant (SPG).40 
                                                 
40
 General Purpose Grant (GPG) in Bahasa Indonesia is Dana Alokasi Umum (DAU) and 
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The GPG intends to address both problems of vertical and horizontal 
fiscal imbalance. The purpose is to balance fiscal capacities across 
regions to finance public services (see: Fadzil and Nyoto, 2011). Based 
on the law 25/1999, the fiscal variables of the GPG comprise the factors 
of population, area, geographical condition, and income level which also 
consider poverty. It is easy to understand that the volume of GPG varies 
across districts. In the law 33/2004, the poverty variable is not included, 
but instead HDI (Human Development Index) has been used. Since we 
use data from 2003-2005, the calculation of GPG still rely on the old 
formula. 
The second policy variable is the Specific Purpose Grant (SPG). The 
SPG is a special grant to ‗promote the attainment of minimum standards 
and compensate for benefit/cost spill-over related to priority capital 
investment‘ (Sidik, 2003). SPG is sectoral-based aiming at financing 
capital investments. As it is of GPG, the SPG covers a three year period: 
2003-2005. The basic assumption is that GPG and SPG act as stimulus 
for local government to enhance sub-regional economic development. 
Considering the importance of human capital, we include HDI 
(Human Development Index) as a control variable. The benchmark 
variable is the HDI of 2002. If local government is capable to invest both 
in economic and human capital, we can expect they influence positively 
on economic performance or economic growth (EGR05). Therefore, the 
regression equation to test the influence of SPG, GPG and HDI on 
regional economic growth is as follows: 
EGR05 = βo + β1GPG35 + β2 HDI02 + β3 SPG35 + ϵ 
where: 
EGR05 is annual economic growth during 200-2005 
GPG35 is average GPG received by the district/city in 2003-2005 
HDI02 is HDI in 2002 
SPG35 is average SPG received by the district/city in 2003-2005 
 
                                                                                                                       
Specific Purpose Grant (SPG) is Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK) 
Recovery Continued 
196 
Table 7.10 Growth regressions (OLS Regression Analysis) 
All Districts and Cities 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(b-coefficient) 
Estimate 
(Standardized) 
Standard 
Error 
Model 1 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.004 
 
3.922 
0.001 
 
 
0.120 
 
0.317** 
0.001 
Model 2 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Human Development Index 
Adjusted R Square = 0.125 
 
-1.923 
0.002 
0.085 
 
 
0.192 
0.366 
 
1.583 
0.001* 
0.023** 
Model 3 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Human Development Index 
Specific Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.229 
 
-0.378 
0.001 
0.077 
-0.114 
 
 
0.073 
0.332 
-0.352 
 
1.543 
0.001 
0.021** 
0.031** 
 
 
Districts only 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(b-coefficient) 
Estimate 
(Standardized) 
Standard 
Error 
Model 1 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.089 
 
3.064 
0.003 
 
 
0.318 
 
0.363** 
0.001* 
Model 2 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Human Development Index 
Adjusted R Square = 0.094 
 
1.125 
0.003 
0.030 
 
 
0.309 
0.130 
 
1.674 
0.001* 
0.026 
Model 3 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Human Development Index 
Specific Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.141 
 
1.251 
0.002 
0.042 
-0.076 
 
 
0.180 
0.180 
-0.274 
 
1.631 
0.001 
0.026 
0.034* 
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Cities Only 
Parameter Estimate 
(b-coefficient) 
Estimate 
(Standardized) 
Standard 
Error 
Model 1 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.120 
 
3.791 
0.007 
 
 
0.502 
 
0.554** 
0.003* 
Model 2 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Human Development Index 
Adjusted R Square = 0.169 
 
6.786 
0.007 
0.043 
 
 
0.539 
-0.080 
 
8.896 
0.001* 
0.026 
Model 3 
Intercept 
General Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Human Development Index 
Specific Purpose Grant (2003-05) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.141 
 
6.164 
0.006 
-0.028 
-0.051 
 
 
0.453 
-0.052 
-0.106 
 
9.321 
0.005 
0.139 
0.150 
 
Dependent variable is district annual economic growth (%) in the period of 2000-2005 
 
We test the equation in three steps. The first step includes all 
district/cities in Java island (97 districts/cities).41 The second step is to 
specify the equation for the districts (n=77) and for the cities (n=20) 
separately, We expect there will be a difference in effect between district 
and city concerning their difference in industrialisation or urbanization. 
The analysis finds three different and interesting results (Table 7.17). 
First, when both districts and cities tested together, General Purpose 
Grant (GPG) and Human Development Index (HDI) are good predictors 
for local economic growth, but GPG turn to be insignificant when 
Special Purpose Grant (SPG) is included. Thus, SPG and HDI are good 
predictors for local economic growth. Second, when only districts are 
analysed, General Purpose Grant (GPG) is the best predictor for local 
economic growth, even when HDI is added. But, GPG turns to be 
insignificant when SPG is included and SPG is the only significant 
variable to predict local economic growth. This means that variance 
explained for economic growth for SPG is higher than others. Third, it is 
                                                 
41
 This number is less than actual number of districts and cities in Java due to the data availability 
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very clear that only GPG function as good predictor for local economic 
growth when only cities are included. 
These findings have two important implications. First, local economic 
growth is clearly associated with fiscal decentralization as an effect of 
regional autonomy. The local economic growth is also associated with 
HDI. But one has to bear in mind that the association is different between 
district and cities. This brings us to different policy implication for 
districts and cities concerning the impact of grant allocations. Second, in 
all cases, GPG is positively associated with local economic growth but in 
the same time SPG is negatively associated with local economic growth. 
This points to a trade-off between both instruments. However, at city 
level can conclude that there is no clear association between regional 
autonomy and local economic growth. This finding seems to confirm 
other findings on both at provincial and district level ( see: Pepinsky and 
Wiharja, 2010). 
The statement by Fadzil and Nyoto (2011: 510) might be the 
explanation why the grants have not fully worked as expected: 
The imbalance of fiscal capacity of the regions is determined by 
the difference in views between the national and regional 
governments. In the perspective of the national government, as 
has been mentioned in the statute, the allocation of subsidies 
and grants are used to enhance the ability of regions to finance 
the needed public services, and to organize and keep pace 
regional development. In terms of the local government view, 
before the implementation of regional autonomy, the central 
government has received such benefit from the exploiting local 
resources, so in this era of autonomy, the central government 
has to pay back what has been delayed. 
This statement is also supported by their finding that there is still 
inequality of local fiscal capacity across the country. This situation has 
pushed the local governments to impose tax efforts which might impede 
the local economic growth. 
Finally, the question is what other factor(s) might explain the 
differences in local economic growth. Arrow and Kurz (cited by 
Devarajan, et.al. 1996) developed a model based on the neoclassical 
tradition where public spending only affected the economy‘s transitional 
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growth rate, but the steady state growth rate remained unaltered. The 
mode is used to explain the importance of private consumption as well as 
the public capital stock on consumer utility derivation. They assumed 
that all government investment was productive. The other model linking 
public spending with economic growth is coming from Barro‘s work 
(1990). He argued that government expenditure to be complementary 
with private production and - like Arrow and Kurz - he assumed all 
government spending is productive. However, several studies ( i.e. 
Landau, 1993 and Barro, 1991) concluded that output growth could be 
negatively correlated with the share of government consumption in GDP. 
Devarajan, et.al (1996) pointed out that in developing countries 
productive expenditures had either negative or insignificant relationship 
with economic growth. Only when expenditure was measured in broad 
category namely current expenditures, it was associated with higher 
economic growth. 
The most interesting finding is from Aschauer‘s (1989) study, 
suggesting that government capital plays an important role in economic 
growth. Finn (1993:1) argued, however, that the finding is surprising 
since ―the output elasticity of government capital is relatively high and 
because government capital contains many different types of stocks‖. 
Based on the explanation above we decide to use capital investment to 
predict the local economic growth. The assumption is that capital 
investment is productive which act as stimulus for economic growth. 
 
Table 7.11 Growth regressions (OLS Regression Analysis) 
Parameter 
Estimate 
(b-coefficient) 
Estimate 
(Standardized) 
Standard 
Error 
Intercept 
Average annual investment 
2003-2005 
Adjusted R Square = 0.085 
3.782 
3.744 
 
0.317 
0.254** 
0.000* 
Dependent variable is district annual economic growth (%) in the period of 2000-2005 
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Regression analysis using capital investment42 of the districts as a 
predictor to show that there is indeed significant association between the 
amount of investment and districts/cities economic growth. 
Unfortunately, the pattern of investment did not change very much before 
and after regional autonomy. This strengthens the previous conclusion 
that regional autonomy has not had any influence on regional economic 
growth, but the level of investment clearly has. 
 
 
 
                                                 
42
 Investment is calculated based on districts expenditures. Capital expenditures has been treated 
as the amount of investment. For this analysis the amount is calculated as average amount of 
investment in the period of 2003-2005. The reason of using only the year 0f 2003-2005 is 
because of data availability. In addition, analysis does not disaggregate districts and cities and 
again it is because of a very limited data available for the cities.  
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusions and Outlook 
VIII.1 Addressing the research questions 
VIII.1.1 Were there any different causes and impacts of the 1930s, 
1960s and 1990s crises? 
The history of modern Indonesian economy has shown that Indonesia 
perceives economic development as a growth process that requires 
specific steps. As a result, Indonesia‘s development strategy has shifted 
factors of production from the primary sector to the industrial sector. The 
former sector is characterised by low-productivity, traditional technology 
and decreasing returns. Meanwhile, the latter is characterised primarily 
by high-productivity, modern technology, increasing returns, and 
structural transformation that alters both the economic and employment 
structures. However, data has revealed that the development process in 
Indonesia has succeeded in achieving economic growth, but failed to 
create sufficient employment growth, especially in industry. This may 
reflects a process of weak structural economic transformation.  
This country has gone through a series of crises. It has experienced 
three different crises in different periods of time, namely in the 1930s, in 
the 1960s and in the 1990s. The crises in the 30s and 90s had similar 
causes and external factors, but yielded different effects. The crisis in the 
30s hit the agricultural sector the most, while in the 90s the modern, or 
urban, sector bore the brunt of the economic crisis. There are similarities 
between the 60s and 90s crises. Both crises were followed by social and 
political unrest that ended the reign of the old regime and ushered in new 
political administrations. There has been a debate on the sequence of the 
political and economic crisis in the 60s.There is no agreement in terms of 
whether the political crisis preceded the economic one or vice versa. 
What distinguishes the 60s crisis from those of the 30s and 90s is that the 
60s crisis was caused by internal factors. 
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Comparing the three crises, in 1930s, 1960s, and 1990s, there are 
similarities and differences in the causes of the crisis. The crisis in the 
1930s and 1990s was caused by external and internal factors together, 
albeit in different contexts. The 1930s crisis was due to economic 
contraction in North America and Western Europe, which was 
transmitted through the contraction in demand of major primary 
commodity exports and the tightening of credit. This crisis caused 
deflation and money scarcity with the availability of food. The 1990s 
crisis was started by the collapse of Thai economy that exposed the 
region‘s vulnerability, changing perceptions of international investors 
and loss of confidence in Asian tigers.  The distinct difference with 
the1930s crisis is that the 1990s crisis caused a high inflation with 
skyrocketing prices. In the meantime there is no strong evidence for 
linking the causes of the crisis in the 1960s to external factors. The crisis 
in 1960s is mainly due to internal factors, both economic and socio-
political. A very weak national economy due to the absence of foreign 
capital and problems with the exchange rate, combined with socio-
political unrest, triggered the crisis. 
The following table shows the summary of the causes and effects of 
the 1930s, 1960s and 1990s economic crisis. 
However, the crises both in 1930s and 1990s also had internal causes 
though of a different in nature. In the 1930s, the main factors were 
serious oversupply of major primary commodity exports, such as rubber 
and sugar, increasing land scarcity, and declining labour wages. In the 
1990s, internal factors are mostly due to the weakness of macro economy 
foundations in which private sector was trapped in short-term debt. We 
cannot deny that speculative attacks against the Rupiah, increase in SBI 
rates, and too tight monetary policy were also among the factors that 
contributed to the worsening national economy 
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Table 8.1 The causes and effects of the 1930s, 1960s, and 1990s crises 
 1930s 1960s 1990s 
Causes External factor:  
1. Sharp contraction in 
economic activity in 
North America and 
Western Europe 
Internal factors: 
1. A serious oversupply of 
major primary 
commodity exports, such 
as rubber and sugar 
2. In the agricultural area, 
land was becoming a 
scarce factor of 
production as the open 
land frontier was 
closing, and tenant 
profits and labour wages 
fell 
 
Internal factors: 
1. Unstable political 
situation 
2. Economy: a. 
economic problems 
due to the 
independence war as 
well as Japanese 
occupation, b. the 
absence of foreign 
capital and problems 
with the exchange 
rate, and c. exchange 
rate 
 
External factors: 
1. The collapse of Thai 
economy exposed the 
region‘s vulnerability 
2. Changing perceptions of 
international investors, 
3. Loss of confidence in 
Asian tigers 
Internal factors: 
1. Weak macroeconomic 
foundation, especially due 
to the increasing external 
debt causing an increase in 
debt payment 
2. The private sector went on 
an investment spending 
spree, 
3. Tight money policy 
Effects 1. Export was decreasing 
2. Decreasing income per 
capita 
3. Increasing poverty 
incidence 
4. The impact is more to 
rural (agriculture) than 
urban sector 
5. High deflation rate, 
scarcity of money 
1. Decreasing 
economic growth 
and high inflation 
rate 
2. Income per capita 
was the lowest in the 
world 
3. Increasing poverty 
incidence 
4. Political crisis  
 
1. Decreasing economic 
growth 
2. Dramatic decrease in 
exchange rate of rupiah to 
US dollar 
3. High inflation rate 
4. Decreasing government 
budget on public services 
causing difficulties for 
people to access the 
services 
5. Prices were skyrocketing 
6. Declining real wages and 
labour productivity 
7. Increase of poverty 
incidence 
8. Lead to multi dimensional 
(economy, politics, and 
social) crisis 
9. Politics: changing 
government 
 
 
The impact of the crisis is similar in some ways between the 1930s, 
1960s and 1990s. These three crises had decreased per capita income 
causing an increase of poverty. However, the 1930s crisis was mostly 
hitting the rural (agriculture), while in 1960s both rural and urban were 
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affected at almost the same rate, and the 1990s crisis mostly hit the urban 
economy whereas in some regions the agriculture sector benefited from 
the crisis. Interestingly, the 1990s crisis had little impact on employment. 
The impact on the macro economy was almost the same: high inflation 
rate and contraction of economic growth, which turned to economic 
turmoil. The last two crises, in the 1960s and 1990s,ended by changing 
government: in the 1960s, Orde Lama (New Order) was replaced by 
Orde Baru (New Order) and in 1990s, the Orde Baru (New Order) was 
replaced by Orde Reformasi (Reformation Orde). 
VIII.1.2 Was there any difference in economic performance at the 
provincial and district level before and during the 1990s 
economic crisis? 
Before the crisis, Indonesia was marked by two contrasting 
phenomenon. First, Indonesia experienced impressive economic growth, 
especially during the New Order. This achievement was accompanied by 
the increase of the manufacturing sector shown by the very high 
contribution of this sector to GDP. The second important phenomenon in 
Indonesian economic development was the high contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to GDP that was not accompanied by sufficient 
labour absorption. Therefore, along with higher education levels, labour 
shifted away from agricultural labour surplus sector to services, not to 
manufacturing. The effect was that agriculture and services functioned to 
absorb most of the labour surplus. This is the sign of failed structural 
transformation as well as weak industrialisation. Third, the regional 
disparity and inequality in development appeared to exacerbate the 
situation, thus performing the biggest challenges to Indonesian 
development. The regions having more advanced industrialisation, such 
as Java, enjoyed high economic growth, while outer islands were still 
lagging behind. 
The island of Java, a small and densely populated region, has become 
the centre of economic activities, contributing to almost 50 percent of the 
country‘s GDP. On the other hand, Papua (Irian Jaya), a large island 
occupied by only 1 percent of the national population, produces less than 
1 percent of the GDP. The growth of manufacturing in Java has also been 
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faster than that in the outer islands. This is not a new phenomenon since 
it has an historical economic precedent, especially under colonial rule in 
the 19
th
 century. 
The disparity is not limited to Java versus non-Java, nor is it specific 
to inter-provincial differences. It is most noticeable within the island of 
Java. Our discussion on provincial disparity places Jakarta on the centre 
stage. As the capital of Indonesia, this province has played a substantial 
role in driving the country‘s economy. The centralisation of the national 
economy in Jakarta has widened the gap between Jakarta and the other 
provinces. For example, per capita GRDP of Jakarta is three times that of 
the Yogyakarta province, even though both provinces are on the island of 
Java. 
In relation to economic performance differences, this research reveals 
in all provinces the discrepancy between economic growth and the 
creation of job opportunities. This caused two problems. First, there was 
a growing gap between the industrial and agricultural sectors. This 
presented a serious problem, as this gap will persist in the absence of 
government support for encouraging competitiveness in the agricultural 
sector. Secondly, most of the labour force was absorbed in the services 
sector, which is dominated by the informal sector. This contributed to the 
high rate of underemployment. Thirdly, unemployment was, and still is, 
on the rise, and will potentially be a major societal problem in the near 
future. Combined together, these problems will become obstacles in any 
poverty alleviation program. 
Compared to Indonesia in general, Java was hit harder by the crisis. It 
can be seen from the different economic growth patterns during the peak 
of the crisis when Indonesia experienced a decline of economic growth 
by about -14 % and Java it was more than -15 %. At the provincial level, 
East Java suffered more than the other provinces. Interestingly the 
contraction in East Java was higher compared to West Java, while West 
Java was more industrialised than East Java. These findings at the 
provincial level do not confirm the hypothesis that the higher the degree 
of industrialisation, the worse the province was hit by the crisis. 
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The effect of the economic crisis in the 90s was very eminent. First, 
the crisis shifted resources back from the modern to the traditional sector, 
from the non-trade to the trade sector, and from the import-dependent to 
the export-oriented sector. Many firms suffered in the form of declining 
profit levels and real income, and in many cases, firms and companies 
were forced to declare bankruptcy. On the other hand, export 
manufacturing and agriculture benefited relatively from the crisis. 
Interestingly, at the provincial level, we hardly find significant changes 
in the patterns of both economic and employment structures, which 
remained fairly stable throughout the crisis. 
Secondly, patterns of household income and expenditures changed. 
Those who lost jobs in industry moved to lower-income jobs or to the 
agricultural or service sectors. This transition affected people‘s 
purchasing power and forced them to find strategies to survive. 
Thirdly, the economic crisis decreased government expenditures on 
public services, such as education and health. As a consequence, people 
had less access to a variety of services. The data reveal a ten percent 
increase of poverty during the period of 1996-1998, expanding the 
number of poor people from 31 million to nearly 54 million people. The 
price hike of essential commodities that define people‘s basic needs is the 
main factor behind the increase of poor people. During this period, 
inflation stood at almost 150 percent. In the meantime, real wages 
decreased from Rp. 70,700 per week to Rp. 68,000 per week. These 
factors conspired to cause the decrease in purchasing power. 
The impact of the Indonesian crisis on unemployment was modest. 
The unemployment rate increased only slightly to 5.5 percent in 1998 
from 4.7 percent in 1997, when economic growth was at its lowest level 
in modern Indonesia history. One important explanation lies in labour 
market adjustment. During the crisis, all sectors experienced a double-
digit contraction, for example, -39.8 percent in construction and -26.7 
percent in the financial sector. It is important to note that employment in 
agriculture was still growing (0.2 percent). This explains that the 
―traditional‖ sectors are more resilient than modern ones. The informal 
sector demonstrated similar elasticity. It had the capacity to absorb 
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people who left industry for services, which are part of the informal 
sector. Based on this tendency, the argument that the agricultural and 
informal sectors are safety valves during an economic crisis is not 
without merit. Indeed, these two economic sectors played important roles 
as buffers that alleviated the impact of economic shock by absorbing 
labour who otherwise would have been unemployed. 
It is important to bear in mind that economic performance has not 
always corresponded with social indicators. Yogyakarta provides a good 
example. The social indicators for this small province show high 
achievement in both education and health. However, its economic 
development has lagged behind other provinces in Java. In contrast, West 
Java, which has benefited from development in manufacturing as a spill 
over effect from Jakarta, has poor social indicators. Its performance in 
education, for example, has been among the lowest in the country. 
Economic performance in Java before the crisis appeared to follow 
the Indonesian pattern. First, all provinces in Java enjoyed high economic 
growth, with manufacture grew at the highest rate. Secondly, in terms of 
economic structure, there was a shift from agriculture to manufacturing 
and services. This tendency, however, was not followed by a changing 
pattern in employment structure. Manufacturing failed to provide 
sufficient jobs, so it was not able to absorb the labour surplus from 
agriculture. Consequently, employment grew at a negative rate. This 
confirms the previous conclusion that development in Java reflected 
industrialisation without employment creation or failed industrialisation. 
The conclusion that we can draw from this analysis is that it is not 
manufacturing that plays an important role in labour absorption, but 
rather the service sector. This is true in all the provinces. Even in West 
Java where manufacturing grew at the highest level, the share of the 
service sector was the highest. Again, since the service sector was 
dominated by the informal sector, we can say that the informal sector 
played a crucial role as a safety valve for the economy: it provided jobs 
and its contribution to the economy was quite high. 
The development pattern across the district before the crisis also 
revealed an interesting pattern. Large cities in Java played two 
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contrasting roles simultaneously, i.e., generative and parasitic. Areas 
surrounding the big cities showed mixed economic performance. Some 
of them experienced high economic growth, possibly caused by a spill 
over effect from the big cities, such as Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, and 
Surabaya. However, not all surrounding areas have benefited in this way. 
In fact, some areas suffered economic deterioration from exploitation of 
resources that made economic development in the big cities possible. 
When the economic crisis hit the country, all areas suffered badly. At 
the provincial level, there was no correlation between better economic 
performance before the crisis and positive or negative effects during the 
crisis. East Java was hit hardest, while West Java, which had better pre-
crisis performance, was spared the worst effects of the crisis. However, at 
the district level, our analysis confirms the hypothesis that the better the 
economic performance was before the crisis, the worse the results of the 
crisis was. 
These findings also support the general conclusion that the crisis 
affected the modern (urban) sector more than it did the traditional (rural) 
sector. The manufacturing sector lost most of its capacity to support 
economic growth. Manufacturing was also the sector that lost its capacity 
to absorb the labour force, which showed a negative growth rate in this 
period. In contrast, the agriculture and services sectors demonstrated 
higher capacities to increase labour absorption. This means that 
agriculture and services played important roles as buffers during the 
economic downturn. 
The analysis has also revealed another interesting finding. When the 
economy grew at a high rate (before the crisis), employment 
opportunities declined. However, it increased almost two percent during 
the peak of the crisis. In two provinces, namely Central and East Java, 
the growth was more than 2 percent. When we compare conditions 
before and during the 1990s crisis, as well as throughout the economic 
recovery, a curious trend emerges. Economic growth did not correspond 
with employment generation. In fact, employment tended to decline. For 
example, in the era of the New Order, every 1 percent of economic 
growth generated 400,000 jobs. However, during the recovery period, 
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one percent economic growth resulted in the generation of only less than 
200,000 employment opportunities. This means that with the entrance of 
approximately 2 million people into the labour force per year, the 
economy should grow more than 10 percent just to absorb the new labour 
force. Even then it will not be able to reduce open unemployment. 
At the district level, the economic contraction reached two digit-
levels in almost all districts. All big cities, the capital city of each 
province, including Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya, 
experienced lower economic growth than the average rate of other 
districts. Interestingly, two districts in Central Java, Cilacap and Jepara, 
enjoyed positive economic growth during the peak of the crisis. The high 
economic growth in these two districts was attributed to the resilience of 
the manufacturing and services sectors, which showed high growth rates 
during the peak of the crisis. Manufacturing in Cilacap depended 
primarily on the oil refinement industry, while in Jepara it was comprised 
primarily by the handicraft industry. 
In general, both at the provincial and district levels, the period of 
1998-2000 represented the first stage of recovery. Economic growth 
gained momentum with most districts benefiting from positive economic 
growth, ranging from 1 to 6 percent annually. However, there was no 
significant correlation between economic growth during the two years 
after the peak of the crisis and economic growth before the crisis. This 
may be because this period was still the first stage of recovery. 
Hopefully, a correlation will emerge when we examine the second stage 
of recovery in the following period, 2000-2007. Only three districts 
continued to suffer negative economic growth, namely Indramayu in 
West Java, Kulonprogo in Yogyakarta, and Sumenep in East Java. 
Factors behind the negative economic growth in these three districts 
included the failure of the manufacturing sector to gain back its role in 
stimulating economic growth. In these three districts manufacturing also 
grew at a negative rate. 
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VIII.1.3 To what extent does the economic performance at the 
provincial and district level explain the changing household 
economic performance? 
We analysed the relationships between provincial and district 
economic performance with household welfare in order to identify 
specific factors that influence the pattern of poverty during and after the 
crisis. This provides insights in the transmission intensity of macro-
economic crises to lower system levels. 
There is evidence that per capita expenditures (PCE) were increasing 
in the period of 1997-2000. The increasing PCE means that at the 
household level, people were able to cope with the crisis. The findings 
also show the importance of education in reinforcing the household 
economy. Households that had better educated members enjoyed better 
conditions. This confirms the human capital theory, which puts education 
as part of human capital as an important factor to improve household 
welfare conditions. Education was more effective if the economic 
conditions of the district were sound. This complementarity strengthens 
the argument that economic growth is still important as a stimulating 
factor for survival. 
Next to showing the importance of education, further analysis shows 
that employment together with the area variable, economic growth of the 
district, are important in explaining better economic conditions in the 
period of 1997-2000. This means providing access for education, as well 
as employment, become important factors for households to improve 
their economic condition. However, this must be supported by favourable 
economic conditions as expressed by economic growth. Economic 
growth, then, is important even though some argue that it might create a 
wider economic gap amongst people. 
These two variables, education and employment, are the most critical 
issues in Indonesian development. Comparing the HDI among ASEAN 
countries we come up with the conclusion that education is the main 
factor contributing to Indonesia‘s low ranking on the Human 
Development Index (Hayes and Sukamdi, 2012). At the same time, the 
unemployment rate is high, 6.32% in February 2012, while the 
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underemployment rate is much higher, 35.55 % in February 2012 (Badan 
Pusat Statistik. 2012b). Since Indonesia successfully maintains relatively 
high economic growth, 6.3 % in 2011-2012 (Badan Pusat Statistik, 
2012a), education and employment problems become the biggest 
challenges in Indonesian development. 
VIII.1.4 Are there any changing economic performances at the district 
level during the recovery period and how might 
decentralisation explain the change in performance? 
Looking at the economic growth at the district level during the period 
of 2000-2007, we can conclude that Indonesia was entering the stage of 
recovery. On average, economic growth during the stage of recovery was 
higher than it was at the end of crisis. This is a good indication of better 
conditions for households, since the district‘s economic situation is 
important in shaping household economic conditions. However, regional 
disparities that existed prior to the crisis remains. 
The province of West Java performed the best among provinces in 
Java island in terms of annual economic growth during the recovery 
period. At district level, overall district economic performance was 
impressive: out of 31 districts, in 23 districts the economy grew by 4-5 
percent annually. It is also very clear that the gap between the districts 
was widening. Moreover, economic growth was driven mostly by the 
growth of manufacturing and services. Data on Central Java and 
Yogyakarta reveal two important issues. First, unlike in West Java, the 
gaps between the highest and the lowest growth rates were not so wide. 
Second, in general, manufacture developed better and with less 
contraction during this period. The growth of manufacture in this region 
became an important factor for supporting economic growth. However, 
as mentioned in the previous section, the growth of manufacture failed to 
stimulate sufficient employment opportunities. 
Statistical tests of the relationship between economic growth and 
employment growth revealed similar results as in other provinces. There 
is no significant correlation between the two variables. It is, thus, also to 
be expected that the correlation between the two variables for all 
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provinces combined would be insignificant. Indeed, our statistical tests 
prove this. Thus, in the recovery period the situation did not change in 
comparison to the situation prior to and during the economic crisis. 
Economic growth had not been able to create sufficient employment 
opportunities. This may continue in the upcoming years. 
These findings have two important implications. First, local economic 
growth is clearly associated with regional autonomy, when regional 
autonomy is measured by grant allocation and human capital (HDI). But 
one has to bear in mind that the association is different between district 
and cities. This brings us to a second policy implication for districts and 
cities concerning the impact of grant allocations. In all cases, General 
Purpose Grants (Dana Alokasi Umum/DAU)are positively associated 
with local economic growth but in the same time Specific Purpose 
Grants(Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK) are negatively associated with local 
economic growth. This points to a trade-off between both instruments. 
VIII.2 Theoretical Implications 
The results of this study reinforce the critique against the Harrod-
Domar growth model: economic growth is not always able to create 
adequate employment opportunities. This is because economic growth, at 
least in the case of Indonesia and many other developing countries, is 
based on capital-intensive industries. At the same time, the industrial 
sector has no linkages with other sectors such as agriculture and services, 
so that these two sectors fail to grow and absorb adequate workforce. 
Instead, what happened was that the surplus in the agricultural sector led 
to a shift of labour from the agricultural sector to the services sector - 
which is largely an informal sector - and not to the industrial sector. This 
symptom is also evidence that industrialisation in Indonesia is not 
accompanied by structural transformation. This refuted suggestions of 
Snow‘s argument that "... industrialisation is the only hope for the poor" 
(cited in: Firebaugh and Beck, 1994: 631). The failed structural 
transformation is becoming an obstacle for the country to follow the 
subsequent stages as proposed by Rostow. Therefore, these theories 
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cannot be used to explain the process of economic development in 
Indonesia. 
Theoretically, to understand economic development in Indonesia it is 
necessary to capture the systematic interaction between the primary and 
secondary as well as tertiary sector. There are symptoms that indicate 
that the growth of the industrial sector was mostly accompanied by the 
exploitation of the agricultural and the services by the industrial sector. 
Therefore, the use of development theory generated from the experience 
of developed countries today should be adapted to incorporate these 
interactions as the main analytical focus. 
At the micro level, human capital theory is an appropriate approach 
for analysing household economic performance, by looking at the 
importance of education as an important factor contributing to welfare. 
However, it is not sufficient since, based on our findings, it is very clear 
that the influence of education changes alongside the changing regional 
economic performance of the district. In other words, the role of 
education in the household economy is strongly contextual in character. 
Therefore, contextual analysis using multilevel method proves to be the 
preferred approach. 
VIII.3 Policy Implications 
One important conclusion from this study is that economic 
development in Indonesia during the New Order had been able to 
produce fairly stable economic growth. But it turns out that success was 
not accompanied by structural transformation, which led to persistent 
high levels of unemployment and high underemployment, and a high 
number of people working in the informal sector. These facts persist and 
worsen when the economic crisis of the 1990s occurred. This makes the 
Indonesian economy fare worse, because what happened next was not 
only an economic but also a multidimensional crisis, occasioning 
political and social unrest. Therefore, the government of Indonesia, 
together with the maintenance of relatively high economic growth, 
should focus on the acceleration of the structural transformation in the 
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right direction, in particular focussing on the transformation of the 
employment structure. 
To achieve the transformation of the employment structure, there are 
several things that can be done. The first is to create linkages between 
large-scale industry, which is generally capital-intensive and a pillar of 
economic growth, with medium and small-scale industries, which are 
more labour-intensive. This should be done in order to increase the 
absorption of the labour force into the industrial sector. Second, the 
government must be able to provide links between industry and 
agriculture. There is very clear evidence that the agricultural sector tends 
to be ignored in the strategies for economic development in Indonesia, 
which causes that sector to have a surplus of labour and very low value 
added. Making the linkages between the agricultural sector and the 
industrial sector will reduce the surplus of manpower and could increase 
the value added of the agricultural sector. Strengthening the agricultural 
sector is very important, because the results of this study prove that the 
agricultural sector was able to survive in times of economic crisis and 
serve as a safety belt for harbouring manpower vis-à-vis the modern 
sector. 
Another important conclusion is that education is an important factor 
in developing the household economy. This means that the current policy 
of the Indonesian government as mandated in the constitution, which 
provides a strong focus on education (one of them by achieving a 20% 
proportion of the State Budget for education program) is an appropriate 
policy. There is a clear effort to increase people‘s access to educational 
services. However, concerning regional disparity and inequality, the 
government has to give more priority to backward regions that show 
inferiority in almost all aspects of development. It is also in line with the 
MDG‘s ―education for all‖. This is the best solution for helping people to 
emerge from a crisis and also to support poverty alleviation programs. 
The economic crisis in 1997-1998 caused many problems, but also 
offered new opportunities for future development. Our analysis has shed 
some light on systematic institutional policy issues needed to deal with 
challenges toward the development of a more equitable Indonesia. 
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Political transition from centralised rule to a decentralised government, 
as a political consequence of the economic crisis, brings new hope for the 
new era of economic development in the country. However, this study 
proves that decentralisation has not been able to encourage economic 
growth at the level of districts and cities. The government's policy to 
provide a budget (General Allocation Fund and the Special Allocation 
Fund) was not a good enough instrument to promote economic growth at 
the level of districts and cities. Apparently, this is because most of local 
budget has been allocated to pay staff salaries (routine expenditures). The 
result has been that only a small fraction of the available budget is used 
for development expenditures. Therefore, the government must seek 
schemes to help the district and city governments to improve economic 
performance. One way is to implement systems of incentives and 
disincentives in the budget allocation from the central government. 
Incentives can be introduced by allocating a larger budget if government 
districts/cities are better able reduce routine expenditures. Otherwise, the 
budget allocation may be reduced if the routine budget isn‘t lowered. A 
final issue concerning decentralisation in Indonesia is the need for the 
government to set up long-term policy for encouraging local 
governments to intensify their own revenue generation. 
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Appendix 1 Sectoral Share of Employment. West Java. 1993-2000 
District 
1993 1997 1998 2000 
A M S A M S A M S A M S 
Pandeglang 59.14 11.16 29.70 57.10 9.02 33.88 56.82 9.55 33.62 60.96 22.97 16.08 
Lebak 69.16 7.52 23.32 57.93 13.50 28.57 56.86 11.34 31.80 69.37 17.77 12.86 
Bogor 20.61 30.39 49.00 12.11 28.64 59.25 11.90 28.66 59.44 31.63 39.64 28.73 
Sukabumi 53.24 15.15 31.61 46.77 21.07 32.15 43.26 19.11 37.63 52.19 31.11 16.70 
Cianjur 59.56 12.22 28.22 55.92 11.13 32.95 62.92 12.21 24.88 63.37 22.15 14.48 
Bandung 32.87 29.97 37.15 26.46 36.89 36.65 30.16 33.72 36.12 48.73 33.04 18.23 
Garut 59.56 12.10 28.34 48.57 15.75 35.67 48.77 17.42 33.81 46.43 34.80 18.77 
Tasikmalaya 45.41 23.02 31.58 39.44 25.54 35.02 41.37 19.83 38.80 46.82 35.16 18.03 
Ciamis 45.64 21.83 32.53 47.38 18.90 33.73 45.34 17.62 37.04 49.55 32.96 17.48 
Kuningan 55.23 11.26 33.52 43.06 11.81 45.13 43.23 11.16 45.62 54.29 31.98 13.72 
Cirebon 39.07 22.53 38.40 30.37 23.44 46.19 28.58 25.29 46.13 27.12 55.27 17.61 
Majalengka 43.88 23.11 33.01 37.33 22.29 40.38 49.88 17.99 32.13 43.12 42.20 14.68 
Sumedang 52.77 16.12 31.11 47.42 20.19 32.39 54.40 14.59 31.01 46.68 33.83 19.49 
Indramayu 55.57 10.48 33.95 49.11 10.43 40.47 49.86 10.54 39.61 43.73 34.36 21.91 
Subang 46.49 15.68 37.83 58.06 12.50 29.44 50.13 11.93 37.95 56.27 30.43 13.30 
Purwakarta 43.60 28.40 28.00 36.57 30.36 33.07 36.60 25.31 38.09 43.98 36.15 19.86 
Karawang 34.04 20.47 45.49 32.87 22.80 44.33 35.12 21.36 43.51 40.60 39.68 19.71 
Bekasi 17.94 25.52 56.54 7.86 34.80 57.34 4.76 38.55 56.68 20.76 45.76 33.48 
Tangerang 12.05 38.93 49.02 14.29 27.58 58.14 12.80 30.33 56.87 22.81 46.42 30.77 
Serang 45.13 17.51 37.36 38.40 22.06 39.54 37.52 20.92 41.56 42.62 36.41 20.98 
City of Bogor 1.66 25.61 72.73 6.20 35.97 57.84 6.41 32.58 61.00 17.53 46.90 35.57 
City of Sukabumi 2.93 19.66 77.41 8.01 19.03 72.97 4.85 18.85 76.30 8.98 57.24 33.78 
City of Bandung 0.94 34.71 64.35 1.54 34.36 64.10 0.69 34.41 64.89 17.68 50.32 32.00 
City of Cirebon 4.19 21.38 74.43 1.89 19.64 78.47 1.70 18.88 79.42 7.53 58.56 33.91 
City of Tangerang na na na 3.83 42.38 53.79 2.57 38.15 59.28 19.36 49.55 31.08 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 2 Sectoral Growth of Employment. West Java. 1993-2000 
District 
1993-1997 1997-1998 1998-2000 
A M S Total A M S Total A M S Total 
Pandeglang -0.15 -4.72 3.95 0.66 1.29 2.89 1.25 1.42 1.38 -1.59 0.87 0.94 
Lebak -3.58 19.52 5.40 0.82 0.04 -3.93 2.82 0.36 5.84 -6.44 -2.97 2.02 
Bogor -10.07 1.21 7.78 2.76 -0.94 -2.33 -2.41 -2.20 15.84 2.49 2.10 4.28 
Sukabumi -3.08 8.71 0.10 -0.03 -5.71 -6.31 -0.40 -4.01 5.89 1.71 4.26 4.51 
Cianjur -4.14 -4.87 1.22 -2.62 5.13 4.42 -5.06 2.00 3.06 -5.82 10.76 4.22 
Bandung -4.92 5.73 -0.58 0.15 4.40 -2.22 -0.25 0.36 -7.03 11.37 8.54 5.52 
Garut -4.85 6.97 5.46 -0.02 1.81 4.19 0.04 1.58 -6.73 -2.30 4.54 -1.76 
Tasikmalaya -6.36 -0.46 -0.50 -3.02 -0.78 -8.10 0.25 -2.11 0.26 7.40 5.04 3.64 
Ciamis 0.33 -4.12 0.24 -0.62 -0.56 -1.26 2.57 0.40 -1.47 -6.17 1.09 -1.26 
Kuningan -9.55 -2.58 3.47 -3.80 0.79 -1.02 0.12 0.28 7.11 -1.54 -1.82 2.42 
Cirebon -6.45 0.62 4.33 -0.37 0.32 2.34 0.55 0.91 -6.80 6.34 2.24 0.95 
Majalengka -3.56 -0.48 5.01 0.23 11.29 -2.38 -2.84 3.21 -6.31 4.14 5.09 -0.37 
Sumedang -4.09 4.21 -0.54 -1.50 3.78 -7.73 -1.27 0.10 -6.74 5.05 9.63 0.88 
Indramayu -5.87 -3.04 1.29 -2.96 3.82 3.55 1.96 3.05 -5.17 -5.61 3.90 -1.39 
Subang 6.58 -4.74 -5.56 0.72 -3.29 -0.92 7.27 0.45 1.74 -6.15 -1.31 -0.27 
Purwakarta -5.57 0.34 2.69 -1.37 1.04 -3.72 4.36 0.85 1.24 -0.56 5.00 2.29 
Karawang 0.78 4.45 0.43 1.40 1.85 -1.97 -0.83 -0.17 -2.21 3.39 3.28 1.45 
Bekasi -14.92 13.02 4.88 4.54 -9.51 0.51 -1.65 -1.43 9.32 -23.11 -8.91 -11.90 
Tangerang -1.15 -13.09 -1.14 -5.26 -1.04 4.19 1.16 1.72 -8.49 2.15 0.70 0.12 
Serang -3.37 6.60 1.85 0.54 -2.35 -3.59 -0.96 -2.06 2.59 3.23 5.71 4.04 
City of Bogor 37.78 7.96 -6.93 -1.29 23.50 19.56 24.14 22.51 -6.40 4.65 9.43 7.08 
City of Sukabumi 28.23 -1.06 -1.91 -0.41 6.23 20.11 21.75 20.40 -8.22 0.22 0.49 0.07 
City of Bandung 16.29 2.39 2.42 2.57 -17.08 1.23 1.55 1.22 -7.57 -6.21 -1.84 -3.31 
City of Cirebon -16.38 -0.83 2.02 0.88 -0.21 1.18 2.39 2.11 7.89 3.18 -0.46 0.41 
City of Tangerang na na na na -8.01 0.98 5.84 3.41 -16.63 -3.94 -4.16 -4.32 
Note: na = data not available 
calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 3 Sectoral Share of Employment. Central Java. 1993-2000 
Districts 
1993 1997 1998 2000 
A M S A M S A M S A M S 
Cilacap 46.55 23.42 30.03 46.00 18.80 35.20 42.47 20.23 37.30 49.47 35.03 15.49 
Banyumas 40.23 23.23 36.54 28.25 26.93 44.82 33.42 22.30 44.28 40.94 35.68 23.38 
Purbalingga 47.28 21.57 31.15 36.92 28.46 34.62 40.56 25.83 33.61 54.88 33.15 11.97 
Banjarnegara 61.00 14.04 24.96 55.34 18.87 25.79 56.27 16.31 27.41 62.94 24.88 12.19 
Kebumen 55.08 16.20 28.72 47.48 25.18 27.34 55.51 20.51 23.98 51.14 33.59 15.27 
Purworejo 67.48 9.08 23.44 62.13 10.76 27.10 52.78 13.79 33.43 55.91 28.87 15.22 
Wonosobo 70.77 10.97 18.26 57.71 11.21 31.08 63.46 15.73 20.82 68.66 22.22 9.13 
Magelang 47.72 25.27 27.01 48.29 17.94 33.77 44.52 21.62 33.86 59.39 32.73 7.89 
Boyolali 60.50 14.91 24.60 55.81 11.49 32.70 51.25 17.75 31.00 63.27 23.44 13.29 
Klaten 34.90 24.23 40.86 31.08 29.79 39.13 30.65 27.60 41.75 38.76 40.19 21.04 
Sukoharjo 36.82 19.50 43.68 24.59 31.66 43.74 22.16 30.50 47.34 35.14 42.14 22.72 
Wonogiri 65.93 10.33 23.74 64.56 15.08 20.36 60.46 13.15 26.38 68.59 22.94 8.47 
Karanganyar 48.79 25.10 26.11 47.81 25.25 26.94 44.13 25.29 30.59 52.87 27.44 19.69 
Sragen 56.47 15.48 28.05 51.75 18.01 30.24 53.51 18.71 27.77 53.07 33.49 13.44 
Grobogan 75.62 6.71 17.67 64.84 10.94 24.22 62.46 10.17 27.37 67.54 22.62 9.83 
Blora 72.11 7.25 20.64 73.58 6.19 20.24 73.20 4.71 22.09 73.73 17.09 9.17 
Rembang 73.94 6.66 19.41 58.13 13.87 27.99 52.88 11.01 36.11 52.10 33.80 14.10 
Pati 61.08 12.43 26.49 49.85 17.50 32.65 56.36 14.48 29.16 52.76 32.40 14.84 
Kudus 24.26 39.82 35.91 13.49 55.35 31.16 18.35 40.47 41.18 43.55 40.06 16.39 
Jepara 36.50 34.39 29.11 24.28 42.29 33.44 25.79 43.47 30.74 24.14 63.67 12.18 
Demak 56.31 16.78 26.91 41.66 21.32 37.02 46.70 22.64 30.66 45.86 35.39 18.75 
Semarang 52.58 19.85 27.56 50.38 21.31 28.30 47.44 22.66 29.90 51.73 32.02 16.25 
Temanggung 66.03 10.63 23.35 63.03 11.36 25.61 61.08 14.46 24.46 68.10 21.26 10.64 
Kendal 48.75 15.59 35.67 40.24 20.24 39.52 43.65 20.97 35.38 52.06 33.58 14.36 
Batang 52.17 21.35 26.48 44.96 21.32 33.73 50.10 18.56 31.34 55.82 31.91 12.27 
Pekalongan 39.54 31.11 29.35 35.20 34.63 30.16 34.19 33.38 32.43 50.98 33.38 15.64 
Pemalang 56.16 9.82 34.02 41.41 13.99 44.60 42.86 15.16 41.98 45.97 36.49 17.54 
Tegal 42.30 23.22 34.48 32.51 22.47 45.02 28.34 26.09 45.57 47.09 35.64 17.27 
Brebes 59.07 8.02 32.92 54.21 11.12 34.67 48.91 14.13 36.96 51.40 32.51 16.09 
City of Magelang 2.10 14.83 83.07 2.72 20.26 77.02 2.42 19.75 77.84 11.82 48.99 39.19 
City of Surakarta 0.54 21.63 77.84 0.91 25.30 73.79 1.05 30.19 68.76 16.99 50.78 32.23 
City of Salatiga 5.33 20.46 74.21 4.38 25.60 70.02 2.53 27.79 69.68 20.82 44.41 34.77 
City of Semarang 4.08 29.90 66.01 6.20 30.79 63.02 5.29 26.36 68.35 12.59 48.39 39.02 
City of Pekalongan 3.84 38.63 57.54 6.16 36.67 57.17 6.72 34.97 58.31 35.14 41.62 23.25 
City of Tegal 11.18 19.53 69.30 8.43 22.56 69.01 11.22 21.32 67.46 11.50 57.89 30.61 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 4 Sectoral Growth of Employment.Central Java. 1993-2000 
Districts 
1993-1997 1997-1998 1998-2000 
A M S Total A M S Total A M S Total 
Cilacap -3.08 3.24 2.13 -1.16 -4.28 5.91 4.68 -0.44 -0.57 -2.13 0.88 -0.29 
Banyumas -5.67 -0.18 13.41 -0.70 4.39 10.90 -8.11 1.84 2.02 2.06 1.32 1.88 
Purbalingga -0.13 -8.60 5.26 -0.42 -0.65 6.10 0.92 1.18 6.13 0.23 -2.36 2.22 
Banjarnegara -19.74 -7.39 5.85 -13.20 0.08 13.03 0.16 1.86 3.80 -1.47 1.19 2.14 
Kebumen -1.13 7.17 0.69 1.78 -0.99 -2.77 0.55 -0.89 -4.43 0.90 1.98 -0.18 
Purworejo -10.75 11.45 -2.05 -1.63 -1.97 -1.19 1.70 -0.07 -0.82 0.90 3.53 1.79 
Wonosobo -2.36 7.88 -5.82 -1.92 -0.31 -2.67 6.61 0.89 0.79 -3.46 -2.17 -0.47 
Magelang 1.34 2.01 2.85 1.91 -3.60 -1.94 0.55 -2.01 -3.51 -4.39 6.80 -0.25 
Boyolali -1.22 4.85 2.56 0.87 1.42 1.54 -1.44 0.60 -3.96 -4.77 9.49 0.22 
Klaten -4.48 12.17 4.89 -1.16 1.48 0.18 4.82 2.19 1.61 -0.33 -1.71 0.55 
Sukoharjo 0.77 -3.63 -2.81 -0.30 3.59 -3.36 5.76 3.66 -0.79 5.51 -1.08 -0.53 
Wonogiri -4.27 22.15 10.90 1.57 -2.01 -5.54 6.30 0.10 2.62 -6.75 -5.01 -0.89 
Karanganyar -5.57 8.23 4.02 -0.81 3.40 -4.52 -3.07 0.08 -2.62 2.89 5.81 0.83 
Sragen -10.98 11.94 -0.44 3.11 8.05 -8.23 5.92 -0.77 1.79 4.90 -0.02 2.38 
Grobogan -9.07 6.04 4.18 0.68 5.35 3.55 0.45 3.00 -5.02 3.85 3.20 1.51 
Blora -7.39 6.01 8.25 -0.09 4.77 3.21 -3.77 1.48 1.48 -5.33 5.54 1.38 
Rembang -1.17 1.68 0.53 -0.12 -0.28 2.22 1.56 0.79 -5.38 -0.32 2.78 -1.66 
Pati -2.12 0.68 1.18 -1.01 -0.52 6.48 -0.56 0.34 3.36 -11.48 2.92 1.48 
Kudus -5.15 6.23 2.00 -0.52 3.62 2.06 -1.69 1.28 1.98 -6.52 -2.28 -1.13 
Jepara -4.61 -1.02 4.42 -1.17 3.89 -2.71 -1.50 0.79 -2.45 9.14 1.17 1.09 
Demak -1.86 3.79 1.67 1.02 -1.30 -1.64 1.11 -0.67 -7.06 5.81 4.40 1.42 
Semarang -7.75 8.76 6.06 -0.60 0.55 1.54 -2.23 -0.51 0.02 7.21 2.37 2.18 
Temanggung -5.55 0.06 7.61 0.81 -3.17 2.99 -0.18 -0.36 10.14 -3.37 0.77 2.83 
Kendal -0.83 9.97 2.03 1.12 -1.13 7.34 2.43 1.16 0.28 -14.48 2.57 -0.52 
Batang 9.37 10.87 0.85 2.72 -3.04 -0.74 0.09 -0.16 -1.02 -2.58 -2.40 -2.40 
Pekalongan 13.93 3.85 -2.00 -0.57 6.53 7.40 1.28 2.98 -3.21 -1.83 -1.67 -1.73 
Pemalang -2.17 8.71 0.89 2.47 -12.47 2.50 0.30 0.42 23.03 10.47 9.77 10.37 
Tegal 11.09 0.81 -0.53 0.43 -1.68 -1.55 3.65 1.85 -12.04 0.86 0.93 0.34 
Brebes 17.63 3.16 4.67 4.70 5.84 2.07 3.16 2.94 -11.83 -6.03 -10.08 -8.70 
City of Magelang -1.43 9.65 5.55 5.69 8.44 -0.21 0.58 1.14 -51.18 -6.82 -7.85 -10.07 
City of Surakarta -10.01 3.30 7.34 -3.16 9.07 -6.77 -2.55 2.68 -5.34 14.83 2.69 0.33 
City of Salatiga -0.56 0.39 -1.09 -0.52 2.18 -1.21 0.27 0.49 0.91 6.19 0.89 2.36 
City of Semarang -2.26 2.49 5.59 -0.65 -3.84 8.24 -2.36 -2.29 9.79 -21.07 -1.84 4.97 
City of Pekalongan -8.81 -2.19 4.47 -1.34 1.24 0.93 -0.82 0.13 3.34 5.74 2.53 3.52 
City of Tegal 6.64 1.91 0.22 0.55 -12.76 1.25 3.49 2.97 12.87 -3.72 -4.91 -4.56 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 5 Sectoral Share of Employment. Yogyakarta. 1993-2000 
Districts 
1993 1997 1998 2000 
A M S A M S A M S A M S 
Kulon Progo 62.40 15.28 22.32 46.53 19.78 33.69 58.64 13.52 27.83 58.43 25.97 15.60 
Bantul 31.93 26.87 41.20 31.86 27.85 40.30 34.07 26.01 39.92 43.74 38.05 18.21 
Gunung Kidul 77.99 8.00 14.01 73.06 9.06 17.88 68.01 13.61 18.39 84.49 8.42 7.09 
Sleman 36.06 23.13 40.81 26.32 22.35 51.32 26.03 23.41 50.57 33.01 44.51 22.48 
City of Yogyakarta 1.18 14.08 84.73 1.50 14.86 83.64 0.77 13.89 85.34 8.46 48.34 43.20 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
 
Appendix 6 Sectoral Growth of Employment. Yogyakarta. 1993-2000 
District 
1993-1997 1997-1998 1998-2000 
A M S Total A M S Total A M S Total 
Kulon Progo -3.27 -8.16 1.16 -2.90 -4.10 -0.43 -1.11 -2.31 4.94 1.64 1.72 3.11 
Bantul -9.83 2.21 2.84 -1.75 5.06 -4.25 -0.58 0.20 -3.62 4.83 4.45 2.02 
Gunung Kidul -5.69 7.53 3.56 0.51 2.00 -2.79 -1.69 -0.58 -1.63 1.11 -1.61 -0.89 
Sleman -1.74 8.40 1.65 0.72 -1.48 -5.53 -0.67 -1.99 0.47 1.95 1.93 1.12 
City of Yogyakarta -4.38 10.80 -2.18 -0.82 6.05 -3.11 -1.50 1.93 -4.94 0.92 9.10 0.13 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 7 Sectoral Share of Employment. East Java. 1993-2000 
Districts 
1993 1997 1998 2000 
A M S A M S A M S A M S 
Pacitan 73.47 9.98 16.55 76.72 6.57 16.71 79.02 5.44 15.53 79.17 13.00 7.83 
Ponorogo 63.66 13.49 22.84 65.26 9.09 25.65 61.89 8.32 29.79 65.76 21.36 12.88 
Trenggalek 60.99 18.89 20.12 56.57 16.83 26.60 52.26 22.83 24.91 52.79 33.67 13.54 
Tulungagung 49.53 20.15 30.32 37.90 23.38 38.72 39.40 27.62 32.98 49.18 36.01 14.81 
Blitar 64.05 10.87 25.09 60.47 13.08 26.46 55.84 13.76 30.40 62.17 25.32 12.50 
Kediri 54.22 15.03 30.75 47.64 19.39 32.97 46.47 16.78 36.75 52.20 33.26 14.54 
Malang 54.56 16.45 28.98 48.16 17.85 33.98 47.44 15.88 36.68 51.97 34.24 13.79 
Lumajang 58.66 13.23 28.11 57.82 10.22 31.96 52.47 11.60 35.92 52.98 33.00 14.02 
Jember 56.84 14.84 28.32 52.90 12.53 34.57 47.30 16.43 36.27 51.63 32.78 15.58 
Banyuwangi 51.01 12.30 36.69 51.20 14.71 34.08 54.14 15.25 30.61 56.54 26.73 16.73 
Bondowoso 64.09 12.38 23.53 58.85 11.91 29.23 58.69 10.26 31.05 67.79 22.20 10.01 
Situbondo 58.88 7.15 33.98 57.99 6.31 35.70 59.97 8.85 31.18 56.57 28.59 14.84 
Probolinggo 68.26 9.34 22.40 67.02 7.41 25.56 62.10 10.90 27.00 61.18 27.53 11.28 
Pasuruan 50.28 21.86 27.85 39.55 28.94 31.51 43.48 23.01 33.51 48.57 35.92 15.51 
Sidoarjo 16.29 40.19 43.52 9.62 47.50 42.88 9.27 41.99 48.73 22.93 52.13 24.94 
Mojokerto 46.39 20.90 32.71 29.79 30.04 40.16 31.87 30.34 37.78 46.32 38.90 14.78 
Jombang 46.33 17.42 36.25 36.51 16.86 46.63 32.58 18.62 48.81 33.16 44.24 22.60 
Nganjuk 53.91 12.44 33.65 52.55 11.69 35.76 56.88 11.45 31.67 51.05 31 .18 17.77 
Mediun 56.77 8.59 34.64 49.42 11.64 38.94 57.89 9.77 32.34 55.79 28.23 15.98 
Magetan 57.85 14.15 28.00 48.21 15.90 35.89 59.64 13.56 26.80 49.72 33.42 16.87 
Ngawi 64.57 10.91 24.51 63.77 9.14 27.09 62.79 6.85 30.36 61.62 26.20 12.18 
Bojonegoro 63.89 10.50 25.61 68.12 8.59 23.29 68.65 9.24 22.11 60.77 27.01 12.21 
Tuban 63.33 10.06 26.61 61.35 10.70 27.95 60.43 9.75 29.82 57.81 27.78 14.40 
Lamongan 65.24 10.58 24.18 63.78 8.81 27.42 69.95 8.10 21.95 59.23 29.13 11.64 
Gresik 47.03 27.88 25.09 30.64 32.94 36.42 28.76 34.52 36.72 36.55 48.86 14.59 
Bangkalan 68.24 8.84 22.93 62.68 9.04 28.28 65.89 9.45 24.66 68.59 20.50 10.91 
Sampang 82.09 5.35 12.55 78.44 3.72 17.84 77.77 6.48 15.76 80.61 11.63 7.76 
Pamekasan 68.47 7.34 24.19 69.92 7.73 22.36 72.62 7.05 20.33 64.64 21.60 13.76 
Sumenep 69.10 7.82 23.08 67.16 10.70 22.14 64.02 11.10 24.88 66.31 25.30 8.40 
City of Kediri 9.90 31.78 58.32 6.97 34.89 58.14 6.65 32.33 61.02 23.56 45.62 30.82 
City of Blitar 10.40 18.73 70.87 9.71 13.61 76.68 7.27 16.08 76.65 16.84 47.16 36.01 
City of Malang 2.51 28.47 69.03 2.61 19.63 77.76 2.09 26.64 71.27 13.92 44.69 41.40 
City of Probolinggo 20.94 20.20 58.86 15.48 21.56 62.96 12.47 18.02 69.50 19.67 39.35 40.98 
City of Pasuruan 11.45 33.25 55.30 10.39 29.57 60.05 10.69 34.83 54.48 11.26 61.25 27.49 
City of Mojokerto 4.68 31.61 63.72 2.55 33.19 64.27 2.94 28.70 68.36 22.44 44.65 32.91 
City of Madiun 4.31 13.82 81.88 3.12 13.73 83.15 4.24 12.02 83.74 7.88 39.28 52.84 
City of Surabaya 1.11 24.82 74.07 1.34 25.81 72.85 1.26 27.23 71.52 10.34 58.11 31.55 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 8 Sectoral Growth of Employment. East Java. 1993-2000 
Districts 
1993-1997 1997-1998 1998-2000 
A M S Total A M S Total A M S Total 
Pacitan -1.45 5.04 7.60 0.34 8.82 -41.86 -1.56 2.29 -3.66 18.12 1.49 -1.54 
Ponorogo 1.14 -13.05 1.99 -0.49 -5.70 -11.20 12.36 -1.57 -2.24 4.86 -3.26 -1.93 
Trenggalek 2.18 -1.71 6.65 2.53 -6.38 37.22 -5.01 1.31 -1.83 -8.04 11.27 0.26 
Tulungagung -7.59 2.15 6.76 -0.79 5.10 15.06 -18.96 -1.89 -0.75 -7.85 -0.39 -2.53 
Blitar -0.80 -7.69 -1.81 -2.11 -10.62 -0.28 6.32 -4.78 3.65 4.52 1.80 3.23 
Kediri 1.61 2.86 5.69 3.12 -1.02 -14.62 9.75 -0.11 -8.73 2.40 -0.25 -3.70 
Malang -1.71 3.90 5.20 1.38 -4.81 -15.33 1.98 -4.38 0.56 17.13 0.82 3.45 
Lumajang -2.07 -5.96 1.02 -1.59 -3.88 17.59 15.96 4.66 -0.09 21.35 1.89 3.29 
Jember -0.94 -8.17 5.40 -0.14 -4.25 39.98 11.48 6.73 -1.30 -5.36 4.16 0.06 
Banyuwangi -1.48 -10.24 0.09 -2.57 10.85 8.51 -6.16 4.71 -0.47 -5.67 2.20 -0.41 
Bondowoso 0.66 -1.03 2.44 0.95 -1.37 -14.78 4.71 -1.19 3.62 17.09 -9.61 1.24 
Situbondo 3.97 1.87 4.73 4.03 5.41 -5.78 -13.58 -2.18 -3.17 -10.46 -1.08 -3.14 
Probolinggo 5.27 2.11 4.42 4.75 -6.55 16.74 5.58 -1.37 -6.26 -4.49 -4.85 -5.69 
Pasuruan 0.70 7.12 2.53 2.97 16.04 -16.83 10.93 4.92 -5.04 8.33 1.11 0.21 
Sidoarjo -10.61 9.02 4.21 4.21 4.45 -10.33 18.97 3.42 1.39 7.30 7.97 7.08 
Mojokerto -3.84 4.22 7.05 2.42 7.64 -0.62 -7.26 -0.83 7.75 0.49 -1.79 2.06 
Jombang -1.03 -1.57 5.98 1.84 -13.58 4.17 -2.71 -5.52 -12.01 9.83 9.28 2.77 
Nganjuk 17.88 22.15 27.66 21.47 11.53 -0.86 -10.62 2.16 -15.91 -1.46 4.67 -7.34 
Madiun -0.01 -1.73 5.69 1.80 12.92 -19.52 -20.62 -3.92 -5.74 2.99 7.36 -0.49 
Magetan -3.69 4.80 7.79 1.07 32.64 -8.44 -19.66 7.37 -20.41 3.80 8.74 -8.30 
Ngawi -2.18 -5.60 0.10 -1.94 5.81 -19.61 19.65 7.23 -8.11 19.43 -4.04 -4.74 
Bojonegoro 5.71 1.74 3.64 4.84 -3.75 2.57 -10.20 -4.71 -12.15 12.58 12.60 -3.74 
Tuban 3.13 -2.24 0.21 1.65 -5.43 -13.09 1.48 -4.32 -2.02 -2.56 8.93 1.29 
Lamongan 3.26 -7.15 2.01 1.76 17.34 -1.66 -14.48 6.94 -6.76 9.37 9.70 -1.56 
Gresik -4.03 7.54 5.06 2.59 -0.39 -0.71 2.28 0.45 1.07 -3.12 -1.59 -1.31 
Bangkalan 5.26 1.84 3.56 4.37 0.02 -24.72 -18.07 -7.81 8.29 6.99 3.88 7.10 
Sampang 5.77 -20.18 1.62 3.08 2.95 80.28 -8.99 3.70 5.44 -27.82 0.22 2.79 
Pamekasan 5.86 -11.30 -0.33 1.83 11.43 -30.90 -3.11 3.80 -5.87 21.26 17.20 1.28 
Sumenep 2.97 -4.01 3.64 2.24 -7.01 0.72 8.54 -2.74 3.28 5.69 -17.31 -1.12 
City of Kediri 0.75 2.95 -1.69 -0.02 -1.56 -3.29 9.81 4.44 -17.20 -7.93 -5.39 -6.94 
City of Blitar 2.47 -3.64 9.04 6.57 -31.33 9.60 -25.07 -21.62 34.66 3.32 -1.78 2.06 
City of Malang -13.49 -4.82 7.05 3.42 -14.87 45.55 -5.66 3.83 -6.99 -8.00 -1.33 -3.18 
City of Probolinggo 4.19 13.33 6.17 7.65 -17.31 -44.22 -1.34 -15.09 5.46 -3.08 -5.72 -3.84 
City of Pasuruan 5.23 13.90 6.25 8.50 6.66 -19.81 -25.39 -20.92 -23.51 -4.26 0.07 -3.71 
City of Mojokerto -3.71 22.48 9.12 12.98 15.63 -47.35 -19.98 -29.80 12.19 5.22 -4.67 -1.21 
City of Madiun -2.66 -2.31 3.15 2.11 35.91 -9.36 4.74 3.77 -22.50 0.37 -5.68 -5.55 
City of Surabaya -4.46 -0.76 3.50 2.16 -0.49 7.99 3.97 4.97 24.90 1.66 -8.05 -4.83 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 9 Sectoral Share of GRDP, West Java, 1993-2000 
District/City 
1993 1997 1998 2000 
A M S A M S A M S A M S 
Pandeglang 41.68 13.97 44.36 37.83 15.80 46.37 36.59 17.80 45.61 36.02 16.64 47.34 
Lebak 33.37 16.72 49.91 33.07 19.76 47.18 35.90 14.90 49.20 39.53 14.12 46.35 
Bogor 12.42 57.81 29.77 11.01 62.87 26.12 10.44 63.32 26.23 10.47 63.20 26.33 
Sukabumi 51.59 15.19 33.22 34.91 20.06 45.03 35.22 18.36 46.42 36.52 16.79 46.69 
Cianjur 43.02 8.95 48.02 39.47 10.37 50.16 42.80 8.00 49.20 43.03 7.57 49.39 
Bandung 14.06 55.62 30.33 9.56 64.22 26.22 10.59 59.75 29.65 10.25 60.42 29.33 
Garut 40.08 12.18 47.74 33.18 14.71 52.11 33.80 14.14 52.06 34.88 13.41 51.71 
Tasikmalaya 27.98 21.11 50.90 26.13 21.59 52.29 23.77 18.37 57.86 24.06 19.03 56.91 
Ciamis 34.59 18.38 47.03 32.33 20.48 47.19 34.01 16.29 49.70 34.13 16.36 49.52 
Kuningan 38.88 8.32 52.80 33.27 10.79 55.94 35.24 10.16 54.59 35.59 9.79 54.62 
Cirebon 22.23 29.57 48.20 19.31 32.44 48.26 22.44 24.55 53.00 24.89 23.65 51.46 
Majalengka 28.84 24.03 47.13 28.26 25.43 46.31 31.29 22.40 46.32 32.70 20.79 46.51 
Sumedang 34.50 19.84 45.66 29.05 23.69 47.26 29.74 20.97 49.29 29.73 20.77 49.51 
Indramayu 13.28 71.86 14.86 13.79 70.61 15.59 12.51 72.00 15.49 15.55 65.49 18.96 
Subang 41.19 13.62 45.20 39.69 13.76 46.55 42.19 10.36 47.45 41.73 9.86 48.41 
Purwakarta 21.95 27.29 50.76 20.95 31.51 47.54 19.79 30.75 49.46 19.46 31.25 49.28 
Karawang 21.26 35.55 43.20 15.31 42.46 42.23 16.73 40.61 42.66 17.86 39.61 42.53 
Bekasi 9.43 61.17 29.40 3.39 72.55 24.06 3.95 69.67 26.38 3.75 70.18 26.07 
Tangerang 13.75 59.56 26.70 11.16 62.57 26.27 10.40 64.91 24.69 10.79 63.64 25.57 
Serang 6.43 74.31 19.26 7.18 71.49 21.33 12.34 63.40 24.26 13.18 62.82 23.99 
City of Bogor 0.37 36.75 62.88 0.42 38.59 60.99 0.45 39.60 59.95 0.47 39.56 59.96 
City of Sukabumi 1.66 12.48 85.86 8.22 11.91 79.87 4.36 11.09 84.55 3.03 11.82 85.15 
City of Bandung 0.45 32.09 67.46 0.30 35.79 63.92 0.40 35.47 64.13 0.37 35.59 64.04 
City of Cirebon 0.98 15.55 83.47 0.43 40.16 59.41 0.34 44.43 55.23 0.36 38.31 61.33 
City of Tangerang 1.18 47.50 51.32 0.36 56.91 42.73 0.37 57.29 42.34 0.34 57.72 41.94 
City of Bekasi n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 10 Annual Growth of GRDP, West Java, 1993-2000 
District/City 
1993-1997 1997-1998 1998-2000 
A M S Total A M S Total A M S Total 
Pandeglang 2.85 8.67 6.55 5.37 -10.40 4.33 -8.89 -7.37 5.04 2.36 7.86 5.87 
Lebak 7.28 12.11 6.03 7.53 -2.96 -32.61 -6.80 -10.63 11.19 3.14 2.85 5.96 
Bogor -2.04 3.11 -2.27 0.97 -21.91 -17.12 -17.37 -17.71 2.39 2.17 2.46 2.27 
Sukabumi 1.48 19.93 20.73 11.89 -9.16 -17.58 -7.18 -9.95 4.08 -2.27 2.50 2.20 
Cianjur 3.48 9.68 6.89 5.73 1.35 -27.93 -8.34 -6.55 2.96 -0.06 2.89 2.69 
Bandung -1.33 12.62 4.76 8.64 -10.90 -25.16 -9.03 -19.57 2.37 4.63 3.48 4.05 
Garut 0.85 10.85 8.07 5.73 -9.99 -15.11 -11.72 -11.64 4.84 0.52 2.85 3.20 
Tasikmalaya 4.49 6.89 7.02 6.30 -20.96 -26.07 -3.87 -13.13 2.84 4.04 1.37 2.21 
Ciamis 4.15 8.82 6.02 5.93 -4.75 -27.96 -4.63 -9.45 3.03 3.06 2.66 2.85 
Kuningan 1.64 12.77 7.21 5.68 -0.07 -11.15 -7.93 -5.66 2.53 0.14 2.06 2.03 
Cirebon 2.81 8.99 6.53 6.50 -7.89 -40.03 -12.98 -20.77 9.62 2.18 2.58 4.10 
Majalengka 6.85 8.93 6.93 7.40 0.38 -20.16 -9.34 -9.35 6.25 0.12 4.13 3.92 
Sumedang 1.45 10.70 6.82 5.91 -9.71 -21.90 -8.01 -11.79 3.13 2.63 3.37 3.14 
Indramayu 5.07 3.63 5.34 4.08 -14.21 -3.53 -6.01 -5.39 5.61 -9.67 4.78 -5.29 
Subang 4.75 6.01 6.51 5.73 -1.31 -30.14 -5.38 -7.17 2.62 0.71 4.23 3.19 
Purwakarta 6.17 11.36 5.68 7.42 -16.57 -13.83 -8.13 -11.69 1.64 3.33 2.31 2.49 
Karawang -0.72 12.67 7.16 7.77 -12.37 -23.28 -18.97 -19.79 9.36 4.53 5.67 5.84 
Bekasi -14.46 15.27 5.05 10.45 -8.44 -24.49 -13.77 -21.36 1.25 4.33 3.34 3.95 
Tangerang 2.81 9.66 7.88 8.32 -15.46 -5.87 -14.72 -9.26 5.17 2.23 5.07 3.25 
Serang 10.10 6.05 9.85 7.09 -26.31 -61.97 -51.22 -57.11 6.56 2.61 2.50 3.08 
City of Bogor 23.78 21.40 19.02 19.93 -10.49 -14.47 -18.07 -16.65 6.31 3.96 4.02 4.01 
City of Sukabumi 71.31 13.49 12.78 14.83 -56.01 -22.84 -12.30 -17.15 -13.37 7.38 4.38 4.00 
City of Bandung -1.97 11.72 7.26 8.72 7.40 -20.40 -19.42 -19.69 0.28 4.27 4.03 4.10 
City of Cirebon -4.78 48.51 7.61 17.15 -25.92 4.71 -12.01 -5.36 6.05 -4.96 7.84 2.34 
City of Tangerang -14.05 21.42 10.86 16.05 -12.69 -16.21 -17.53 -16.76 -1.80 3.68 2.80 3.29 
City of Bekasi n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 11 Sectoral Share of GRDP, Central Java, 1993-2000 
District/City 
1993 1997 1998 2000 
A M S A M S A M S A M S 
Cilacap 11.95 48.65 39.41 12.41 48.02 39.57 10.70 51.11 38.19 10.83 51.72 37.45 
Banyumas 32.84 16.70 50.46 27.51 25.02 47.46 28.21 24.83 46.96 26.74 24.94 48.32 
Purbalingga 36.63 16.27 47.10 34.89 17.20 47.91 32.98 16.62 50.40 31.58 17.17 51.25 
Banjarnegara 43.48 20.33 36.19 41.45 22.61 35.94 45.00 21.55 33.45 40.37 21.27 38.37 
Kebumen 47.01 12.19 40.81 39.79 17.46 42.75 38.42 18.34 43.24 39.44 16.80 43.76 
Purworejo 34.47 16.76 48.76 30.96 17.83 51.22 34.89 16.60 48.51 34.47 16.49 49.04 
Wonosobo 45.71 19.55 34.74 53.36 15.62 31.01 52.80 15.58 31.62 52.39 15.07 32.54 
Magelang 41.20 25.23 33.57 34.65 27.52 37.82 34.26 27.61 38.13 31.52 28.31 40.17 
Boyolali 31.45 22.28 46.27 29.10 25.41 45.49 32.17 22.80 45.03 33.28 21.44 45.27 
Klaten 27.20 25.90 46.90 22.74 30.35 46.91 23.02 30.02 46.95 19.46 32.44 48.10 
Sukoharjo 30.78 29.02 40.20 23.70 36.88 39.42 25.01 31.24 43.76 21.27 32.81 45.92 
Wonogiri 45.65 12.58 41.77 45.43 12.98 41.59 50.03 9.60 40.36 50.49 9.49 40.02 
Karanganyar 24.46 38.23 37.31 18.21 46.27 35.52 18.82 42.60 38.58 19.13 43.74 37.13 
Sragen 46.39 22.15 31.46 37.40 28.52 34.08 39.85 26.07 34.08 40.05 24.42 35.54 
Grobogan 49.66 12.90 37.44 42.34 17.02 40.64 47.03 13.57 39.41 47.52 8.82 43.66 
Blora 44.86 17.27 37.87 42.34 17.56 40.10 45.01 14.73 40.26 45.28 14.92 39.80 
Rembang 45.89 12.04 42.07 42.84 15.21 41.95 46.10 10.79 43.12 46.21 10.80 42.99 
Pati 47.34 15.64 37.02 42.34 20.22 37.45 46.24 17.21 36.54 44.81 18.50 36.70 
Kudus 3.44 63.34 33.22 3.22 63.32 33.46 3.40 62.87 33.73 3.24 62.08 34.69 
Jepara 36.03 23.41 40.56 26.01 30.06 43.93 21.07 33.95 44.97 22.31 32.39 45.30 
Demak 41.90 18.10 40.00 39.33 19.77 40.91 45.07 14.56 40.37 44.34 15.06 40.60 
Semarang 30.44 36.77 32.79 17.66 49.90 32.44 18.97 45.38 35.65 18.23 44.56 37.22 
Temanggung 35.10 26.07 38.83 33.35 25.68 40.97 34.46 25.26 40.28 32.38 26.11 41.51 
Kendal 25.35 43.92 30.73 19.14 50.21 30.65 19.45 49.84 30.71 20.23 48.55 31.22 
Batang 30.29 34.70 35.01 26.35 36.33 37.32 28.00 36.47 35.53 27.17 37.01 35.82 
Pekalongan 26.20 31.86 41.94 21.14 35.60 43.26 18.80 37.81 43.39 16.85 38.56 44.59 
Pemalang 39.41 20.27 40.33 34.93 25.00 40.07 35.73 23.97 40.29 33.95 25.12 40.93 
Tegal 31.83 25.40 42.78 25.78 28.55 45.67 28.38 25.31 46.31 27.43 25.84 46.74 
Brebes 50.07 15.15 34.78 51.10 15.26 33.64 51.52 14.85 33.63 52.89 14.40 32.70 
City of Magelang 4.23 23.24 72.54 3.28 24.22 72.50 3.34 22.67 74.00 3.05 21.95 75.00 
City of Surakarta 2.16 33.30 64.54 1.29 38.93 59.78 1.51 40.83 57.66 1.50 40.39 58.10 
City of Salatiga 5.44 30.16 64.40 5.05 30.12 64.84 5.51 29.10 65.39 5.68 28.97 65.35 
City of Semarang 2.03 36.30 61.67 1.53 38.53 59.94 1.22 37.29 61.48 0.79 36.68 62.52 
City of Pekalongan 15.90 28.11 55.98 11.02 36.44 52.54 12.33 34.91 52.77 9.53 35.52 54.95 
City of Tegal 15.81 23.48 60.71 9.92 29.56 60.52 10.39 29.75 59.86 14.21 30.01 55.77 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 12 Annual Growth of GRDP, Central Java, 1993-2000 
District/City 
193-1997 1997-1998 1998-2000 
A M S Total A M S Total A M S Total 
Cilacap 2.83 1.52 1.96 1.85 -3.76 18.88 7.77 11.67 5.97 5.93 4.28 5.31 
Banyumas 0.55 16.28 3.50 5.10 -4.45 -7.52 -7.79 -6.80 -0.43 2.50 3.73 2.26 
Purbalingga 5.11 7.89 6.85 6.40 -12.18 -10.23 -2.28 -7.10 -0.41 3.44 2.62 1.77 
Banjarnegara 4.35 8.46 5.42 5.60 4.52 -8.26 -10.39 -3.73 -4.56 0.11 7.92 0.77 
Kebumen 0.76 14.94 6.27 5.05 -16.03 -8.68 -12.02 -13.03 5.09 -0.73 4.34 3.72 
Purworejo 2.75 7.19 6.86 5.56 5.39 -12.93 -11.43 -6.49 1.83 2.11 3.00 2.45 
Wonosobo 12.05 1.92 4.78 7.80 -16.01 -15.34 -13.46 -15.12 2.56 1.23 4.45 2.95 
Magelang 0.06 6.78 7.65 4.48 -4.25 -2.82 -2.36 -3.14 -1.61 3.85 5.27 2.57 
Boyolali 3.75 9.32 5.34 5.79 -0.78 -19.45 -11.17 -10.25 3.37 -1.46 1.90 1.62 
Klaten 1.18 10.08 5.82 5.81 -10.25 -12.30 -11.28 -11.35 -6.02 6.26 3.46 2.22 
Sukoharjo 2.61 16.30 9.00 9.54 -5.35 -24.02 -0.44 -10.30 -5.57 4.93 4.88 2.38 
Wonogiri 4.93 5.87 4.94 5.05 4.98 -29.48 -7.48 -4.67 3.31 2.23 2.39 2.84 
Karanganyar -1.12 11.66 5.15 6.45 -8.69 -18.66 -4.03 -11.65 4.57 5.07 1.73 3.70 
Sragen 0.39 12.85 8.08 5.94 -2.56 -16.40 -8.58 -8.56 2.67 -0.88 4.59 2.42 
Grobogan -1.88 9.44 4.22 2.11 0.39 -27.96 -12.35 -9.62 4.22 -16.39 9.14 3.68 
Blora 1.88 3.79 4.85 3.36 0.83 -20.45 -4.76 -5.15 2.25 2.60 1.35 1.94 
Rembang 2.23 10.27 3.93 4.01 -3.21 -36.22 -7.54 -10.05 4.06 4.00 3.79 3.94 
Pati 0.73 10.45 3.88 3.59 3.65 -19.21 -7.41 -5.11 -0.63 4.65 1.17 0.95 
Kudus 4.89 6.63 6.84 6.64 -6.81 -12.42 -11.07 -11.79 -1.13 0.70 2.76 1.34 
Jepara -1.76 13.46 8.73 6.58 -18.97 13.00 2.40 0.03 5.60 0.23 3.00 2.62 
Demak 5.41 9.49 7.70 7.10 2.55 -34.09 -11.69 -10.52 1.77 4.37 2.90 2.61 
Semarang -1.50 21.82 12.57 12.87 -11.68 -25.23 -9.67 -17.79 1.07 2.16 5.35 3.11 
Temanggung 3.37 4.30 6.11 4.69 -3.00 -7.63 -7.70 -6.12 -0.29 4.57 4.42 2.86 
Kendal -1.26 9.53 5.85 5.92 -8.24 -10.36 -9.52 -9.70 4.10 0.75 2.93 2.08 
Batang 1.87 6.69 7.18 5.48 -4.55 -9.83 -14.48 -10.17 0.63 2.92 2.59 2.17 
Pekalongan 0.60 9.14 6.98 6.15 -18.51 -2.70 -8.12 -8.39 -2.49 4.03 4.43 3.01 
Pemalang 3.18 12.06 6.17 6.33 0.63 -5.65 -1.09 -1.63 0.05 5.06 3.45 2.64 
Tegal 0.29 8.85 7.46 5.72 0.15 -19.35 -7.75 -9.02 1.95 4.78 4.17 3.70 
Brebes 6.59 6.24 5.17 6.04 3.15 -0.41 2.28 2.32 5.88 2.90 3.04 4.49 
City of Magelang -0.91 6.64 5.53 5.55 -5.81 -13.30 -5.46 -7.37 -0.84 2.09 4.43 3.73 
City of Surakarta -3.46 14.13 7.68 9.76 0.80 -9.74 -16.98 -13.93 2.49 2.24 3.18 2.79 
City of Salatiga 4.49 6.40 6.63 6.45 7.58 -4.84 -0.68 -1.51 4.20 2.45 2.64 2.67 
City of Semarang 10.35 20.25 17.64 18.48 -49.21 -38.61 -34.94 -36.57 -16.03 3.33 5.06 4.18 
City of Pekalongan -1.49 15.19 6.26 7.96 2.41 -12.26 -8.03 -8.42 -8.60 4.89 6.10 3.97 
City of Tegal -5.42 12.57 6.19 6.27 -0.13 -4.02 -5.67 -4.64 80.79 55.24 49.19 54.56 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 13 Sectoral Share of GRDP, Yogyakarta, 1993-2000 
District/City 
1993 1997 1998 2000 
A M S A M S A M S A M S 
Kulon Progo 23.59 27.34 49.07 24.73 28.39 46.89 27.16 25.95 46.89 28.45 13.43 58.13 
Bantul 23.59 24.96 51.46 21.68 26.86 51.46 22.53 26.10 51.37 21.70 27.16 51.14 
Gunung Kidul 31.27 24.46 44.27 28.47 26.05 45.48 30.94 24.71 44.36 37.33 22.08 40.59 
Sleman 17.07 27.16 55.77 15.14 28.57 56.28 13.10 27.60 59.29 14.18 27.67 58.15 
City of Yogyakarta 1.53 20.74 77.72 0.98 20.03 78.99 0.98 18.65 80.37 0.91 18.64 80.45 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
 
Appendix 14 Annual Growth of GRDP, Yogyakarta, 1993-2000 
District/City 
1993-1997 1997-1998 1998-2000 
A M S Total A M S Total A M A Total 
Kulon Progo 4.57 4.33 2.18 3.35 -6.73 -22.36 -15.07 -15.08 -7.31 -34.85 0.84 -9.43 
Bantul 4.00 8.19 6.22 6.22 -5.78 -11.92 -9.51 -9.35 0.35 4.30 2.01 2.24 
Gunung Kidul 4.25 8.41 7.43 6.72 0.90 -11.91 -9.43 -7.14 17.82 1.39 2.61 7.26 
Sleman 3.92 8.45 7.32 7.08 -20.37 -11.11 -3.08 -7.99 6.79 2.80 1.68 2.67 
City of Yogyakarta -3.32 7.13 8.52 8.08 -11.06 -17.24 -9.59 -11.13 -1.76 2.30 2.37 2.32 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 15 Sectoral Share of GRDP, East Java, 1993-2000 
District/City 
1993 1997 1998 2000 
A M S A M S A M S A M S 
Pacitan 43.33 10.02 46.66 42.13 10.32 47.55 45.20 9.06 45.74 44.07 11.71 44.22 
Ponorogo 43.82 10.00 46.18 40.92 11.70 47.37 43.98 10.01 46.01 40.02 17.58 42.40 
Trenggalek 34.31 8.39 57.30 33.29 9.31 57.40 34.62 7.79 57.59 33.68 10.06 56.25 
Tulungagung 18.85 30.44 50.71 16.05 35.01 48.94 17.98 31.31 50.71 16.27 35.69 48.05 
Blitar 44.75 8.03 47.22 44.33 9.00 46.67 45.08 7.88 47.03 43.06 13.70 43.24 
Kediri 38.49 17.12 44.39 34.96 18.66 46.38 35.36 17.78 46.86 33.91 21.43 44.65 
Malang 31.26 16.91 51.82 27.36 20.39 52.25 28.96 17.83 53.21 29.38 18.01 52.61 
Lumajang 40.58 13.54 45.88 37.05 15.45 47.50 40.28 11.20 48.53 40.57 12.17 47.25 
Jember 36.02 12.28 51.70 32.52 14.62 52.87 34.28 11.66 54.05 34.63 12.13 53.24 
Banyuwangi 33.50 16.95 49.56 29.70 19.13 51.18 32.63 14.62 52.74 32.36 15.48 52.17 
Bondowoso 43.51 7.16 49.32 40.38 8.89 50.74 41.68 6.84 51.48 42.11 6.54 51.35 
Situbondo 41.16 11.73 47.11 36.47 14.40 49.13 40.72 10.73 48.55 40.06 11.57 48.37 
Probolinggo 43.15 21.87 34.98 41.03 24.42 34.55 45.18 20.67 34.15 45.44 19.86 34.70 
Pasuruan 21.16 44.21 34.63 17.31 49.54 33.15 20.30 45.71 33.99 19.34 46.38 34.28 
Sidoarejo 5.72 55.98 38.30 4.37 58.43 37.20 5.10 56.29 38.61 4.66 56.04 39.29 
Mojokerto 20.59 36.39 43.02 18.27 37.79 43.94 20.56 34.05 45.39 18.85 36.31 44.84 
Jombang 34.61 13.61 51.78 30.08 16.53 53.39 33.00 13.23 53.77 32.73 13.24 54.03 
Nganjuk 36.07 11.06 52.86 33.10 13.38 53.52 35.46 10.30 54.23 35.39 10.02 54.59 
Mediun 44.73 6.92 48.34 41.62 8.09 50.29 42.54 6.24 51.21 41.66 6.00 52.34 
Magetan 45.08 6.96 47.96 40.95 8.61 50.44 42.12 6.14 51.74 43.90 5.93 50.17 
Ngawi 46.25 6.89 46.87 42.90 8.49 48.61 45.27 6.20 48.52 45.34 6.29 48.37 
Bojonegoro 52.43 6.43 41.14 48.79 8.03 43.18 50.20 6.76 43.04 50.24 6.70 43.07 
Tuban 22.22 41.85 35.93 19.02 43.66 37.31 24.45 33.30 42.26 20.45 41.97 37.58 
Lamongan 50.42 6.13 43.45 46.86 7.46 45.68 51.22 5.29 43.48 51.02 6.15 42.83 
Gresik 12.26 57.48 30.26 9.10 61.11 29.79 11.03 57.86 31.10 10.14 60.36 29.51 
Bangkalan 45.32 4.68 50.00 41.94 5.83 52.23 44.12 5.14 50.73 44.87 5.21 49.92 
Sampang 53.57 4.62 41.81 50.61 5.42 43.97 53.68 3.82 42.51 54.41 3.58 42.00 
Pamekasan 33.17 7.46 59.37 30.24 8.12 61.65 32.99 5.45 61.55 33.24 5.85 60.91 
Sumenep 41.24 14.03 44.73 35.84 20.72 43.44 37.01 23.76 39.24 38.43 21.15 40.42 
City of Kediri 0.79 77.54 21.67 0.30 80.75 18.95 0.26 80.91 18.83 0.26 80.37 19.37 
City of Blitar 5.76 17.45 76.79 4.31 19.27 76.42 4.49 19.14 76.37 4.35 19.86 75.79 
City of Malang 1.34 41.71 56.95 0.89 45.92 53.19 0.75 40.10 59.15 0.72 39.99 59.29 
City of Probolinggo 5.23 29.58 65.18 3.53 34.32 62.16 3.80 31.80 64.40 3.84 31.54 64.62 
City of Pasuruan 6.43 29.63 63.94 4.57 32.74 62.69 5.36 30.48 64.16 5.15 30.88 63.97 
City of Mojokerto 2.76 29.62 67.63 1.89 34.52 63.58 2.05 32.92 65.04 1.92 35.10 62.98 
City of Madiun 2.97 23.97 73.06 1.89 27.82 70.30 1.83 25.86 72.30 1.79 25.89 72.32 
City of Surabaya 1.25 44.76 53.99 0.26 49.50 50.23 0.29 45.48 54.23 0.26 43.96 55.77 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 16 Annual Growth of GRDP East Java 1993-2000 
District/City 
1993-1997 1997-1998 1998-2000 
A M S Total A M S Total A M S Total 
Pacitan 2.85 4.36 4.07 3.58 -0.05 -18.23 -10.40 -6.85 1.41 16.74 1.00 2.71 
Ponorogo 2.40 8.33 4.83 4.16 -0.82 -21.03 -10.37 -7.71 0.91 40.16 1.55 5.78 
Trenggalek 3.23 6.76 4.06 4.01 -4.37 -23.07 -7.73 -8.04 1.98 17.50 2.18 3.39 
Tulungagung 2.79 10.83 6.08 7.02 -5.58 -24.62 -12.67 -15.72 -0.37 11.81 1.95 4.74 
Blitar 4.07 7.33 4.01 4.31 -8.35 -21.09 -9.17 -9.88 2.91 38.81 0.97 5.30 
Kediri 1.68 6.42 5.30 4.16 -12.82 -17.87 -12.93 -13.81 2.02 14.38 1.70 4.18 
Malang 1.96 10.47 5.63 5.42 -5.99 -22.36 -9.59 -11.21 3.41 3.18 2.10 2.67 
Lumajang 1.85 7.67 5.10 4.19 -7.12 -38.07 -12.72 -14.56 2.30 6.26 0.57 1.92 
Jember 1.85 9.16 5.08 4.49 -6.56 -29.28 -9.39 -11.38 3.02 4.50 1.72 2.50 
Banyuwangi 1.73 8.06 5.68 4.84 -4.21 -33.34 -10.16 -12.83 1.32 4.67 1.19 1.75 
Bondowoso 2.52 10.24 5.20 4.46 -5.59 -29.63 -7.19 -8.54 2.10 -0.69 1.44 1.57 
Situbondo 1.02 9.61 5.21 4.12 0.22 -33.16 -11.29 -10.24 0.78 5.52 1.42 1.61 
Probolinggo 4.31 8.58 5.31 5.63 -3.85 -26.09 -13.69 -12.68 1.01 -1.28 1.52 0.72 
Pasuruan 2.75 11.15 6.86 8.04 1.30 -20.32 -11.46 -13.64 0.17 3.38 3.07 2.63 
Sidoarejo 1.67 9.92 7.96 8.75 -7.05 -23.37 -17.46 -20.46 -2.00 2.30 3.43 2.52 
Mojokerto 2.00 6.10 5.66 5.10 -4.15 -23.22 -11.99 -14.80 -1.25 6.50 2.50 3.13 
Jombang 1.73 10.60 6.17 5.36 -4.35 -30.22 -12.19 -12.81 1.46 1.89 2.12 1.87 
Nganjuk 2.63 9.98 5.20 4.87 -7.05 -33.21 -12.11 -13.26 1.39 0.06 1.83 1.49 
Madiun 2.61 8.63 5.51 4.47 -11.06 -32.88 -11.39 -12.99 -0.22 -1.13 1.94 0.84 
Magetan 0.90 9.02 4.67 3.36 -9.26 -37.10 -9.50 -11.78 4.36 0.47 0.66 2.23 
Ngawi 1.77 9.27 4.64 3.69 -5.08 -34.28 -10.22 -10.06 1.91 2.52 1.69 1.84 
Bojonegoro 1.55 9.30 4.66 3.40 -9.17 -25.68 -12.03 -11.73 1.43 0.91 1.43 1.39 
Tuban 1.54 6.69 6.56 5.56 -1.53 -41.58 -13.23 -23.38 -1.41 21.02 1.66 7.79 
Lamongan 1.77 8.85 4.95 3.64 -0.89 -35.68 -13.68 -9.33 2.12 10.26 1.55 2.32 
Gresik -0.06 9.33 7.25 7.67 -1.65 -23.19 -15.31 -18.88 0.33 6.90 1.95 4.67 
Bangkalan 1.69 9.56 4.82 3.68 -3.99 -19.53 -11.36 -8.75 1.63 1.48 -0.04 0.78 
Sampang 2.09 7.74 4.86 3.55 -2.51 -35.29 -11.12 -8.07 2.05 -1.75 0.76 1.36 
Pamekasan 1.94 6.54 5.31 4.33 -3.17 -40.38 -11.40 -11.26 1.35 4.64 0.45 0.98 
Sumenep 2.12 16.61 5.00 5.77 -1.28 9.59 -13.63 -4.39 1.47 -6.03 1.06 -0.43 
City of Kediri -12.77 12.23 7.43 11.10 -20.80 -9.57 -10.31 -9.74 0.81 0.11 1.87 0.44 
City of Blitar -1.09 9.01 6.22 6.35 -12.38 -16.49 -15.95 -15.90 0.49 3.94 1.65 2.04 
City of Malang -1.55 11.86 7.35 9.20 -33.83 -31.70 -13.03 -21.79 -0.95 0.82 1.07 0.96 
City of Probolinggo -3.05 11.03 5.73 6.99 -12.33 -24.55 -15.63 -18.57 1.24 0.24 0.83 0.66 
City of Pasuruan -1.36 10.13 6.90 7.42 3.55 -17.71 -9.56 -11.63 0.97 3.66 2.84 2.99 
City of Mojokerto -2.09 11.77 5.93 7.57 -5.44 -16.60 -10.52 -12.52 -0.47 6.08 1.10 2.73 
City of Madiun -2.93 12.82 7.66 8.70 -20.50 -23.96 -15.88 -18.22 0.59 1.89 1.85 1.84 
City of Surabaya -26.17 12.15 7.40 9.36 -12.53 -28.68 -16.21 -22.38 -4.39 -0.17 2.98 1.54 
Note : calculated based on data provided by BPS various year 
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Appendix 17 Growth Rate of Gross Regional Domestic Product at Constant 1993 
Prices by Provinces, 1996-1997 
Province 
Growth rate (%) Change 
1996-1997 1996 1997 
1. Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 2,47 -0,16 -2,63 
2. North Sumatra 9,01 5,70 -3,31 
3. West Sumatra 7,87 5,14 -2,73 
4. Riau 5,46 3,16 -2,30 
5. Jambi 8,81 3,91 -4,90 
6. South Sumatra 8,03 5,08 -2,95 
7. Bengkulu 5,72 3,07 -2,65 
8. Lampung 7,95 4,15 -3,80 
9. Jakarta 9,10 5,11 -3,99 
10. West Java 9,21 4,87 -4,34 
11. Central Java 7,30 3,03 -4,27 
12. Yogyakarta 7,74 3,51 -4,23 
13. East Java 8,26 5,02 -3,24 
14. Bali 8,16 5,81 -2,35 
15. West Kalimantan 10,75 7,53 -3,22 
16. Central Kalimantan 11,85 6,29 -5,56 
17. South Kalimantan 9,95 4,69 -5,26 
18. East Kalimantan 8,29 4,45 -3,84 
19. North Sulawesi 9,25 5,38 -3,87 
20. Central Sulawesi 8,33 4,71 -3,62 
21. South Sulawesi 8,31 4,30 -4,01 
22. Southeast Sulawesi 6,01 5,32 -0,69 
23. West Nusa Tenggara 8,11 5,26 -2,85 
24. East Nusa Tenggara 8,22 5,62 -2,60 
25. Maluku 7,14 3,51 -3,63 
26. Papua 13,87 7,42 -6,45 
Indonesia 7,82 4,7 -3,12 
Note: calculated based on data provided by BPS various years 
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Summary in Dutch 
De geschiedenis van de moderne Indonesische economie heeft 
aangetoond dat men in Indonesië de economische ontwikkeling 
beschouwt als een groeiproces dat specifieke maatregelen vereist. Als 
gevolg daarvan is de ontwikkelingsstrategie van Indonesië geweest om 
de productiefactoren uit de primaire sector naar de industriële sector te 
verschuiven. De primaire sector wordt gekenmerkt door lage 
productiviteit, traditionele technologie en dalende rendementen. De 
industriële sector daarentegen wordt vooral gekenmerkt door een hoge 
productiviteit, moderne technologie, toenemende opbrengsten en 
structurele transformatie die zowel de economische als de 
werkgelegenheidsstructuren verandert. Echter, uit de gegevens blijkt dat 
het ontwikkelingsproces in Indonesië alleen economische groei 
veroorzaakte, maar heeft nagelaten om de werkgelegenheidsgroei te 
versnellen, vooral in de industrie. Het resultaat is industrialisatie zonder 
het scheppen van extra werkgelegenheid. 
Als we een vergelijk maken tussen de tijd voor, tijdens en na de 
crisis, dan ontstaat een merkwaardige trend. Zo kwam economische groei 
niet overeen met het creëren van werkgelegenheid. In feite daalde de 
werkgelegenheid juist. In het tijdperk van de Nieuwe Orde bijvoorbeeld, 
genereerde 1 procent economische groei ongeveer 400.000 banen. 
Echter, tijdens de herstelperiode resulteerde 1 procent economische groei 
in minder dan 200.000 nieuwe banen. Dit betekent dat bij een netto 
instroom van ongeveer 2 miljoen mensen in de beroepsbevolking per 
jaar, de economie met meer dan 10 procent moest groeien, alleen maar 
om de nieuwe arbeidskrachten op te vangen, zonder dat de dan heersende 
werkloosheid wordt teruggedrongen. 
De discrepantie tussen de economische groei en het scheppen van 
werkgelegenheid veroorzaakt verschillende problemen. Ten eerste is er 
een groeiende kloof tussen de industrie en de landbouw. Dit vormde een 
ernstig probleem, aangezien deze kloof zal blijven bestaan bij gebrek aan 
steun van de overheid bij het stimuleren van het concurrentievermogen in 
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de agrarische sector. Ten tweede, het grootste aandeel in de 
beroepsbevolking is werkzaam in de dienstensector, die wordt 
gedomineerd door de informele sector. Dit heeft bijgedragen aan een 
hogere graad van onderbezetting. Ten derde, de werkloosheid zat, en zit 
in de lift, en zal mogelijk een groot probleem gaan vormen in de nabije 
toekomst. Gecombineerd, zullen deze problemen geduchte hindernissen 
voor elk armoedebestrijdingsprogramma vormen. 
Indonesië is zoals bekend door een aantal economische crises gegaan. 
Er zijn drie verschillende crises in verschillende perioden, namelijk in de 
jaren 1930, in de jaren 1960 en in de jaren 1990. De crises in de jaren '30 
en '90 hadden soortgelijke, externe veroorzakers, maar de gevolgen 
waren verschillend. De crisis in de jaren '30 raakte namelijk de agrarische 
sector het sterkst, terwijl in de jaren '90 de moderne sector de last droeg 
van de economische crisis. Er zijn ook overeenkomsten tussen de crises 
uit jaren '60 en '90. Beide crises werden gevolgd door sociale en politieke 
onrust waardoor het bewind van de oude regering ten einde kwam en 
plaats maakte voor nieuwe politieke coalities. Er is een debat over de 
volgorde van de politieke en economische crisis in de jaren '60: ging de 
politieke crisis vooraf aan de economische of was het juist andersom? 
Wat de crises uit de jaren '60 van die uit de jaren '30 en '90 onderscheidt, 
is dat de eerste werd veroorzaakt door interne factoren. 
Het effect van de economische crisis in de jaren '90 was zeer 
duidelijk. Ten eerste verschoven de hulpmiddelen van de moderne naar 
de traditionele sector, van de non-trade naar de sector handel, en van de 
import-afhankelijke naar de op de export gerichte sector. Veel bedrijven 
kregen te maken met kleinere winstmarges en dalend reëel inkomen, en 
in veel gevallen werden bedrijven en bedrijven gedwongen tot een 
faillissement. Aan de andere kant profiteerde de exportindustrie en de 
landbouw van de crisis. Interessant is dat op provinciaal niveau 
nauwelijks verandering in de patronen van zowel de economie als de 
werkgelegenheidsstructuren werd gevonden. 
Ten tweede veranderden door de crisis in de jaren ‘90 de patronen 
van het gezinsinkomen en de uitgaven. Degenen die hun banen in de 
industrie verloren, werden verplaatst naar lagere inkomensbanen of 
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vonden werk in de landbouw- of de dienstensector. Deze overgang trof 
de mensen in hun koopkracht en dwong hen tot het vinden van alternatie 
strategieën om het hoofdf boven water te houden. Ten derde daalden de 
overheidsuitgaven aan openbare diensten, zoals onderwijs en 
gezondheidszorg. Bijgevolg kregen mensen minder toegang tot 
verschillende diensten. De gegevens hebben aangetoond dat de crisis 
zorgde voor een toename van de armoede. Uit gegevens van Said en 
Winifred (2001) blijkt dat er een armoedestijging van tien procent was in 
de periode van 1996-1998, en steeg het aantal armen van 31 miljoen naar 
bijna 54 miljoen mensen. 
De prijsstijging van essentiële grondstoffen die nodig zijn om in de 
basisbehoeften van mensen te voorzien, is de belangrijkste factor achter 
de stijging van het aantal arme mensen. Tijdens deze periode bedroeg de 
inflatie bijna 150 procent. Verder daalden de reële lonen daalden van Rp. 
70.700 per week naar Rp. 68.000 per week. Deze twee factoren samen 
veroorzaakten de daling van de koopkracht. 
De impact van de Indonesische crisis in de jaren negentig op de 
werkloosheid was "niet zo ernstig". Alleen de werkloosheid steeg licht 
tot 5,5 procent in 1998 (het kwam van 4,7 procent in 1997) en wel op het 
moment dat de economische groei op het laagste niveau stond in de 
geschiedenis van het moderne Indonesië. Een belangrijke verklaring voor 
de relatief milde effecten op de wekgelegenheid ligt in aanpassing van de 
arbeidsmarkt. Tijdens de crisis was er in alle sectoren een dubbelcijferige 
krimp, bijvoorbeeld -39,8 procent in de bouw en -26,7 procent in de 
financiële sector. Het is belangrijk op te merken dat de werkgelegenheid 
in de landbouw nog steeds groeiende (0,2 procent) was. Dit geeft aan dat 
de "traditionele" sectoren veerkrachtiger bleken te zijn dan moderne. De 
informele sector toonde vergelijkbare elasticiteit. Het had de capaciteit 
om mensen die uit de industrie vertrokken op te vangen in diensten die 
deel uitmaken van de informele sector. Op basis van deze tendens, lijkt 
het een steekhoudend stelling dat de landbouw en informele sectoren de 
veiligheidskleppen zijn tijdens een economische crisis. Inderdaad hebben 
deze twee economische sectoren een belangrijke rol gespeeld als buffers 
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die de gevolgen van de economische schok hebben verminderd door het 
opvangen van arbeiders die die anders werkloos zouden zijn geworden. 
Zwakke structurele transformatie was een van de ontwikkelings-
gerelateerde problemen waarmee Indonesië werd geconfronteerd. De 
regionale verschillen in de ontwikkeling leek de situatie te verergeren. 
Op basis van theoretisch uitzichten bestaat de relatie tussen regionale 
verschillen en nationale ontwikkeling uit twee fasen (Szirmai, 2005). In 
de eerste fase, heeft de ontwikkeling de neiging om zich te concentreren 
op bepaalde gebieden en dat leidt tot toenemende regionale verschillen. 
Tijdens de tweede fase, als een land voldoende nationale economische 
groei realiseert, dalen de regionale verschillen aanzienlijk. Indonesië 
bleek echter niet deze twee fasen te volgen. Het land is namelijk blijven 
steken in de eerste fase, wat resulteerde in langdurige regionale 
verschillen, die nooit leken te verdwijnen. Het verschil is heel duidelijk te 
zien. Zo is Java, een klein en dichtbevolkt eiland uitgegroeid tot het 
centrum van de economische activiteiten, dat bijdragen levert tot bijna 50 
procent van het BBP van het land. 
 Aan de andere kant vinden we Papua, een groot eiland bezet door 
slechts 1 procent van de nationale bevolking, en daar wordt minder dan 1 
procent van het BBP gegenereerd. De groei van de productie in Java is 
sneller dan die in de buitenste eilanden, die betere prestaties in de 
ontwikkeling van de productie hebben. Dit is geen nieuw fenomeen 
omdat het historische economische precedenten kent, vooral tijdens de 
koloniale heerschappij in de 19e eeuw, die de regionale ontwikkeling en 
onderontwikkeling het best kunnen verklaren. 
Het verschil is niet beperkt tot Java versus niet-Java, noch tot 
specifiek inter-provinciale verschillen. Dat is merkbaar op het eiland 
Java. In discussies over provinciale ongelijkheid, wordt Jakarta vaak in 
het midden geplaatst. Als vestiging van de hoofdstad van Indonesië, heeft 
deze provincie een belangrijke rol gespeeld in het besturen van de 
economie van het land. Door centralisatie van de nationale economie in 
Jakarta, is de kloof tussen Jakarta en de andere provincies verbreed. 
Bijvoorbeeld, de GRDP per inwoner van Jakarta is drie keer die van de 
provincie Yogyakarta, hoewel beide provincies op het eiland Java liggen. 
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Het is belangrijk om in gedachten te houden dat de economische 
prestaties niet altijd overeenkomen met de sociale indicatoren. 
Yogyakarta is een goed voorbeeld. De sociale indicatoren voor deze 
kleine provincie laten een hoge prestatie in zowel onderwijs- als 
gezondheidszorg zien. Echter, de economische ontwikkeling bleef bij 
andere provincies in Java achter. In tegenstelling hiertoe heeft West-Java, 
die heeft geprofiteerd van de ontwikkeling in de verwerkende industrie 
als een spill-over effect van Jakarta, slechte sociale indicatoren. Zijn 
prestaties in het onderwijs, bijvoorbeeld, is een van de laagste in het land. 
De economische prestaties in Java voor de crisis bleken het 
Indonesische patroon te volgen. Ten eerste kenden alle provincies in Java 
een hoge economische groei, waarbij de industrie het hardst groeide. Ten 
tweede was er in termen van de economische structuur een verschuiving 
van landbouw naar industrie en diensten. Deze tendens werd echter niet 
gevolgd door een veranderend patroon in de werkgelegenheidsstructuur. 
De industrie kon niet voldoende banen bieden, zodat ze niet in staat 
waren om het arbeidsoverschot in de landbouw over te nemen. In 
aanvulling hierop kromp de werkgelegenheid. Dit bevestigt de eerdere 
conclusie dat in Java industrialisatie verliep zonder het scheppen van 
extra werkgelegenheid, ook wel mislukte industrialisatie genoemd. 
De conclusie dat we uit deze analyse kunnen trekken is dat de 
industrie niet een belangrijke rol speelde in het scheppen van banden 
maar de dienstensector. Dit geldt voor alle provincies. Zelfs op West-
Java, waar de productie het snelst groeide, was het aandeel van de 
dienstensector het hoogst. Omdat de dienstensector in Indonesië werd 
gedomineerd door de informele sector, kunnen we zeggen dat de 
informele sector een cruciale rol heeft gespeeld als een veiligheidsklep 
voor de economie: het voorzien van banen en de bijdrage aan de 
economie was vrij hoog. 
Het ontwikkelingspatroon binnen de districten voor de crisis bleek 
ook een interessant patroon te hebben. Grote steden op Java speelden 
twee contrasterende rollen tegelijkertijd, dat wil zeggen een generatieve 
en een parasitaire. Gebieden rond de grote steden toonden namelijk 
gemengde economische prestaties. Sommigen van hen kenden een sterke 
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economische groei, mogelijk veroorzaakt door een spill-over effect van 
de grote steden, zoals Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang en Soerabaja. Niet 
alle omliggende gebieden hebben echter op deze manier geprofiteerd. In 
feite leden sommige gebieden economische achteruitgang door de 
exploitatie van de hulpbronnen die de economische ontwikkeling in de 
grote steden mogelijk maakte. 
Toen de economische crisis het land raakte, werden alle gebieden 
zwaar getroffen. Op provinciaal niveau bleek er echter geen samenhang 
tussen betere economische prestaties vóór de crisis en de mogelijke 
positieve of negatieve effecten van de crisis. Oost-Java werd het hardst 
getroffen, terwijl West-Java, die betere pre-crisis prestaties kende, 
bespaard van de ergste gevolgen. Op districtsniveau waren de resultaten 
echter zeer interessant. Zij bevestigden de hypothese dat hoe beter de 
economische prestaties waren vóór de crisis, hoe harder de crisis toe 
sloeg. 
De bevindingen steunden ook de algemene conclusie dat de crisis 
meer invloed had op de moderne (stedelijke) sector dan de traditionele 
(landelijke) sector. De industriesector verloor het grootste deel van haar 
vermogen om de economische groei te ondersteunen. Industrie verloor 
ook zijn vermogen om de beroepsbevolking, die een negatief 
groeipercentage in deze periode toonde, over te nemen. Juist de 
dienstensectoren en landbouw toonden een hogere arbeidscapaciteit. Dit 
betekent opnieuw dat ook hier de landbouw en diensten een belangrijke 
rol hebben gespeeld als buffer tijdens de economische neergang. 
De resultaten onthulden een andere interessante bevinding. Toen de 
economie (vóór de crisis) snel groeide, namen de kansen op werk juist af. 
De arbeidsmarkt groeide echter met bijna twee procent tijdens de piek 
van de crisis. In twee provincies, namelijk Midden-en Oost-Java, was de 
groei zelfs meer dan 2 procent. 
Op districtsniveau liep de economische krimp in de dubbele cijfers in 
bijna alle districten. Alle grote steden, de hoofdstad van elke provincie, 
met inbegrip van Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta en Surabaya, hadden 
toen een lagere economische groei dan gemiddeld. Interessant is, dat 
twee districten in Midden-Java, Cilacap en Jepara, juist een positieve 
Summary in Dutch 
255 
economische groei tijdens het hoogtepunt van de crisis meemaakten. De 
hoge economische groei in deze twee districten wordt wel toegeschreven 
aan de veerkracht van de industrie-en dienstensectoren, die tijdens het 
hoogtepunt van de crisis hoge groeicijfers lieten zien. Zo steunde de 
industrie in Cilacap vooral op de olie-industrie, terwijl in Jepara de 
ambachtelijke industrie belangrijk was. 
In het algemeen gesteld, vertegenwoordigde op provinciaal en 
districtsniveau, de periode van 1998-2000 de eerste fase van herstel. 
Economische groei kwam in een stroomversnelling en de meeste 
districten profiteerden van de economische groei, variërend van 1 tot 6 
procent per jaar. Er was echter geen significante correlatie tussen 
economische groei gedurende de twee jaar na de piek van de crisis en de 
economische groei voor de crisis. Dit kan zijn omdat deze periode nog 
steeds behoort tot de eerste fase van herstel. Hopelijk zal een correlatie 
ontstaan wanneer we de tweede fase van herstel in de volgende periode 
analyseren namelijk 2000-2007. Slechts drie districten kenden een 
negatieve economische groei, namelijk Indramayu in West-Java, 
Kulonprogo in Yogyakarta, en Sumenep in Oost-Javan. Tot de factoren 
achter de negatieve economische groei in deze drie districten, is het falen 
van de industrie om de economische groei te stimuleren. In deze drie 
districten kromp ook het aandeel van de industrie. 
De vraag is vervolgens, hoe de economische omstandigheden op 
districtsniveau huishoudelijke omstandigheden kunnen verklaren in de 
eerste fase van herstel. Gebaseerd op de analyse van huishoudelijke 
economische omstandigheden, zijn er aanwijzingen dat de uitgaven per 
hoofd van de bevolking (PCE) in de periode van 1997-2000 steeds groter 
werden. Nadere analyse laat zien dat de economische huishoudelijke 
omstandigheden werden beïnvloed door verschillende huishoudelijke 
indicatoren, namelijk het onderwijs van de leden van het huishouden en 
het aandeel van de leden van het huishouden dat werkzaam was. 
Huishoudens die beter opgeleide leden en meer werkende leden hadden, 
kenden meer voorspoed. Verder bleken huishoudens in stedelijke 
gebieden onder gunstiger omstandigheden te verkeren in vergelijking met 
de huishoudens in plattelandsgebieden. Binnen de verklarende factoren 
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bleek onderwijs de variabele die het best het verschil in de 
huishouduitgaven kon verklaren. 
Interessant is verder dat de resultaten uit multilevel analyse erop 
wijzen dat het onderwijs effectiever is wanneer de economische 
omstandigheden binnen een district goed zijn. Deze bevinding versterkt 
het argument dat de economische groei nog steeds belangrijk als een 
stimulerende factor om economisch te overleven. 
We kunnen uit deze bevindingen de conclusie trekken dat het 
noodzakelijk is voor de overheid om de economische groei in districten / 
steden te (blijven) stimuleren door het aanbieden van beter onderwijs 
voor de mensen. Dit is de beste oplossing voor het helpen van mensen 
om uit een crisis te geraken en ook om zo indirect 
armoedebestrijdingsprogramma's te ondersteunen. 
Tijdens de tweede fase van herstel, 2000-2007, was de economische 
groei op districtsniveau beter. Geen enkel district toonde namelijk 
negatieve economische groei. Gemiddeld genomen was de economische 
groei in de tweede fase van herstel hoger dan in de eerste fase van 
herstel. Dit is een goede indicatie van betere voorwaarden voor gezinnen, 
omdat de economische situatie in een district belangrijk is bij het 
vormgeven van huishoudelijke economische omstandigheden, hoewel de 
problemen blijven bestaan. Zo zijn de regionale verschillen die voor de 
crisis bestonden nog steeds aanwezig. Dit betekent huiswerk voor de 
overheid als het gaat om de toekomstige ontwikkelingen. 
Uit de analyse van de regionale autonomie en de lokale economische 
groei komen drie verschillende, interessante resultaten. Ten eerste is het 
zo dat wanneer beide districten en steden samen worden getoetst, General 
Purpose Grant (GPG) en Human Development Index (HDI) goede 
voorspellers blijken te zijn van de lokale economische groei, maar GPG 
blijkt onbelangrijk te zijn als het Special Purpose Grant (SPG) ook wordt 
opgenomen in de analyses. Dus, na controle zijn SPG en HDI goede 
voorspellers voor de lokale economische groei. Ten tweede blijkt dat als 
alleen districten worden geanalyseerd, General Purpose Grant (GPG) de 
beste voorspeller voor de lokale economische groei is, zelfs wanneer HDI 
wordt toegevoegd. Maar GPG blijkt onbelangrijk te zijn als SPG wordt 
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toegevoegd en de laatste is dan de enige belangrijke variabele om de 
lokale economische groei te voorspellen. Dit betekent ook dat de 
verklaarde variantie van de economische groei door SPG hoger is dan 
door andere variabelen in de analyse. Ten derde, het is heel duidelijk dat 
alleen GPG een goede voorspeller is voor de lokale economische groei 
indien alleen steden zijn opgenomen. 
De implicaties van deze uitkomsten zijn tweeledig. Ten eerste houdt 
de lokale economische groei duidelijk verband met fiscale decentralisatie 
als een gevolg van de regionale autonomie. De lokale economische groei 
is ook mede het resultaat van HDI. Maar men moet bedenken dat dit 
effect anders is in districten dan in steden. Dit impliceert een ander beleid 
voor districten en steden wat betreft subsidie toewijzingen. Ten tweede is 
in alle gevallen GPG positief verbonden met de lokale economische 
groei, maar SPG is tegelijkertijd negatief verbonden met de lokale 
economische groei. Dit wijst op een trade-off tussen beide instrumenten. 
Echter, op stadsniveau kunnen we concluderen dat er geen duidelijk 
verband tussen de regionale autonomie en de lokale economische groei. 
De economische crisis in 1997-1998 veroorzaakte veel problemen, 
maar biedt ook nieuwe mogelijkheden voor toekomstige ontwikkelingen. 
Het werpt ook licht op systematische institutionele beleidskwesties die 
nodig de zijn op weg naar een meer rechtvaardig Indonesië. De politieke 
overgang van gecentraliseerde regelgeving naar een decentrale overheid, 
als een politiek gevolg van de economische crisis, brengt hoop voor het 
nieuwe tijdperk van economische ontwikkeling in dit land. Echter, de 
huidige situatie met betrekking tot de wereldwijde financiële crisis van 
2008 belemmert vooralsnog de ontwikkelingsinspanningen. 
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